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This thesis is concerned with a study of the concept of politics 
in Marxist theory, and more particularly with Antonio Gramsci's 
contribution towards a revaluation of historical materialism. 
In Chapter 1 I will introduce two major 'Western' conceptions of 
the state and politics, 
conceptions of politics 
provide an outline of 
to be termed the unitarian and pluralist 
respectively. In section 1.1 I will 
the main characteristics of the Ancient 
Greek polis or city-state to serve as the basis for section 1.2 
in which I will provide a comparative overview of the concepts of 
the state and politics in Aristotle and Plato. My discussion in 
section 1.2 of Plato's political unitarianism will serve as a 
starting point for my analysis of Marx's unitary concepts of the 
state and politics in section 1.4 and Chapter 2. Section 1.4 
will, in addition, address the question of the influence on Marx 
of Hegel's and Feuerbach's political thought. In section 1.3 I 
will describe the thought of Bernard Crick who takes Aristotle's 
early political pluralism as the starting point for his liberal 
pluralist understanding of the state and politics. This will in 
turn serve as the contrasting background for my analysis of 
Marx's unitary concepts of the state and politics as well as 
providing a link to Gramsci's 'Marxist pluralism'. 
As background to the discussion of Gramsci's theory of politics 
in Chapters 3 and 4 I will provide an analysis of Marx's concepts 
of the state and politics in Chapter 2, which will be divided 
into three sections. In section 2.1 I will give an account of 
some of Marx's major early works highlighting their significance 
for Marx's transition to his materialist conception of history, 
which will be the subject of section 2.2.1. Against the back-
ground of my discussion in section 2.2.1 of some of the most im-
portant concepts of historical materialism I will, in section 
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2.2.2, outline the problem of economism in the orthodox Marxism 
of the Second and Third Internationals. 
My analysis of Gramsci's theory of politics will commence in 
Chapter 3 which will focus on Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony'. In 
section 3.1 I will describe the first meaning of hegemony in 
Gramsci which I will then relate to his concepts of the 
'pofitical party', the 'intellectuals' and 'ideology' (3.1.1). In 
section 3.2 I will describe the second meaning of hegemony in 
Gramsci with particular reference to his concepts of passive 
revolution' (3.2.1), the 'integral state' (3.2.2), the 'war of 
position' and war of manoeuvre' (3.2.3), and 'civil society' 
(3.2.4). 
Chapter 4 will focus on the question of Gramsci's critical 
recasting of historical materialism against the background of his 
critique of economism. Section 4.1. will be divided into five 
parts. Section 4.1.1 is devoted to an analysis of Gramsci's con-
cept of philosophy. Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 will deal with the 
distinction Gramsci drew between 'conjucntural' and organic 
elements which operate in the history of a society. In section 
4.1.4 I will analyse Gramsci's concept of the 'historical bloc' 
and in section 4.1.5 I will ·provide an overview of three impor-
tant interpretations of the latter concept. Section 4.2, which 
deals with Gramsci's dualistic concept of politics, will be 
divided into two parts. In section 4.2.1 the influence on Gramsci 
of Machiavelli's political thought will be outlined with a view 
to section 4.2.2 in which Gramsci's 'pluralist' concept of 
politics will be analysed. 
In my concluding chapter I will outline the importance of 
Gramsci's pluralist concept of politics for the concept of 
democracy in the tradition of Marxist political theory. 
4 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concerned with a study of the concept of politics 
in Marxist theory, and more particularly with the contributions 
of Antonio Gramsci to remedy the relative neglect and defects of 
a properly theorised concept of politics in the Marxist 
tr~dition. 
I 
For the greater part of the Twentieth Century the dominant themes 
in political theory have been framed by the mutually antagonistic 
liberal and Marxist paradigms. The 'bipolarity' of global politi-
cal activity and conflict has, in one way or another, informed 
and structured this polarised relationship. From the construction 
of the liberal welfare state in the aftermath of the October 
Revolution and Great Depression, to the post-war formation of op-
posing politico-ideological 'blocs' -- punctuated by the histori-
cally complex and energic rise and collapse of fascism the 
very terms of the theoretical understanding of politics itself 
was determined by opposing paradigms. 
Soviet domination of Marxist political theory, especially until 
the the late 1950s, stemmed from the uniquely prominent status 
which the success of the Russian Revolution accorded Marxism-
Leninism and,. subsequently, Stalinism. The prominence of 
Stalinism had important implications for the development of Mar-
xist political theory, especially during the Inter-War period. On 
a general level it contributed towards the ideological dogmatism 
of orthodox Marxism and the suppression of important work in the 
field of Marxist political theory. For our purposes it should be 
noted that attempts to suppress Gramsci's political ideas was not 
limited to the actions of the Italian fascist state but also oc-
cured within factions of the Italian Communist Party after the 
Second World War. 
It would nonetheless be quite erroneous to suggest that the rela-
tive neglect of .political theory in the Marxist tradition can 
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wholly be equated with the history of authoritarian constraints 
in the political and intellectual spheres of Soviet influence. 
For the source of much of the difficulty and controversy sur-
rounding Marxist political theory is also related to the unsys-
tematic and implicit nature of Marx's political writing. Herein 
lies Gramsci's great contribution to Marxism and the central 
theme of this study: the formulati~n of a Marxist theory of 
political action which ~ntil comparatively recently remained 
unrecognised, even within the world of Marxism. 
Gramsci, like Marx and Len~n before him, argued that social 
classes have their origins in the material relations of produc-
tion and that class struggle has. a determining role in the 
process of social change. For Marx, Engels and Lenin the state 
was a classbound institution, and the struggle for state power 
between antagonistic classes constituted the substance of 
politics. Consequently if, as Engels argued, the state would 
wither away following a communist revolution, politics too would 
disapear. Gramsci radically altered this restricted notion of 
politics in at least two important respects. Firstly, he argued 
that the struggle for state power was only one aspect of the 
workers' struggle against the capitalist state. The other was the 
struggle for hegemony, i.e. the struggle to replace the 
bourgeoisie's intellectual and moral dominance in all aspects of 
state and civil life. Gramsci therefore broadened the classical 
Marxist concept of politics to include also the struggle between 
conflicting concepts of social, ideological and political 
reality. Secondly, in a move directly related to his notion of 
hegemony and his redefined concept of civil society, Gramsci 
rejected the narrow classbound concept of the state found for ex-
ample in Lenin. Instead, Gramsci argued that the supremacy of a 
social group involves integrating its own interests and aspira-
tions with those of a broad spectrum of social forces, not all of 
whom have a class identity. Gramsci referred to such non-class 
groups as popular-democratic movements, and consistently argued 
that the supremacy of a particular social group could not be sus-
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tained without such a broad based alliance. Furthermore, Gramsci 
argued that such alliances could only be constructed and main-
tained on the basis of consent which would have to be continually 
renewed and renegotiated even after a transition to a socialist 
order. Politics, for Gramsci, was thus not conceived merely as a 
strategy for a socialist revolution; it was the basis and neces-
sary condition of socialism itself. Politics permeated every 
dimension of life and every aspect of human existence. It was, in 
short, the 'means by which the single consciousness is brought 
into contact with the social and natural world in all its forms' 
(Hoare and Nowell Smith,1986: xxiii). Thus although Gramsci gave 
due weight to role which material conditions have in determining 
social, political and intellectual life, he conceived politics as 
the positive expression of developing individual energies, the 
human faculty for creative and critical thought, and the human· 
capacity for collective action towards changing given socio-
economic conditions: 
'Is it better to "think", without having a critical 
awareness, in a disjointed and episodic way? In other words, 
is it better to take part in a conception of the world 
mechanically imposed by the external environment, i.e. by 
one of the many social groups in which everyone is automati-
cally involved from the moment of his entry into the con-
scious world? ... Or, on the other hand, is it better to work 
out consciously and critically one's own conception of the 
world and thus, in connection with the labours of one's own 
brain, choose one's sphere of activity, take an active part 
in the creation of the history of the world, be one's own 
guide, refusing to accept passively and supinely from out-
side the moulding of one's personality?' (Gramsci,1986: 323-
324). 
Passages such as these reflect the importance Gramsci attached to 
critical thought and strength of will, qualities which Gramsci 
not only brought .to his philosphy and practice of Marxism, but 
which characterised his often difficult personal life. 
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Antonio Gramsci was born in Ales on the island of Sardinia on 22 
January 1891. Sardinia had a long history of imperial occupation. 
The peasant culture of the island benifited very little from suc-
cessive occupations which left behind an exhausted natural en-
vironment and. an impoverished populace. As Davidson tells us, the 
pattern of 
'exploitation was set by the Carthagians and Romans who es-. 
tablished huge grain farms on the plains of the west and 
south and worked them on an exploitation basis with in-
digenous and imported slave-labour. Both the land and the 
slaves were drained of life in a savage and senseless 
exploitation' (Davidson,1977: 2). 
By the time the island was united with Italy in 1861 Sardinia's 
traditional role as a subordinate province was well established. 
The socio-economic and political consequences of this were 
greatly to influence Gramsci's intellectual development. 
Gramsci had a lonely childhood. At the age of four his spine was 
damaged in a fall. As a consequence of that fall his growth 
slowed and he began to develop a hunch-back (Hoare and Nowell 
Smith,1986: xviii-xix). After his father's arrest and imprison-
ment in 1898, Gramsci's family lost the privileges it had derived 
from its petty-bourgeois status and the young Gramsci was con-
fronted with the resentment and ignorance of the local peasantry: 
'He met extreme cruelty and persecution born both of the so-
cial culture itself and realities such as class and the con-
comitant class hatreds, and of the natural cruelty of 
children towards the abnormal. As a result he had become by 
1900 a desperately lonely child, whose withdrawal from the 
normal life of his peers resulted in a sensitivity and 
capacity for fantasy which made him very socially aware of 
cruelty and injustice' (Davidson,1977: 27). 
It is perhaps not surprising that, isolated from his 
taunted by the weak minded Gramsci, a gifted child, 
peers and 
filled his 
days w{th passionate reading and deep introspection. He never 
resigned himself to a bad fate, always dominating 'his own unhap-
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piness with an iron w~ll for study' (Saporito in Davidson,1977: 
34) and he began a long personal° struggle which would lead him to 
considerable achievement, and tragedy. 
Gramsci's political awakening began by way of life as a student 
at Turin University which he attended on a scholarship he won 
from Sardinia (Hoare and Nowell Smith,1986: xx). It was here that 
Gramsci gained the interest, so evident in his prison notes, in 
the thought of Machiavelli, Hegel and Croce, as well an Antonio 
Labriola who was 'the only Italian theoretical Marxist of any 
consequence before the first world war (Hoare and Nowell 
Smith, 1986: xxi). Gramsc i only reluctantly gave up· time f ram his 
studies, and although he became a member of the Italian Socialist 
Party (PSI) in 1913, his involvement in active politics remained 
for some time quite limited and tentative (Davidson,1977: 63). 
Gramsci's first substantive political initiative was a blunder: 
coming out in support of an unpopular policy decision, involving 
Italy's entry into World War I, by the then newly appointed 
secretary of the PSI Benito Mussolini (Hoare and Nowell 
Smith,1986: xxx). After the 'incident' Gramsci was ostracized 'by 
the bulk of the Turinese working-class leaders, to whom he 
referred bitterly and contemptuously as "peasants"' 
(Davidson,1977: 69). Under great personal pressure and stung by 
his tentative foray into the unstructured, and unsubtle life of 
politics, Gramsci withdrew into his studies. It was during this 
period that he devoted much attention to Marx's classical texts. 
Gramsci soon gained recognition amongst fellow students as an op-
ponent of the nationalistic excesses sweeping through Europe. 
Furthermore, he gradually won back his position in the PSI, and 
his intellectual talent gained practical expression: 
'When a worker said things that were wrong... Gramsci knew 
how to reprove him both dryly and severely if it was needed; 
but always in a fashion which convinced him that he had made 
a mistake, without offending him, much less humuliating him' 
(Parodi in Davidson,1977: 73). 
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·:: ... 
Gramsci's experience of the intellectual needs of the workers • 
provided him with a cultural perspective which influenced the 
development of his ~ighly original mature conceptions of the 
intellectuals, ideology, and politics. In 1916 he wrote: 
'The first step in emancipating oneself from political and 
social slavery is that of freeing the mind ... The problem of 
education is the most important class problem' (Gramsci in 
Davidson,1977: 77). 
The period of praxis had arrived. 
In view of the 'orthodox' Marxist tendency to emphasise Gramsci's 
indebtedness to Lenin, it is worth recalling that Gramsci knew 
nothing of Lenin until 1917 (Davidson,1977: 81, 162-167; Hoare 
and Nowell Smith,1986: xxx, xxxi; McLellan,1986: 178). This 
would, of course, change after news of the Russian Revolution 
began to reach Southern Europe. And Gramsci read what little be-
came available of Lenin's writing in Italy following the 
revolution. Nonetheless, it was the Italian milieu which con-
stituted the formative influence on Gramsci's unique world view 
(Hoare and Nowell Smith,1986: lviii-lx). And even in his early 
writing Gramsci eschewed any form of dogmatism, exclaiming in 
1918 that Marx was 
'not a Messiah who left a string of parables laden with 
categorical imperatives and absolutely incontrovertible 
norms outside the categories of time and space' (Gramsci in 
Davidson,1977: 90; see Gramsci,1988: 34-37). 
During the years 1919-1920 Gramsci's increasing activity within 
the Turin workers' movement and his collaboration with Angelo 
Tasca and Palmira Togliatti, amongst others, inspired his now 
famous Ordine Nuoyo articles and contributed heavily towards his 
involvement in the formation of the factory council movement 
(Davidson,1977: 122-127; Hoare,1978: xvi, Hoare and Nowell 
Smith,1986: xxxvii). Gramsci conceived the factory councils, 
which were organised around the principle of direct participatory 
workers' democracy, as 
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'the institutions whereby the dictatorship of the 
proletariat would be exercised, institutions which stood 
towards the "voluntary", "private" associations such as the 
party and the trade union in a relation of "State" to 
"government", (Hoare and Nowell Smith, 1986: xxxix).. 
However, they soon conflicted with the perceived interests of the 
traditional working-class organisations and especially with the 
leaders and bureaucrats of the more broadly based, and generally 
more 'conservative' socialist trade union federation (C.G.L.). 
The union leaders and functionaries were essentially reformists 
who feared for their positions of power and who had long enjoyed 
the backing of important leaders within the PSI. Union hostility 
and the lack of PSI support together with the council movement's 
failure to recognise the importance of a revolutionary party to 
guide the movement resulted in the movement's defeat in a series 
of confrontations with the employers' federation in 1920. Amadeo 
Bordiga, the first leader of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), 
characterised the ideas of the Ordine Nuoyo as a form of 
'reformism' or 'syndicalism' defined 
'by the erroneous view that the proletariat can emancipate 
itself by winning ground in economic relations, while 
capitalism still holds political power through its control 
of the state' (Bord iga in Hoare and No we 11 Smith, 1986 :· 
xxxix). 
Faced with the crushing defeat of the council movement, Gramsci 
condemned the PSI and the unions for their prevarication and par-' 
tial complicity. Nevertheless, Gramsci recognised his own under-
estimation of the need for a cohesive, highly organised revolu-
tionary party to spearhead the socialist movement (Hoare,1978: 
xvii). By 1924 this realisation had reached a very sophisti~ated 
level of analysis in Gramsci's writing (Gramsci,1978: 191-203). 
Gramsci's intellectual sophistication and mushrooming practical 
wisdom aside, Bordiga managed to exploit the drawbacks of the Q.z.:=. 
dine Nuoyo group by emphasising his grasp of a revolutionary 
party's vital role (Hoare and Nowell Smith,1986: xxix, xxxiv). 
And the consolidation of the national faction of communists 
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within the PSI led to the formation of the Italian Commuist Party 
in January 1921 under Bordiga's leadership (Hoare,1978: x-xii; 
Hoare and Nowell Smith,1986: xxxiii-xxxiv). Prior to the forma-
tion of the PCI Gramsci had begun to devote considerable energies 
to analysing the structural conditions which had led to the PSI's 
impotence_. An early insight involved equating the rot within the 
PSI with the petty-bourgeois mentality which permeated Italian 
society: 
'After having corrupted and ruined the institution of 
parliament, the petty-bourgeoisie corrupts and ruins the 
other institutions as well, the fundamental pillars of the 
state: the army, the police and the magistracy' (Gramsci in 
Davidson,1977: 161). 
This view constituted the basis for Gramsci's incisive analysis 
of fascism. The failure of the PCI to derive benefit from this 
analysis was perhaps largely due to Bordiga who displayed a 
'sublime lack of interest in the question at all' (Hoare,1978: 
xxi). Nonetheless, Gramsci was now, however tentatively and 
unconsciously, moving onto the terrain of his radical revaluation 
of orthodox Marxism with the first suggestion of his more mature 
notion of class hegemony emerging in his thought. 
In May 1922 Gramsci went tp Moscow as the PCI representative to 
the Comintern. He returned, after a brief stay in Vienna, in Hay 
1924 at which time he was elected to the leadrship of the PCI 
(Hoare,1978: xiv). However, Mussolini's total dictatorship had 
begun and Gramsci's political life ended with his arrest in 1926. 
In prison, struggling to adjust to the difficult conditions, 
Gramsci began to write his now famous notebooks. Davidson writes 
of Gramsci's prison years: 
'When first in prison Gramsci felt the deprivation of his 
liberty so strongly that he even wondered whether he sho~ld 
sink into oblivion -- "like a stone into the sea" -- and cut 
off all contact with the outside world... this took an ever 
heavier toll on his body, initiating a process of 
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disintegration ... His teeth fell out, he suffered from ter-
rible skin complaints as the result of a blood complaint, 
and the result was frequent pain and ensuing lethargy... In 
1930 a contributory factor was the hostility and misun-
derstanding of many of his political comrades in prison with 
him' (Davidson,1977: 242, 243, 248). 
By 1931 Gramsci's health began to decline rapidly. Nonetheless 
between 1934 and 1935 he produced some of his most important 
work. Gramsci died in 1937. 
There are a number of problems associated with reading Gramsci. 
Firstly, most of Gramsci's writing is fragmentary as well as 
open-ended. An important reason for the somewhat tentative nature 
of Gramsci's pre-prison writing was his deep involvement in the 
political life of Italy. This was particularly true of Gramsci's 
years of activity in the Turin worker's movement. However, more 
importantly Gramsci's prison writings, which have been collected 
(and re-organised) in English translation under the title 
Selected Prison Notebooks (Gramsci,1986), to which I will refer 
as the SE.N., were never revised or systematised by Gramsci. It is 
therefore difficult to develop a balanced view of his highly com-
plex ideas. This is especially true if one is obliged to read 
Gramsci in English since to date no definitive edition of his 
complete set of writings has been published in English 
translation. This has contributed towards the often superficial 
analyses of his thought especially, but by no means only, in the 
Anglo-Saxon world (e.g. McLennan,1987). 
A further difficulty with studying Gramsci is the innovative man-
ner in which he used key concepts. On the one hand, Gramsci 
utilised many concepts which are familiar to students of Hegel 
and Marx whilst imparting them with a new meaning, often without 
clearly indicating this altered usage. On the other hand, Gramsci 
sometimes used the same concept in different ways, a problem 
which in most cases can only be resolved by close examination of 
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his texts. In the case of Gramsci's prison notes this latter 
problem is further complicated by his frequent use of a code to 
evade· the prison censors. This has led some commentators to im-
part incorrect or inaccurate meanings to some of Gramsci's most 
crucial concepts (Bobbio,1988). McLellan makes one such error 
when he claims that 'Gramsci used civil society to refer to the 
superstructure· (McLellan,1986: 188). As defined by Gramsci, 
civil society was ·one element in his complex and dialectical con-
ception of the superstructural sphere. 
Yet another difficult aspect of Gramsci's writing is its specific 
historical context. Gramsci frequently utilised historical and 
cultural references which are quite specific to Italy and are 
therefore not always easily accessible to students of Marx. This 
is especially true of Gramsci's theory of politics which to a 
large extent was based on novel historical phenomena such as the 
Italian struggle for unity during the 19th Century. 
There are at least three major historical dimensions which must 
be taken into consideration for a proper reading of Gramsci's 
more mature political writing. The first of these involves the 
impact which the initial success of the October Revolution and 
the subsequent problems arising from the building of real exist-
ing socialism had on the development of Gramsci's theory of 
politics. Gramsci analysed the Russian Revolution from an his-
torical point of view (e.g. Gramsci,1986: 229-238). According to 
that view the cataclysmic revolutionary break in Russia was as 
much a product of particular historically determined conditions 
as it was of the political intervention of the Bolsheviks. 
Gramsci argued that the success of the Russian Revolution, and 
analogously .the validity of Lenin's theory of political initia-
tive or intervention, could therefore not be viewed in the 
abstract as a model or blue-print for reproduction by socialist 
movements elsewhere (e.g. Gramsci,1986: 238). The reason for the 
' 
success of the Bolshevik revolution and Lenin's strategy was that 
Czarist Russia lacked the sophisticated and complex economic, 
14 
social, and political 
societies in the West, 
political intervention 
that, on the contrary, 
infrastructure of advanced bourgeois 
and was therefore less able to resist 
by revolutionary forces. Gramsci argued 
capitalist relations of domination in ad-
vanced Western societies enabled their bourgeoisies to make con-
siderable material concessions to a broad spectrum of social 
groups in response to capitalism's long-term socio-economic 
crisis. This capacity for concrete reform aimed at the construc-
tion or reconstitution of the bourgeois's consensual political 
base posed serious difficulties for the working-class movement. 
Gramsci described this 'type' of state intervention aimed at the 
reform or re-organisation of capitalism as passive revolution' 
(Gramsci,1986: 106-114). Gramsci argued, however, that the 
process of capitalism's re-organisation throws up a series of 
problems and contradictions which can, in the long term, only be 
resolved by the complete economic, social and political transfor-
mation of society. Thus whilst Gramsci argued that the bour-
geoisie had, historically, proven itself capable of resisting the 
complete revolutionary transformation of society (a phenomenon to 
which Gramsci devoted a great deal of investigation), he nonethe-
less held the view that capitalism's long-term crisis created the 
basis for incremental revolutionary intervention. Gramsci 
emphasised, however, that a complete transformation of capitalist 
society is not inevitable since the structural contradictions 
which emerge during the re-organisation of capitalism may effec-
tively be contained, if not resolved, within new relations of 
domination., Gramsci's rejection of the notion of capitalism's in-
evitable downfall and his related critique of economism are the 
basis for his view that capitalist relations of domination can 
only be brought to an end by the political intervention or in-
itiative of the subordinate working-class movement. However 
Gramsci's notion of political activity was not, as in Lenin, 
limited to the sphere of the political state but included the 
creation of a class's moral and intellectual (i.e. cultural) 
predominance or :hegemony' (see below and Chapter 3) in the 
sphere of civil society which Gramsci included in his concept of 
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the 'integral state'. 
The second major historical development which directly influenced 
Gramsci's theory of politics, which we have already touched on 
above, involved the social upheaval which followed Italy's defeat 
during the First World War and the political struggle which sub-
sequently erupted between the Italian parties of the Left and the 
Right. The victory of the Italian Fascist Party in 1922 deepened 
the crisis of the demoralised and disorganised Left and led to 
Gramsci's arrest in 1926. And it was during Gramsci's internment, 
which ended with his release from prison shortly before his death 
in 1937, that he devoted a great deal of attention to the reasons 
for the failure of the Left, not on 1 y but especially in Italy,- to 
develop adequate strategies to deal with the threat of fascism. 
It is important that Gramsci did not regard fascism as merely 
reactionary or backward. Gramsci argued that the rise of fascism 
must in part be ascribed to the advanced way in which it 
addressed the problems thrown up by the long-term 'organic' 
crisis of the liberal state. For Gramsci an important element in 
the defeat of the Left was its failure to recognise the relative 
sophistication of the fascist strategy and its success in 
decapitating its political opposition and incorporate much of the 
latter's mass-base into its own movement (Gramsci,1886: 118-120, 
156, 203, 210-211, etc.). 
A third historical dimension to Gramsci's theory of politics, and 
one which informs his analyses of the Russian Revolution and 
fascism, were the implications for the working-class movement of 
the economic and political re-organisation of advanced Western 
societies in the face of the severe socio-economic crisis result-
ing from the Great Depression. Gramsci did not initiate the 
debate in the European communist movement regarding the par-
ticular problems of contsructing socialism in the West. Yet he 
was the first Marxist to develop a comprehensive theory of 
revolution specific to the conditions of advanced Western 
societies in which the relationship of the state and society dif-
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fered in very important respects to that of Lenin's Russia. This 
distinction is emphasised, however implicitly at times, 
throughout Gramsci's mature political writing (Gramsci,1986: 229-
239, 242-243, etc.). 
As important as it is to take these historical dimensions irito 
account when analysing Gramsc i · s po 1 it ical th'ought, there is a 
danger of their Q.Y.e..I:-emphasis (Bellamy,1992). A more serious er-
ror has been the tendency by some commentators to trivialise 
Gramsci's contribution to the general theory of Marxism. This is, 
for example, the thrust of McLennan's treatment of Gramsci in his 
otherwise valuable book Marxism, Pluralism and Beyond: 
'There is arguably less general theory in Gramsci than in 
any other major marxist theorist: his principal concern is 
to assess and reorder the political and ideological con-
figuration of socio-cultural values" (McLennan,1987: 117). 
As against this view I will argue that although Gramsci's thought 
is not easily accessible, making the problem of balance in one's 
approach to him all the more important, he was indeed, in Hoare's 
words, 
'the greatest Marxist Western Europe has produced in this 
century, and the one from whom there is most to be learned' 
(Hoare,1978: xxiv). 
And as Mercer argues, Gramsci's significance as a Marxist 
theoretician lay in his awareness of the need for, and his con-
tribution towards, a theoretical reconstruction within Marxism 
(Mercer,1980: 103-105). More particularly, Gramsci's rejection of 
'orthodox· Marxism's economic determinism and political reduc~ 
tionism was central to his political theory. This concern to free 
Marxism from orthodox dogma underlay most of Gramsci's writing, 
and most especially his prison notebooks. Moreover, as most 
notable Gramscian scholars and commentators have observed, 
Gramsci's revaluation of historical materialism to a great extent 
revolves on his concept of 'hegemony' (e.g. Sassoon,1987; Buci-
Glucksmann,1982; Houffe,1979; Morera,1990; Bobbio,1988; de 
Giovanni,1979; Simon,1987; Femia,1987; etc.). Furthermore, 
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Gramsci's focus on 'consensual politics' with his concept of 
hegemony has served as a basis for interesting recent work 
towards re-establishing democracy as the central issue in Marxist 
discourse, as well as of socialist thought more generally 
(Mercer,1980; Sassoon,1980; Hall,1980; Laclau and Mouffe,1989). 
My analysis of Gramsci's politics will proceed against its back-
ground in Marx's materialist conception of history, or historical 
materialism. In Chapter 1 I will introduce two major 'Western· 
conceptions of the state and politics, to be termed the unitarian 
and pluralist conceptions of politics respectively, by way of a 
brief analysis of their origins in the political thought of An-
cient Greece. Thus in section 1.1 the Ancient Greek concept of 
the polis or city-state will be introduced to serve as the basis 
for a comparative overview, in section 1.2, of the concepts of 
the state and politics in Plato and Aristotle. I will argue that 
Plato envisaged an ideal state characterised by an extensive 
degree of social and political unity; an early form of 
communism' (Plato,1987). The discussion of Plato will serve as a 
starting point for analysing Marx's unitary conception of the 
state and politics in sections 1.4 and Chapter 2. In section 1.4 . 
I will also discuss the influence on the young Marx of Hegel's 
unitary concepts of the state and politics, highlighting some im-
portant Platonic elements in Hegel's theory of the state. 
In section .1.2 I will argue that Plato's ideal state was a target 
of much of Aristotle's writing on the state and politics, and of 
the latter's rejection of Plato's unitary concept of tpe state 
(Aristotle,1981). Contrary to Plato Aristotle conceived the state 
as a diversified or 'pluralistic' community of individuals. I 
will argue that Aristotle's early political pluralism can thus 
serve as a point of deprature for understanding the state and 
politics in modern liberal pluralism. In section 1.3 this will be 
illustrated with reference to the thought of Bernard Crick who 
bases his liberal pluralism directly on Aristotle's classical 
conception of the state and politics (Crick,1973). Crick's 
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liberal pluralism will, in turn, serve as the contrasting back-
ground for my analysis of Marx's unitary concepts of the state 
and politics as well as providing a link to Gramsci's dualistic 
concepts of the state and politics which formed the basis for the 
latter's 'Marxist pluralism'. As I will argue in later chapters, 
Gramsci's 'pluralist' theory of politics is an important con-
tribution towards resolving the central problem of pluralism for 
Marxist theory,.namely that 
'Marxists can readily recognize plurality and to a con-
siderable extent embrace it politically and descriptively; 
but marxism will always encounter great difficulty in at-
tempting to theorize non-class constraints, because this in-
volves the kind of causal and ontological eguiyalence 
amongst factors, which virtually dissolves marxism as an ex-
planatory project' (McLennan,1987: 118-119). 
My account of Marx's concepts of the state and politics will be 
divided into three parts. Firstly, in section 1.4. I will explore 
the influence which the political thought of Hegel and Feuerbach 
had on the young Marx. In section 1.4.1 I will outline Hegel's 
concept of the state with particular reference to its formulation 
in his Philosophy of Right (Hegel,1981). In section 1.4.2 I will 
highlight the main elements of Marx's 1843 Critigue of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right (Marx,1843). The 1843 Critigue contains, in-
ter alia, a brilliant analysis of Hegel's concept of the state 
(and politics). And although Marx's own concepts of the state and 
politics remained implicit in this work I will argue that the 
1843 Critigue nonetheless contains Marx's key political ideas in 
embryonic form. In conclusion to Chapter 1 I will outline the in-
fluence which Feuerbach's radical humanism had on Marx's break 
with the Young Hegelians as well as on Marx's historical 
materialist perspective. The second part of my discussion of Marx 
will commence in Chapter 2. In section 2.1 I will give an account 
of Marx's 1843 articles On the Jewish Question (Marx,1843 (2)) 
and Introduction to a Crjtgue of Hegel's Pbilosphy of Right 
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(Marx,1844), as well as the 1844 Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts (Marx,1844 (2)). The basis for the discussion in sec-
tion 2.1 will be the significance of these early works for Marx's 
transition to bis materialist conception of history first formu-
lated in The German Ideology (Marx,1846) of 1846. The discussion 
of historical materialism in section 2.2.1 constitutes the third 
part of my account of Marx's political thought in the course of 
which I will introduce some of the most important concepts in 
historical materialism, which constituted the foundation of 
Marx's mature political thought. I will argue that in first ad-
vancing the fundamental theses of historical materialism the ma-
ture Marx conceived the material relations of production as the 
basis of social relations as well as of the form and function of 
the political state. In other words, for Marx the state derived 
its form and function from society's social relations which were, 
in turn, shaped by the prevailing mode of production. Marx's con-
ception of the determinate relation between the historical modes 
of material production and the social, political and ideological 
relations of different social formations constituted a radical 
inversion of Hegel's idealistic philosophy. Hegel conceived of 
the bourgeois state as an end in itself; a rational social col-
lectivity which as the guardian of the collective interest of all 
its members intervenes to order and harmonise civil society's 
conflictual and particularistic interests and class relations. 
For Hegel the bourgeois state transcended antagonistic socio-
economic relations in a dialectical process (Hegel,1981). 
Although in Marx~s view the bourgeois state did arise from the 
need to regulate conflictual social relations in civil society, 
contrary to Hegel Marx viewed this state in capitalist society as 
essen~ially a class state, the political expression of the 
bourgeoisie's economic and social dominance and an essential 
means of ensuring that dominance. Marx argued that the bourgeois 
state could therefore neither transcend civil society's conflic-
tual interests and classes nor could it represent and uphold 
society's general interest (Marx,1843). It was on this basis of 
20 
the state as a classbound institution that Marx's concept of 
politics as the struggle between. antagonistic classes in society 
emerged. 
As background. to the discussion of Gramsci's theory of politics 
in Chapters 3 and 4 I will outline the problem of 'economism· in 
orthodox Marxism in section 2.2.2, which constitutes the bridge 
to my analysis of Gramsci's theory of politics in subsequent 
chapters. Section 2.2.2 will address the problem of 'economic 
determinism' in the conception of the state as well as the 
pronounced 'reductionism' of the class-based concept of politics 
which pervaded the Marxism of the Second and Third 
Internationals. These were tendencies which were intertwined with 
the 'monistic' character of orthodox Marxism's political theory. 
Of direct concern to my theme of Gramsci"s politics, and the ob-
ject of much of Gramsci's important political writing, is the 
'vulgar· economism of Second and Third International Marxisms. 
Section 2.2.2 will thus serve as the context for introducing 
Gramsci"s revaluation of historical materialism to which his con-
cepts of hegemony and the state as well as his radical critique 
of economism are most central. 
My analysis of Gramsci's politics will commence in Chapter 3 with 
a discussion of the dual nature of Gramsci's concept of 
'hegemony· which constituted the organising concept of his prison 
notes. The discussion in Chapter 3 will be divided into two main 
sections. In section 3.1 I will describe the first meaning which 
Gramsci attached to his concept of hegemony which I will then re-
late to his concepts of the political party, the intellectuals 
and ideology. More specifically I will argue that in this first 
meaning Gramsci's concept of hegemony refers to the tran~forma­
tion of a subordinate class's economic-corporate consciousness, 
i.e. a class consciousness limited to economic interests, into a 
fully fledged political consciousness which constitutes the basis 
for its counter-strategy or hegemonic project against the 
dominant social class or group. On Gramsci's view the role of 
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intellectuals, the political party and ideology should be related 
to their function in the creation of a class's hegemonic 
consciousness. 
In section 3.2 I will describe the second meaning of Gramsci's 
concept of hegemony. Following on from section 3.1 I will show 
that in Gramsci's view a subordinate class which seeks to estab-
lish its complete predominance in society must not only attain 
economic dominance as well as governmental (i.e. narrowly 
political) power but must also establish its intellectual and 
moral (i.e. cultural) leadership amongst a broad cross-section of 
society's social classes and groups. For Gramsci a class's 
economic and political domination of society presupposes that 
class's intellectual and moral leadership which it exercises, 
indeed must exercise, through the 'private' hegemonic apparatuses 
(e.g. schools and trade unions) located in the sphere of civil 
society. Gramsci included civil society in his extended concept 
of the 'integral state·. For Gramsci, therefore, the state is un-
derstood not only as the coercive governmental apparatuses of 
society (which he refers to as 'political society') but also in-
volves the 'private' hegemonic apparatuses of civil society 
through which a fundamental social class seeks to win the consent 
of the governed as the basis of its economic and political 
dominance. 
Gramsci's concept of hegemony and his extended definition of the 
state had important implications for his concept of,politics. In 
Chapter 4 I will focus on the question of Gramsci's critical 
recasting of historical materialism against the background of his 
critque of economism and his emphasis of a dialectical reading of 
Marx's classical texts, with particular reference to Gramsci's 
emphasis of Marx's now famous, and controversial, Preface to A 
Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy. On the basis of 
Gramsci's revaluation of historical materialism I will then, in 
section 4.2, describe the dual perspective underlying Gramsci's 
broadening of Marx's class-based concept of politics. Thus I will 
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relate the distinction Gramsci made between the spheres of civil 
society and political society in his concept of the 'integral 
state', i.e. the spheres of hegemony and coercion respectively, 
to his dual concept of politics according to which he distin-
guished between the functions of coercive and consensual politi-
cal activity aimed at the founding of a new state. 
And finally, in my concluding chapter I will highlight the main 
implications of Gramsci's 'Marxist pluralism' for the broader 
Marxist tradition, focusing on the Gramsci's revaluation of the 
orthodox Marxist notion of democracy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE STATE AND POLITICS 
The central purpose of this chapter is to provide the historical 
and theoretical context for the discussion, 
chapters, of Marx and Gramsci's conceptions of 
politics. 
in subsequent 
the state and 
The approach decided upon here entails broadly outlining two 
major conceptions of the state and politics in Ancient Greek 
political thought as a theoretical context for distinguishing be-
tween modern unitarian and pluralistic conceptions of the state 
and politics in senses to be defined shortly. In later sections 
of this chapter this focus will be narrowed to the manner in 
which these concepts of the state and politics may be said to 
have anticipated the modern debate between exponents of unitarian 
and pluralistic concepts of the state and politics. More 
specifically, we will be concerned with the extent to which they 
may usefully be employed to illustrate the important theoretical 
contribution of Antonio Gramsci to the Marxist concept of the 
state and politics within the tradition of Marxist political 
thought. 
Starting with a general introductory description of the Ancient 
Greek 'polis' or state in section 1.1, the discussion in section 
1.2 will focus on Plato and Aristotle's respective concepts of 
the state and politics. More specifically, Aristotle's 
'pluralistic' conception of the state and politics will be con-
trasted with Plato's 'unitarian' conception. This will then be 
related in section 1.3 to a discussion of 'modern political 
pluralism·, as well as providing a broad context for a discussion 
of Gramsci's 'Marxist pluralism' in Chapter 3 onwards. Plato's 
'unitary' conception of the state and politics will, in turn, 
serve to provide a broadly illustrative theoretical context for 
the discussion of Marx's 'monistic' or unitarian conception of 
the state and politics, in section 1.4 as well as in Chapter 2. 
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The intention here is certainly not to suggest that there exists 
any linear relation between these ancient and modern conceptions 
of politics. Rather it is hoped that this approach may serve to 
articulate certain fundamental concepts and issues which have 
persisted in the complex tradition of Western political thought. 
The discussion of Marx's conception of the state and politics 
will be divided into two parts: section 1.4.1 addresses the ques-
tion of the influence on Marx of Hegel's political thought, with 
particular reference to the concepts of civil society, the state, 
and politics. The underlying theme of the latter section will be 
the implicit concept of the state and politics contained in 
Marx's earlier critique of Hegel's concept of the state. In sec-
tion 1.4.2 I will provide a brief dicussion of the influence of 
Ludwig Feuerbach's 'radical humanism' on the young Marx. I will 
argue that Feuerbach made a substantial contribution to Marx's 
break with the Young Hegelians, a theoretical transition charac-
terised by Feuerbachian categories but which in due course led 
Marx also to reject the undialectical nature of Feuerbach:s 
materialism. Section 1.4 will thus serve to address the question 
of the link between the unita.rian concept of politics in Plato 
and in Marx with reference to Marx's rejection of the duality of 
state and civil society in Hegel's conception of society. 
1. The Concept Of The State And Politics In Plato And Aristotle 
1.1 The Greek 'Polis' 
In the extensive body of literature on the political theory of 
Ancient Greece it has frequently been argued that Plato and Aris-
totle may be regarded as the two founding fathers of Western 
political thought, a view based on the generally acknowledged in-
fluence their concepts of the state and politics have retained 
through th~ centuries, transcending the ancient city-state era to 
inform modern conceptions of the state and politics (see for ex-
ample Sinclair in Aristotle,1981: 18, 24; also Lee,1987: 32). The 
context in which Plato and Aristotle's conceptions of politics 
and the state took shape was that of the Greek polis, and the 
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particular way in which they interpreted the nature of the polis 
(both in ideal and ·actual' form), it will be argued, is the key 
to their respective concepts of politics. For this reason the 
discussion of their concepts of the state and politics will be 
preceded, in this section, by a brief account of the general 
characteristics of the Greek polis. 
Over and above the question of its relative size (generally far 
smaller in area and total population than the modern nation-
state) the ancient Greek city-state or polis had two further 
general characteristics, on the one hand its unity and 
solidarity, and on the other its limited membership (see Sinclair 
in Aristotle,1981: 24). The polis functioned as a tightly woven 
organic structure in which 'private' (the individual and the 
household) and 'public' (community) spheres were far less 
pronounced or differentiated than in the modern (bourgeois) 
state. The structural 'organicity' of the polis coupled to the 
restrictions which were placed on the granting of any citizenship 
to its members (for example the exclusion of slaves from any 
rights to citizenship) produced a state form which 'embraced a 
much smaller proportion of the population but a much larger share 
in the daily lives of each' (Sinclair in Aristotle,1981: 24) than 
is generally the case in the modern state. 
The highest interest in the polis was the city-state itself, and 
for individuals the supreme good consisted in securing a recog-
nised place in the life and activities of the city. The highest 
glory, therefore, was citizenship; membership in the common life 
of the polis. The politeja or constitution of the polis was a 
mode of life rather than merely a formal legal structure (see 
Aristotle,1981: 167-185; Plato,1987: 356-9). The central theme in 
Ancient Greek theory of the polis concerned the harmony of this 
common life, with little distinction made between the various 
elements of the polis. The theory of the polis was at once 
ethics, sociology, and economics, as well as politics in the nar-
rower modern sense (Sabine,1971: 13, also 100; see also 
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Lee,1987: 32). Consequently the law of the polis was 'the source 
of all standards of human life, and... the virtue of the in-
dividual is the same as the virtue of the citizen' (Jaeger,1987: 
32; see also Sabine,1971: 94-8, 100). 
If Plato and Aristotle both emphasized the subordination of the 
individual's private interests to those of the citizen and hence 
the polis, this may be said to reflect the dominance of the com-
munal ethic underlying much of Greek political the6ry~ However, 
the term 'community: and the particular role and place of the 
'individual' (both private and public) within it, were subject to 
diverse interpretation. As we shall see, Aristotle challenged the 
Platonic preoccupation with the primary role of the 'public 
individual' or citizen as subordinated to the interests of the 
polis. Nevertheless his theory of politics and the state is also 
imbued with a strong ethical bias (see Aristotle,1981: 179-183). 
He, like Plat-0, 
'ideal state' (see 
J 
investigated the question of the nature of an 
for example Aristotle,1981: 101-109), the 
state as a 'type'. It was in their respective portrayals of this 
ideal, however, that they differed so markedly; a difference, so 
it will be argued, that to a large extent is reflected in their 
differing concepts of politics. This distinction is perhaps most 
dramatically illustrated in Plato's Republic and Aristotle's 
Politics, the latter largely a product of Aristotle's extended 
criticism of Plato's concept of the polis and politics as formu-
lated in the Republic. Section 1.2 will highlight this critique, 
commencing with a brief account of the general characteristics of 
the polis in Plato, followed by a more detailed description of 
the origin of the polis, and the relation of the individual to 
the polis, in Aristotle. The section will then conclude with an 
account of the nature of the polis in Plato and Aristotle -- in 
the course of which their respective concepts of politics will be 
identified and elaborated. 
1.2 Plato And Aristotle: Their Concepts Of The State And Politics 
It is generally accepted that the .institution of the polis con-
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stitutes the main focal point of Plato's theory of politics. More 
controversially, Plato also elevated the interests of the polis 
above all else, including the lives and interests of its in-
dividual members, the citizens (Lee,1987: 54-5). It should 
nevertheless be noted that Plato did not conceive of the polis in 
the abstract, i.e. as an entity apart from the individuals of 
which it is composed: 
'Well, we are bound to admit that the elements and traits 
that belong to a state must also exist in the ·individuals 
that compose it. There is nowhere else for them to come 
from' 
And further: 
'Societies aren't made of sticks and stones, but of men 
whose individual characters, by turning the scale one way or 
another, determine the direction of the whole' (Plato,1987: 
358). 
However when Plato referred to the polis he emphasised the ideal 
of communality, of the need to cultivate and promote binding com-
munal relations between the individuals of which it is composed: 
'in the perfect state women and children should be held in 
common ... men and women should share the same education and 
the same occupations both in peace and war, and ... they 
should be govern~d by those of their number who are best at 
philosophy and war ... when our Rulers are appointed, they 
will take the soldiers and settle them in accomodation ... 
where there are no private quarters but everything is common 
to all' (Plato,1987: 356-357). 
To this ideal state of 'communism', to which corresponds an ideal 
type of individual (see Plato,1987: 357), Plato couterposed what 
he regarded as imperfect societies, that is those of 'timarchy', 
'oligarchy', 'tyranny' and 'democracy'. Of the latter forms of 
society, the first three are to varying extents elitist, aris-
tocratic and militaristic in nature. However, Plato argued, the 
democratic society is quite distinct from all other types of 
societies, characterised by a lack of individual restraint, self-
discipline and integrity. For Plato these characteristics lend 
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themselves to individual excess and the loss of the drive towards 
excellence in all spheres of life (Plato,1987: 373, 374). Fur-
thermore the selection of democratic society's leadership is 
determined 'by lot', that is by popular election, with little or 
no regard for the suitability of candidates. Plato regarded these 
democratic characteristics and principles as quite contrary to 
good sense. Moreover since democracies typically prioritize 
'liberty and freedom of speech' as well as every individual's 
freedom 'to do as he likes', giving rise to a society in which 
there will be 'the greatest variety of individual character' 
(Plato,1987: 375), there is consequently 
'no compulsion either to exercise authority if you are 
capable of it, or to submit to authority if you don't want 
to... Democracy doesn't mind what the habits and background 
of its politicians are; provided they profess themselves the 
people's friends... It's an agreeable anarchic form of 
society' (Plato,1987: 376, 377). 
The hostility expressed in the Republic towards the Greek concept 
of democracy is, of course, a manifestation of Plato's aversion 
to Athenian society, but is developed by Plato as a general 
philosophical premiss. More importantly, for our purposes, it is 
the corollary of his communal ethic. Plato emphasized the impor-
tance of order and coherence in society and stressed the need for 
planning and central authority - the power to order society. His 
was an essentially centralist and unitary view of the polis, 
derived partly f ron his utop ia.n is• and partly frr.>a his re<.~ogn i-
t ion that to enact a rational blue-print or plan of an ideal 
state, the 'Guardian' rulers require the requisite authority, and 
power, 'their function being to see that friends at home shall 
not wish, nor foes abroad be able, to harm our [ideal] state' 
(Plato,1987: 180, see 182, 196-224). Accordingly only the best, 
the ·truly just and good', . can and must rule (Plato, 1987: 358). 
Plato thus provided a paradigmatic expression of the unitary con-
cept ion of politics and the state. 
It was this idealised and unitary Platonic conception of the 
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function of the polis and the nature of human society to which 
Aristotle devoted much criticism and from which he derived great 
insight. Aristotle's Politics commences as follows: 
'Observation tells us that every state is an association, 
and that every association is formed with a view to some 
good purpose... Clearly then, as associations aim .at some 
good, that association which is most sovereign among them 
all and embraces all others will aim highest, i.e. at the 
most sovereign of all goods. This is the association which 
we call the state, the association which is "political"' 
(emphases added) (Aristotle,1981: 54). 
This notion of the polis as an association, and thus inherently 
pluralistic, is then systematically developed by Aristotle. Argu-
ing that in principle those who depend on others for their sur-
vival must unite in pairs, Aristotle (who propounded an histori-
cal doctrine of the state) sought to identify the natural evolu-
tionary origin of the polis in what he considered the two primary 
types of human association, namely: 
1. the natural union of male and female; and, 
2. the mutual relation of 'the natural ruler and ruled, for the 
purpose of preservation' (Aristotle,1981: 56, 57). 
Aristotle therefore begins his analysis of the origin · of the 
polis by describing the natural primary human association of the 
household, consisting of the association of men with women and 
slaves (Aristotle,1981: 58), in addition to the relation of divi-
sion between the ruler and the ruled which, according to this 
view, is a natural one rooted in differing inherent human 
capacities or aptitudes. These primary relationships constitute a 
uniting 'common interest' (Aristotle,1981: 57). However although 
the formation of. the primary human associations is 
of man's natural desire for, and need of, unity, 
not equate unity with uniformity (see below). 
a reflection 
Aristotle did 
A further stage in the natural evolution of human associations, 
Aristotle argued, 'is the village, the first association of a 
number of houses [households] for the satisfaction of something 
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more than daily needs' (Aristotle,1981: 58). 
The polis or state is the final form of association - an amal~ 
gamation of several villages (Aristotle,1981: 59). The polis is 
thus composed of all the other forms of human association and 
community, and is their ·end'. The aim and end of the poli~ it-
self is perfection; ·and self-sufficiency is both end and 
perfection' (Aristotle,1981: 59; see Mulgan,1977: 16). The polis 
is therefore a natural phenomenon as it 'evolves as a direct ex-
tension of the first nucleus of human organization, the family' 
(Bobbio,1988: 183) and serves to secure life itself, as well as 
to 'secure the gQQ.d. life' (Aristotle,1981: 59). Aristotle thus 
viewed the polis as sovereign, natural (i.e. a natural means and 
end), self-sufficient and political. Conversely the form of human 
association or community which is political is the state. The 
premiss underlying all else is that human beings are "political 
animals' (politikon .z..Q.Q.ll.) (Aristotle,1981: 59, 60). 
Two aspects are here of crucial importance with regard to 
Aristotle's concept of politics. Firstly, Aristotle viewed the 
state as constituted of individuals and associations of in-
dividuals who cooperate, at the very least in order to ensure 
survival, and ultimately to strive after the best life possible. 
Individual men are thus dependent on each other not only in order 
to ensure the survival of the species, 
hance the individual life by means 
but also in order to en-
of interaction and 
cooperation. Furthermore, as the state comes into being 
naturally, and inasmuch as nature is itself an end, the state, 
i.e. the association of human individuals in all its forms, con-
stitutes the natural end of all human association - the nature of 
the state thus reflects the 'nature of man. 
This brings us to the second point, i.e. the nature of man ac-
cording to Aristotle. At the outset Aristotle defined the human 
individual as belonging to the genus animal, but specifically as 
a political animal distinguished, thereby, from all others. As 
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the state, a natural entity, is the supreme and political form of 
human association, it follows that man is distinguished by his 
natural capacity in, and naturally determined need for, life in a 
state. In short, man lives by nature in a state, and is therefore 
political by nature - hence man the 'Political zoon·. However, 
this account of Aristotle's view of the origin of the state and 
its relation to human nature does not dispense with the need to 
focus more directly on Aristot.le's concept of politics 12..e.r.. .s..e... 
This, it will be argued, may best be accomplished by combining 
Aristotle·s view of the general relation of the human individual 
to the state with his account of alternative state forms. 
In book two of the Politics Aristotle presents the reader with 
three alternative state forms or types, the analyses of which 
reveal, amongst other things, Aristotle's concept of politics. 
They are: 
1. All citizens of a state having all things in common, i.e. 
wives, children and property; 
2. All citizens having nothing in common; or, 
3. Some combination of communality and severality 
(Aristotle,1981: 101-102). 
Aristotle rejected the second alternative at the outset, arguing 
that it would be a contradiction, a nonsense, as the polis must 
of necessity involve some form of association (Aristotle,1981: 
54, 101-102). The first alternative posits a view of the polis as 
characterized by extreme communality and unity, or communism'. 
This forms the critical target of book two of the Politics which 
commences with the question: 
'whether it is better to remain in our present condition [of 
separate families and private property] or to follow the 
rule of life laid down in the Republic' (Aristotle,1946: 
40). 
For Aristotle the answer to this entailed evaluating the underly-
ing world view propounded in Plato's Republic according to which 
'children, wives, and property ought to be held in common' 
(Aristotle,1981: 102; see Plato,1987: 237-242, 356), and the 
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state 'should be as much in unity as possible' (Aristotle,1946: 
40; Aristotle,1981: 104, also 111; see Plato,1987: 356-7). Aris-
totle asked whether Plato's ideal state would, in fact, con-
.stitute a state at all (Aristotle,1981: 104, 105, etc.), and 
argued that in any event the proposed means or scheme for realiz-
ing it is impracticable (Aristotle,1981: 107-9; see also 
Lee,1987: 16, 21, 22, 44). For, as Aristotle said, underscoring 
the inherent plurality of politics on his view, 
'it is obvious that a polis which goes on and on, and be-
comes more and more of a unit, will eventually cease to be a 
polis at all. A polis by its nature is some sort of 
aggregation' (Aristotle, 1946: 40). 
Or in a different translation: 
'is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a 
degree of unity as to be no longer a state? - since the na-
ture of a state is to be a plurality ... ' (Aristotle,1988: 
21). 
This for our purposes, arguably, represents the central idea of 
the Politics, namely that the state is by nature 'aggregative' -
it is in essence a 'pluralistic human association'. Pursuing the 
Platonic goal of 'unity', i.e. the unity of opinion and sentiment 
and moral standards, therefore not only restricts the practice of 
free thought central to the functioning of the polis, but in so 
doing endangers the existence of the polis itself. Aristotle 
argued that there is: 
a point at which a polis, by advancing in unity, will cease 
to be a polis; there is another point, short of that, at 
which it may still remain a polis, but will none the less 
come near to losing its essence, and will thus be a worse 
polis. It is as if you were to turn harmony into mere 
unison, or to reduce a theme to a single beat' 
(Aristotle,1946: 51). 
As has already been noted, Aristotle did not fail to recognize 
that a state to exist at all requires a degree of cohesion and 
unity. This he acknowledged in his concluding argument against 
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Platonic unity or 'doctrine of communism' (see Politics, Book 2, 
Chapter 5). After all 'the polis ... is an aggregate of many 
members' (Aristotle,1946: 51). However in Aristotle's view the 
polis or political association transcends any mere quantitative 
aggregation. It is qualitatively differentiated: 
'for similars cannot bring [a polis] into existence' 
(Aristotle,1946: 41). 
If it is 'reciprocal equivalence' that ensures the existence of 
the state (Aristotle,1981: 104), the polis is not a 'natural 
unity' in the sense of being an undifferentiated unity. After 
all: 
a household is a more self-sufficient thing than the 
individual, the state than the household; and the moment the 
association comes to comprise enough people to be self-
suff icient, effectively we have a state. Since, then, a 
greater degree of self-sufficiency is to be preferred to a 
lesser, the lesser degree of unity is to be preferred to the 
greater' (Aristotle,1981: 105-6). 
A 'genuine' unity, therefore, consisted for Aristotle not of a 
mere communality of means and ends, but, rather, in a dynamic and 
symbiotic interaction of differentiated means in pursuit of a 
non-monolithic, or differentiated, end. A polis accordingly 
requires members 
complement one 
thereby attain a 
104). Aristotle 
differentiation, 
12olis with the 
of varied capacities who mutually support and 
another through an 'exchange of services' and 
higher and better form of life (Aristotle, 1981: 
is thus linking the 'political' with diversity, 
plurality; and the political association or 
aggregation or plurality of qualitatively dif-
ferentiated individuals. Aristotle's concept of political ac-
tivity is therefore linked to the concept of the autonomous yet 
responsible and socially integrated individual within the context 
of a state characterized by tolerance, i.e. of a state directed 
towards accomodating human diversity and not towards instituting 
conformity. 
Thus it may be said that it was Aristotle's political 'pluralism' 
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... 
which led him 
politics and 
Hence, 
to reject of 'Plato's "unitary· 
his 'centralist' conception of 
conception of 
an ideal state. 
"what Aristotle calls the ideal state is always Plato's 
second-best state. The rejection of communism ... shows that 
the ideal state of [Plato's] Republic was never entertained 
by Aristotle, even as an ideal. His ideal was always con-
stitutional and never despotic rule, even though it were the 
enlightened despotism of the philosopher-king· (emphasis 
added) (Sabine,1971: 93, also 94-8, 116; see Bobbio,1988: 
73-7). 
Aristotle's treatment of politics characteristically incorporated 
the notion of human diversity, and hence the need for and 
desirability of a variety of institutions and diversity of 
pattern. At root lay a pluralistic concept of politics (Lee,1987: 
55). It is this pluralistic conception of politics which has, 
throughout the history of Western political thought, stood in 
challenge to the (Platonic) unitary concept of politics. 
1.3 Modern Political Pluralism 
In the above sections Plato's unitary concept of the state and 
politics was contrasted with Aristotle's political pluralism, 
with the emphasis on Aristotle's critique of Plato. The discus-
sion in this section seeks to 'extend' this through an examina-
tion of the conception of the state and politics which, arguably, 
constitutes the most important alternative to the Marxist 
conception, i.e. modern political pluralism. To this end Bernard 
Crick's concept of the state and politics, which he describes as 
derived from Aristotle's Politics, as formulated in his In. 
Defence of Politics, has been selected as broadly representative 
of this view. The intention here is certainly riot to suggest that 
Crick's is the only or most important non-Marxist pluralistic 
concept of politics. Yet his is a concise and richly suggestive 
conception useful as a starting point for a comparative analysis~ 
In the course of the discussion reference will be made to the 
relation between the concept of politics and the notions of 
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democracy, freedom and the state. The purpose of this discussion 
is the provision of a theoretical background for later sections 
(see chapter 2 onwards) in which, amongst other related topics, 
the challenge of political pluralism to Marxist unitarianism will 
be examined. 
Echoing Aristotle, Crick commences with the argument that 
politics - the political act - arises 'in organized st~tes which 
recognize themselves to be an aggregate of many members, not a 
single tribe, religion, interest, or tradition'. Politics is the 
consequence of the 'simultaneous existence of different 
traditions, within a territorial unit under a common rule'. 
Precisely how the unit was formed is not relevant. What is 
relevant is whether the social structure is sufficiently complex 
and divided, so making politics a plausible response to the 
problem of governing it, the problem of maintaining order at all' 
(Crick,1973: 18). 
Crick interprets Aristotle's rejection of Plato's unitarian ideal 
as a rejection of the individual's subordination to either state 
or despot. Consequently, a political order marks: 
'the birth, or the recognition of freedom ... politics repre-
sents at least some tolerance of differing truths, some 
recognition that government is possible, indeed best 
conducted, amid the open canvassing of rival interests. 
Politics are the public actions of free men. Freedom is the 
privacy of man from public actions' (Crick,1973: 18). 
Crick maintains that such a political order relies on a distinc-
tive method of rule, i.e.: 
1. engaging society's diverse and divergent groupings in an 
ongoing dialogue, so encouraging articulation of interests; 
2. pursuing the greatest possible conciliation of competing 
values and interests; and, 
3. the establishment of a legal framework ensuring and 
reflecting the legal status of the various interests, geared 
in turn to enhancing a sense of security and contributing 
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towards the clearest and safest possible means of interest 
articulation (Crick,1973: 18-19). 
This pluralist process' is what distinguishes the specifically 
political order and method of rule from 'tyranny, oligarchy, 
kingship, dictatorship, despotism, and... totalita~ianism' 
(Crick,1973: 19). The political order is one in which interests 
are conciliated by means of proportionally shared power accorded 
in line with the relative contribution to the overall ,community's 
welfare. The political system 
'is that type of government where politics proves successful 
in ensuring reasonable stability and order... no finality 
[being implied] in any act of conciliation or compromise 
(Crick,1973: 21-2; see also Polan,1984: 132). 
A political doctrine is 'a coherently related set of proposals 
for the conciliation of actual social demands in relation to a 
scarcity of resources' (Crick,1973: 32). 
The mere presence of political activity must, therefore, not be 
confused with a political system properly constituted, for to 
some degree all systems of government can incorporate political 
elements. However, truly political systems assume or presuppose 
the need for tolerance and incorporation of diverse groups and 
interests, viewing politics not merely as a means to an ideologi-
cal end. Politics is the 'mechanism' of social demand 
articulation, dependent on the individual's ongoing activity 
(Crick,1973: 23). The common good of any society is not to be 
confused with a particular ideology. Rather it is: 
'the process of practical reconciliation of the interests of 
the various sciences", aggregates or groups which compose 
the state' (Crick,1973: 23-4). 
The moral consensus of a free state is constituted by the politi-
cal activity which takes place in it. The "end' of a political 
society is not some a-priori ideological blue-print, but 
tolerance of human diversity. The means to that 'end', 
moreover, is political activity itself. 
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In this view, then, political societies are not merely plural, 
i.e. aggregates characterised by diversity, they are pluralistic, 
i.e. aggregates or states in which diverse groups and interests 
interact politically in the process of demand articulation. 
Crick's pluralistic concept of politics underlies his normative 
understanding of the classical notion of politics in terms of 
democracy (unlike Aristotle who judged democracy in a manner that 
was 'axiomatically negative' (Bobbio,1988: 93)) and freedom, a 
liberal understanding of politics, in short: liberal-democratic 
pluralism. 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, one of the themes 
which will be introduced is Marx's rejection of the pluralistic 
concept of the state and politics. Although this will not serve 
as the central focus of these sections, which will deal primarily 
with the relation of Hegel and Fauerbach to Marx, Marx's critique 
of Hegel was in important respects also an affirmation of the 
latter's rejection of pluralism and of his construction of a 
unitary or 'organic' conception of human society. Marx embraced 
Hegel's view that in the face of extreme conflict in civil 
society, arising as a direct consequence of the articulated dis-
juncture between the spheres of civil society and political 
society in modern pluralistic (i.e. 'liberal') society, liberal 
pluralism's emphasis of the individual's will as the reason of 
the state was unsustainable. Marx, it is true, rejected Hegel's 
view of the state as the regulator of conflictual civil 
relations. However Marx saw in Hegel's dialectical account of 
society's' relations a basis for his materialistic theory of 
society's dialectical unity, i.e. of the dialectical relation be-
tween civil society and the state rooted in the economic rela-
tions of civil society. It is to this relation between Hegel's 
and Marx's conceptions of society to which we now turn. 
1.4 Marx's 'Early' Political Writing 
'Marx did not develop a single, coherent theory of politics' 
(Carnoy,1984: 45). Indeed his work on a theory of politics 
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remained largely incomplete, implicit and unarticulated (see for 
example, Sassoon,1987; Jessop,1984; Miliband,1988). Any reading 
of Marx's political writing is therefore fraught with problems, 
not the least of which is the difficult exercise of ascertaining 
Marx's concepts of the state and politics both in his earlier 
works (i.e. prior to the German Ideology) as well as in his more 
mature works in the tradition of 'historical materialism'. An 
open mind is essential in this search for, as Derek Sayer reminds 
us, to transform Marx's 'texts into sacred tablets is to make a 
mockery of the critical spirit that animates everything he wrote' 
(Sayer,1989: xxii). After all it was Marx himself who maintained 
that it is wise and prudent in life to 'doubt everything' 
(Marx,1989: 2). 
Section 1.4 is intended as a general outline of the influence of 
Hegel and Feuerbach on Marx's early political writing with spe-
cial reference to the guiding question of the unitarian concepts 
of the state and politics in Plato and Marx. The discussion will 
be divided into three sub-sections. Beginning with a brief over-
view of Hegel's conceptions of the state and politics in 1.4.1, 
the focus in 1.4.2 will shift to Marx's critique of Hegel's con-
cept of the state and politics, with particular reference to 
Marx's early work The Critigue of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. In 
the final sub-section Marx's critique of Ludwig Feuerbach's radi-
cal anthropocentric humanism will be explored with a view to 
highlighting the influence Feuerbach's rejection of German 
idealism had on the direction of the young Marx's 'materialist' 
political perspective. 
1.4.1 The State And Politics In Hegel 
Hegel's political writing was probably the greatest single in-
fluence on the development of Marx's conception of the state and 
politics (see Held,1987: 53; Jessop,1984: 2-7, 8). In particular 
Hegel's work the Philosophy of Right served as one of the 
greatest formative stimuli on Marx's early political thought. A 
central theme of Hegel's later work is the relationship of the 
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human individual to the economic and social institutions govern-
ing his life, and the relation of the latter to the institution 
of the state, to which Hegel accorded a unique rational status 
(Hegel,1981: 155-156). The Philosophy of Right was a systematic 
and coherent expression of Hegel's vision of society as an 
organic, harmonious whole which, especially in his youth, he 
believed had been realized in the Greek city states of antiquity' 
(Callinicos,1987: 32). 
The starting point of Hegel's political philosophy was a critique 
of liberal individualism. Hegel took issue with the dominant 
theme of Anglo-French philosophy of the Age of Enlightenment, 
namely the doctrine of inalienable individual rights expressed 
for example in the works of Locke and Adam Smith. Hegel's 
critique of individualism was, in part, based on a different in-
terpretation of the transformation of feudal society by the 
French Revolution (Kolakowski,1987 (1): 39; also Sabine,1971: 
650). In the liberal view, the rise of the absolute monarchy 
heralded the demise of feudalism, and the French Revolution rep-
. resented the triumph of the rights of man over dictatorial 
monarchy. In this view, notably argued by Locke, Rousseau and 
Adam Smith, the end of feudalism heralded the establishment in 
society of the distinct spheres of civil society and the state. 
Civil society, although overtly conflictual in nature, was in 
fact characterised by an underlying coherence and unity. The 
French Revolution thus represented the attainment of individual 
liberty, constitutionally regulated government by consent, and 
officialdom bound by their responsibility to a nation-wide 
electorate. (Walton,1987: 128; Arthur,1985: 6). 
Although Hegel did not simply dismiss these claims, he took issue 
with certain aspects of these supposed revolutionary 
·achievements' of the European bourgeoisie. Thus, although agree-
ing that the post-feudal era of modern Absolutism produced a more 
unified and centralized form of territorial rule with greater law 
and order, in Hegel's view neither the rise of the absolutist 
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monarchy nor bourgeois ascendancy and revolution ensured the com-
plete elimination of feudalism (Hegel,1956: 399). For Hegel the 
destruction of feudalism was to be viewed as a di•lectical 
process (Hegel,1981: 34-35) whose formal achievement, (i.e. its 
constitutional expression) was not to be equated with the actual 
elimination of all residues of feudal forms. In principle Hegel 
agreed that the emergence of the absolute monarchy heralded the .. 
demise of feudalism as a system or order. And in his view the 
Revolution ' did in principle rid society of its form~l feudal 
foundations (institutions, sociial relations, etc.) in addition to· 
bringing the national state into existence as the accumulative 
result of monarchial centralization and revolutionar.y 
' 
constitutional-republicanism (Hegel,1956: 400, 403-404, 448; see 
Hall,1987: 7-8; Jessop,1984: 8; Sabine,1971: 650) .. Howeve~, in 
Hegel's view despite the Revolution's pursuit of the ideals of 
liberty and equality, it brought about the perpetuation· of 
feudalism in another form (i.e. after undergoing a complex' 
transmutation): the French Revolution leveled the functional dif-
ferences between men in their social capacities to a 'common and 
abstract political equality' (establishing only formal political,· 
and not real social equality) and reduced .the 'instituti~ns of 
both society and the state to utilitarian devices· (Sabine ,'1971: 
651; also Arthur,1985: 6). In other words for Hegel the liberal 
doctrine upheld the· individual right of political. eq~alfty· 
without adequately addressing the real source of inequ~lity 
rooted in fundamental social relations; it subordinated state. arid 
civil interests to those of the egoistic private individual. ··As 
against this Hegel regarded the individual as a member· of a wider 
community, a social being, obtaining his or her value through 
participation in the institutions of civil society (which e~­
bodies private interests and motives) which in turn are subsumed 
and transcended in the higher interests of the state. 
, . 
For Hegel civil society ( rou.ghly coterminous with the 'state of 
nature· in the natural jurists) represented 'the realm of in~ 
dividuals who have left the unity of the family to enter into 
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interests not only achieve their complete development and 
gain explicit recognition for their right (as they do in the 
sphere of the family and civil society) but, for one thing, 
they also pass over of their own accord into the interest of 
the universal, and, for another thing, they know and will 
the universal [which they take] as their end and aim and are 
active in its pursuit' (Hegel,1981: 160). 
In Hegel's view freedom thus designated the individual's ability, 
through a capacity for reasoning, to understand 'necessity'. The 
individual attains freedom in so far as he subordinates his sub-
jective will or self-will to the general interests of the com-
munity embodied in the political state: 
'As the highest form of the objectivization of Mind, the 
state represents the general will, and the freedom of the 
individual is a reality when it is based on obedience to the 
law, for then the will is obeying itself' (Kolakowski,1987 
(1): 73) 
Consequently the individual and his motives must firstly be 
'absorbed and transmuted' (Sabine,1971: 651) in civil society's 
institutions, and then in those of the state (see Walton,1987: 
127-8; Jessop,1984: 4). In the synthesis of private individual 
interests with those of the citizen (a notion reminiscent of the 
Ancient Greek view which equates the virtue the virtue of the in-
dividual with that of the citizen) the dualistic opposition be-
tween the egoistic individual and the communal citizen is 
abolished, thereby transcending the opposition between freedom 
and necessity: 
'In contrast with the spheres of private rights and private 
welfare (the family and civil society), the state is ... an 
external necessity and their higher authority; its nature is 
such that their laws and interests are subordinate to it and 
dependent on it. On the other hand, however, it is the end 
immanent within them, and its strength lies in the unity of 
its own universal end and aim with the particular interest 
of the individuals, in the fact that individuals have duties 
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to the state in proportion as they have rights against it' 
(Hegel,1981: 161). 
Underlying this dialectical synthesis is the view that man is a 
rational being and his will is therefore potentially informed by 
universal principles (see Arthur,1985: 5-6; Bottomore,1987: 199; 
Jessop,1984: 4). As the state is representative of the general 
will obedience to its laws constitutes the attainment of freedom 
by the individual. Nevertheless the will of the state is not, as 
in the pluralistic view, identical with the collectivity of its 
citizens' individual wills - 'the general will is not the will of 
the majority but the will of historical Reason' (Kolakowski,1987 
(1): 74). Furthermore, Hegel did not propose that the distinction 
between civil society and the state be eliminated. Rather, he 
conceived of the state as the mediator of the differences and 
conflicts existing both within civil society as well as between 
civil society and the general will as embodied in the institu-
tions of the state. 
Therefore, although Hegel agreed with Locke, Rousseau and Adam 
Smith that the demise of feudalism and the absolute monarchy was 
marked by the emergence of the distinct spheres of civil society 
and the state, he rejected their view that the competitive and 
conflictual nature of civil society concealed an underlying unity 
and coherence, a reflection of the 'innate rationality in civil 
society which will lead to the general good' (Bottomore,1987: 
73). He did however consider civil society to be potentially 
unified and coherent, but maintained that it was the role of the 
state to realize and articulate this potential (Walton,1987: 128; 
also Callinicos,1987: 32). 
As suggested above, Hegel also rejected the emphasis liberals 
placed on the primacy of the individual and his interests -- of 
the doctrine of individualism. The displacement of the individual 
as the central concern or focus of the state does not, however, 
imply that Hegel adopted a position of anti-constitutionalism 
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(see Hegel,1981: 160-174), but rather of the pluralist conception 
of politics informing liberalism (Hegel's rejection of liberalism 
was nevertheless not unqualified, see below). For Hegel the 
state, which alone embodies ethical values, was both the end and 
highest value of human society (much as the polis was in Ancient 
Greece, and in particular in Plato's conception of it), the 
highest form of expression of man as a social being from which 
the individual derives his value. Hegel's anti-individualism and 
state-centric views thus constituted a direct challenge to Anglo-
French liberal pluralism and signified a major shift in Continen-
tal European conceptions of the state. 
The basic shift from a pluralist to an ultimately unitarian con-
ception of politics and the state had far-reaching consequences 
for Hegel's more specific political theory. Thus the elevation of 
the efficient administration of the state to a high priority (a 
concern Hegel shared with Plato) was a natural consequence of the 
dialectical and unitarian conception of human society in which 
the state represented a higher expression of the social relations 
circumscribing jndjyjdual existence. Hegel (like Plato) also en-
visaged the creation of a 'gove~ning class' or 'universal class', 
a 'class of civil servants' (Hegel,1981: 131) determined on merit 
and enjoying a distinct position of authority in a hierarchally 
structured political system (Sassoon,1987: 135; also Sabine,1971: 
662). This ruling elite would function in a detached and impar-
tial manner in its mediation of private and social interests 
(Jessop,1984: 4, 5), whilst the bureaucratic organization would 
constitute the nexus between the governing class in g~neral and 
the higher institutions of the state (McLellan,1987: 13; 
Sabine,1971: 662). In other words the class of civil servants is 
'the crucial link between the particularism of civil society and 
the universality of the state' (Avinieri,1972: 158). 
Hegel sought to ensure the orderly functioning of civil society 
by means of a judicial system geared to the protection of the 
economic sphere of civil society (especially with regard to the 
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rights of property and person). His theory of constitutional 
government was, at least in this respect, broadly in accordance 
with liberal conceptions (and in an even wider sense with that of 
Aristotle who emphasized the protection of individual property 
rights and free exchange, as essential to the fostering of a 
'political' order). However, even though Hegel distinguished be-
tween legal authority and personal power, he did not acknowledge 
any relationship between the rule, of law and democratic political 
processes. The question of 'legality' was recognized as an essen-
tial feature of the rational state: all men as equal before the 
law. Yet for Hegel legal equality did not extend to the realm of 
law-making. Hegel's philosophical system quite explicitly sought 
to build on and extend 18th Century philosophical enquiry, focus-
ing on the historical study of economic systems, 
nations, and national cultures and institutions. 
social groups, 
Hegel replaced 
the idea of natural law, dominant amongst Enlightenment thinkers, 
with a universal conception of history underscored by the dialec-
tical method of study serving as a scientific instrument of so-
. cial investigation. The dialectical process in history (above all 
in his Phenomenology of Spirit) is the process of the removal of 
the world's alienness and objectivity by means of the Mind's as-
similating or preserving negation of the created universe - his-
tory conceived as the progressive and phased development of ~ 
sciousness (see Hegel,1981: 34-35). The Anglo-French pluralistic 
conception of politics as an independent or autonomous 
of individuals in pursuit of their particular interests, 




politics as a reflection of 'social forces, of rivalries between 
nations or antagonisms between economic classes' (Sabine,1971: 
666-7). However the displacement of the individual by the 'social 
group', 'economic class', state and nation as the determining 
forces in the historical process, was indicative of the decline 
in influence of the 'classical' (i.e pluralistic) Anglo-French 
conception of politics on the Continent. And this development 
laid the foundation for the emergence of various systems of as-
sociated radical political thought, the most notable of which was 
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that of Karl Marx. 
1.4.2 Marx's Critique Of Hegel's Conceptions Of The State And 
Politics 
In section 1.4.1 Hegel's concepts of the individual, civil 
society, the state and politics were considered for the purpose, 
in this section, of describing their profound influence on Marx's 
own political concepts. The first part of this section consists 
of a general description of the manner in which Marx applied 
Hegel's 'dialectical method' in his own view of history, 
'stripped' of Hegel's idealism. This will be followed by an ac-
count of Marx's critique of Hegel's concept of th~ state with 
particular reference to Marx's uncompleted manuscript Critique of 
Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right' (1843). 
Marx, especially towards the conclusion of the early phase of his 
thought, categorically rejected Hegel's idealism and his 
idealization of the state. Marx described these as 
'"mystifications" that infected the dialectic because of the 
metaphysical idealism by which the system was vitiated' 
(Sabine,1971: 667). Marx nevertheless adopted Hegel's dialectical 
method applying it to a 
reality' (Lacey,1986: 133) 
material rather 
substituting for 
than a spiritual 
Hegel's 'World 
Spirit' the forces of production (i.e. the powers available to 
society in material production: see Chapter 2). In other words 
material values and economic considerations were viewed as the 
'cause and the proper end of human, and especially social, 
action' (Lacey,1986: 133; see Kolakowski,1987 (1): 58-59). In~ 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) (representing 
·Marx· s first draft of his "Economics" ' (Mc Le l lan, 1988: 75)) Marx 
devoted the final section to a Critigue of Hegel's Dialectic and 
General Philosophy, constituting 'probably his fullest account of 
his view of Hegel's dialectic, praising him for having discovered 
man's world-creating capacities, but criticizing his abstract 
philosophical portrayal' (McLellan,1988: 75). Hegel, noted Marx, 
does 'indeed conceive of labour as the self-confirming essence of 
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man' however 'the only labour that Hegel knows and recognizes is 
abstract, mental labour· (Marx in McLellan,1987: 153). Hegel's 
conception of history is thus properly dialectical in that it 
portrays the phased historical development or evolution of human 
civilization in terms of the preserving or assimilating negation 
of the manifoldness of Being, however it is unacceptably idealis-
tic in the sense that this historical process is perceived as the 
unfolding of the 'Spirit" or 'Mind' (depriving objective reality 
of its objectivity). In the Grundrisse (1857-8) Marx would later 
refer to Hegel's idealization of history in the following terms: 
'Hegel fell into the error ... of considering the real as the 
result of self-coordinating, self-absorbed, and spon-
taneously operating thought, while the method of advancing 
from the abstract to the concrete is but the way of thinking 
by which the concrete is grasped and is reproduced in our 
mind as concrete. It is by no means, however, the process 
which itself generates the concrete' (Marx,1857: 352) 
Marx's critique of Hegel's idealist dialectic in the Manuscripts 
provided 'the general framework of the Marxian dialectic' 
(McLellan,1987: 153). However Marx's adoption of Hegel's dialec-
tic 'stripped of its mystified form' (Marx in Bottomore,1987: 
123) and the coupling of it to a 'materialistic conception of 
history' should not simply be equated with what later became 
known as 'dialectical materialism', i.e. with 
'dialectical materialism in the tradition started by the 
later Engels. For Engels such a materialist dialectic was 
basic and could be summarised in the "laws" of the negation 
of the negation, the interpenetration of opposites, and the 
transformation of quality into quantity... In Marx any 
dialectical perception of nature was subordinate to the 
dialectic of historical praxis, the dialectic between man 
and nature' (McLellan,1987: 152). 
In other words Marx conceived of the basic form of the dialectic 
not as a mechanical determinism but as a historical process in-
volving a 'material interchange between man and nature· 
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(McLellan,1987: 154). Our focus in this section, however, is not 
primarily on the question of the nature of the dialectic in Marx 
as much as it is on the formative influence of Hegel's unitary 
conception of the state and politics on the young Marx. For this 
purpose we may best turn to one of his early works in which that 
formative influence can best be studied. 
Marx's critique of Hegel's idealism in the Critique of Hegel's 
'Philosophy of Right' (1843), certainly counts as one of Marx's 
more difficult works. At the time of its writing Marx's thought 
was undergoing a complex and fruitful transition which would, a 
few years hence, find expression in the original formulations of 
The German Ideology. Most of the seminal themes of the 1843 
Critique reverberate throughout Marx's subsequent writing. Of 
Marx's broader criticism of Hegel's idealism it is his critique 
of Hegel's conception of the state (its origin, composition and 
function) which most concerns us here. Marx criticized Hegel for 
founding his conception of the state upon abstract ideas, and of 
portraying the elements of the state, the 'family unit' and 
'civil society', as manifestations of the 'Spirit', and not, as 
Marx insisted, as material manifestations of men or individuals 
as they exist empirically: 
•the fact is that the state originates in the mass as it ex-
ists as members of the family and civil society; speculation 
expresses this fact ... as an act of a subjective idea, dis-
tinct from the fact itself ... the fact that served as a 
beginning is not conceived of as such but as a mystical 
result' (Marx,1843: 27). 
The fundamental notion that Marx is asserting here is that the 
political relation between men is a social one, and that the 
state, both in form and function, is an expression of these so-
cial relations. It is idealist speculation that imparts empirical 
and social reality with a meaning other than its own. And the 
source of this error in Hegel's philosophy is, according to Marx, 
to be sought in Hegel's transformation of the true subjects of 
history, i.e. human individuals, into 'predicates of a universal 
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substance' (Kolakowski,1987 (1): 123). Man is not, as Hegel would 
have it, the subjective aspect of the state. On the contrary, the 
state is the creation of man and has no independent value outside 
of its function as an instrument serving the needs of empirical 
individuals, men in their real social existence. 
Marx introduced the concept of 'democracy' (a concept which at 
this stage of his intellectual development was strongly in-
fluenced by Feuerbach's radical humanism) to illustrate the dis-
tinction between his concept of the state and that of Hegel. Marx 
described democracy as 'starting from man and makes the state 
into objectified man', whereas Hegel 'makes man into the subjec~ 
tive aspect of the state' (Marx,1843: 28). In other words, for 
Marx the aim of democracy. is the restoration of control of the 
state to all its people, 'to make the state once more an instru-
ment of man, i.e. to dealienate political institutions' 
(Kolakowski,1987 (1): 124), and hence restore the people's 
capacity for 'self-determination' (Marx,1843: 28). However 
achieving this goal is not possible as long as there remain dis-
tinct or particular spheres in (bourgeois) society, as divided 
into, on the one hand, the political state in which man's univer-
sal species essence (see 1.4.3 below) finds expression and, on 
the other hand, the realm of man's real existence in his private 
capacity as an individual member of civil society. Marx described 
this dualistic relation in the liberal bourgeois state as one of 
'abstraction' or alienation. The individual member of civil 
society also stands as citizen in a relation to the state which 
becomes increasingly alienated and merely formal: 
Marx 
the particular spheres did not realize ... that their 
private essence coincides with the other-worldly essence of 
... the political state, and that its other-worldly being is 
nothing but the affirmation of their own alienation. ... 
The abstraction of the state as ·such belongs only to the 
modern time, because the abstraction of private life also 
belongs only to modern times' (Marx,1843: 29, 30). 
therefore disagreed both with the particularistic liberal 
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conception of the state as well as Hegel's view that the general 
will is the will of historical Reason. 
Underlying Marx's view of the alienating force of the modern 
state, of the state's abstraction from real man, was an inter-
pretation of feudalism and ·the French Revolution which, in a num-
ber of important respects, he shared with Hegel. Marx, like 
Hegel, viewed society in the Middle Ages as divided into or com-
posed of feudal 'societies' known as 'guilds' or 'estates', each 
of which had a political role: 
'in the Middle Ages property, trade, society, and men were 
political; the material content of the state was delimited 
by its form; each private sphere had a political character 
' or was a political sphere or politics formed the character 
of the private sphere... the people's life and the state's 
life were identical' (Marx,1843: 30; see Marx,1857 (2): 154-
156). 
In other words as the 'articulation of the civil community coin-
cided with the political division' (Kolakowski,1987 (1): 125), 
much as in the organic city-state of Ancient Greece, separate 
civil and political realms did not exist. (As we will see in sec-
tion 2.1, Marx expanded on this theme in On the Jewish Question). 
With the demise of the feudal order, culminating in bourgeois 
political revolution, the political significance of the estates 
was abolished and a public division between civil and political 
life emerged. As a consequence of this the individual's existence 
in post-feudal society became 'dualistic', i.e. as both an in-
dividual 'private' member of civil society and as citizen of the 
state. 
In agreement with Hegel Marx described civil society in its 
liberal conception and form as the arena of egoism and self-
interest, 'the site of crass materialism, of the modern property 
relations, of the struggle of each against all' (Bottomore,1987: 
73). However, unlike Hegel Marx did not consider the political 
state capable either of regulating its relation with civil 
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society or of mediating between the particularistic relations of 
competition and conflict within civil society. Marx's rejection 
of the state as mediator of civil society extends to his rejec-
tion of Hegel's idea of officialdom or the bureaucracy as the 
detached and impartial organization of functionaries regulating 
private and social interests and thus effecting a 'synthesis be-
tween the common good and that of particular sections or 
corporations' (Kolakowski,1987 (1): 124). On the contrary 
'"bureaucracy" is the "state formalism" of civil society. It 
is the "state's consciousness", the "state's will", the 
"state's power". . . and thus a particular, closed -society 
within the state... Bureaucracy must thus safeguard the im-
aginary universality of the (political state]' (Marx,1843: 
30). 
Furthermore, the 
aims of the state are transformed into the aims of the 
bureaux and the aims of the bureaux into the aims of the 
state. Bureaucracy is a circle from which no one can escape 
(Marx,1843: 31). 
From this we can conclude that Marx considered as illusory 
Hegel's notion of the bureaucracy as somehow establishing a 
mutually beneficial functional bond between the interests and 
needs of the individuals in civil society on the one hand, and 
the imperatives of the state on the other. Ultimately the 
bureaucracy serves neither the interests of the individual nor of 
the species but its own, 
state. 
i.e. it constitutes a state within a 
Marx thus posed the problem of the relation between civil society 
and the state differently than Hegel. For him it was not a ques-
tion of how the state can best optimize its regulative capacity 
in relation to civil society, but rather how to optimize the 
capacity of real individuals in 'actual' civil society to regu-
late the political state. In the 1843 Critique Marx argued that 
this may be achieved by 'the extension and greatest possible 
universalization of voting, of active as well as passive 
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\suffrage ... ' (Marx,1843: 34). However, he came to see that some-
what ironically, unrestricted suffrage transforms civil society 
itself into an 'abstraction', the full achievement of which is 
'at once also the transcendence of the abstraction' rendering its 
distinction from political existence 'inessential': 
'Within the abstract political state the reform of voting 
advances the dissolution of this political state, but also 
the dissolution of civil society' (Marx,1843:, 35). 
In other words the universal extension of suffrage proposed b~ 
Marx would eliminate the gulf between private individuals and 
their relations and material interests in civil society on the 
one hand, and the political state and its political institutions 
on the other, by subjecting the state to the regulative control 
of its citizens and their interests in civil society. However to 
fully politicise and democr~tise society would be to abolish the 
specific function of the state as the sphere or arena of politics 
proper, of autonomous political activity, both in the liberal as 
well as the Hegelian conceptions (although in Hegel's case the 
state is understood dialectically, as 
transcendence of civil society, and is 
restricted sense unitarian). 
the absorption and 
in that somewhat 
Implicit in the 1843 Critique, it can be argued, there is thus a 
unitary concept of politics as pertaining to the activity within 
and of the political state and political institutions. This is a 
'narrow' definition in the sense that politics is viewed as the 
domain of state activity and intervention: 
'In all states that are not democracies, the state, the law, 
the constitution is the dominant factor without really 
dominating, i.e. materially penetrating all the other 
spheres that are not political' (Marx,1843: 29). 
However, as was seen above, Marx proposed a definition of 
democracy that would not only restore the control of the politi-
cal state to the 'people', but which would lead to the demise of 
the political state itself, and hence, presumably, of politics 
narrowly understood as the activity and function of the state. 
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The question therefore arises as to what, if any, (positive) con-
cept of politics Marx is in actual fact proposing. It could be 
that in suggesting that the split between civil society and the 
political state. be abolished by means of universal suffrage Marx 
is proposing some form of radical democratic humanism in which 
politics as activity in the political state is transformed into a 
universal domain open to all members of society. On the other 
hand, as we have seeD, in the 1843 Critigue Marx also clearly 
equated the institution of universal suffrage with the con-
sequence of the demise of the political state itself. Clearly 
therefore Marx rejected the liberal concept of politics in terms 
of participation through representation as he unequivocally 
rejected the split between civil society and the political state, 
also proposed in a qualified dialectical sense in Hegel. 
There is another possible interpretation of Marx's concepts of 
the state and politics in the 1843 Critigue, one which is adopted 
in Chapter 2 as the basis for our discussion of Marx's emergent, 
if to a great extent implicit, concepts of the state and 
politics. It was noted above that Marx considered political rela-
tions between individuals as basically social, and that the form 
of the state is an expression of these social relations. In the 
liberal conception of society the duality of civil society and 
the state is essential in the sense that civil society is the 
necessary arena of free initiative, i.e. of the unhindered inter-
action and exchange between individuals and their interests. The 
existence and justification of the state is therefore conditional 
upon the division between civil society and the state, with the 
latter supposedly regulating the free exchange in civil society. 
In other words, pluralism in the liberal sense is impossible 
without the existence of civil society distinct from the state. 
According to Marx's view, it follows that in the liberal concep-
tion of society in which individual relations are conflictual the 
political state does not, indeed cannot, function in the inter-
ests of the 'people', i.e. it cannot function as a proper or 
'true' state, since its form is an expression of society's con-
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flictual relations. Much the same holds true for Marx's inter-
pretation of Hegel's conception of the state, which whilst not 
'democratic' in the liberal sense is nevertheless also conceived 
of as (dialectically) distinct from civil society. For Marx the 
origin of the dual nature of modern society must be sought in the 
empirical study of the social relations of individuals which 
determine the nature and form of the state, and the latter's 
relation to civil society, and not in the individual's relation 
to the political state. 
This arguably penetrates to the heart of the·opposition between 
pluralistic and unitary conceptions of politics, with the former,. 
generally speaking, emphasizing the individual's independent 
value in relation to the state of which he is a member, and the 
latter proposing an 'organic' conception of the state in which 
the individual's value relates to his membership of that state. 
Marx's concepts of the state and politics, however implicit, may 
therefore be said to be unitary in the sense that his focus is 
the nature of social relations of the state, and not the relation 
of the individual to the state. 
Marx did not propose a positive conception of politics or the 
state in the 1843 Critique. In fact his conception was clearly 
negative in as far as Marx envisaged the dissolution of the 
political state. Furthermore, it remained for him to give content 
to his notion of man as a 'social being' (see 1.4.3 below) and to 
draw explicit conclusions from this for his conception of the 
state and politics. However as Callinicos puts it: 
'The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right marks a major 
step towards historical materialism by locating the source 
of alienation in the structure of society rather than the 
state of man's consciousness. There is, however, little con-
sideration of class-relations, and Marx's politics remain 
those of . "democratic extremism" rather than communism 
(Callinicos,1987: 34). 
The extent to which he achieved this in his subsequent early 
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works, culminating in the German Ideology, constitutes the sub-
ject matter of Chapter 2, which in addition seeks to explore the 
question of monism in Marx's conception of the state and 
politics. However before we continue with an account of Marx's 
early political writing we will firstly examine the general in-
fluence of Ludwig Feuerbach's materialism and radical humanism on 
the young Marx. 
1.4.3 Feuerbach And Marx 
Marx's writings of the period of 1843-5 were strongly influenced, 
apart from Hegel, by the ideas of Ludwig Feuerbach whose 
'critique of Hegel ... set Marx on the road to a more materialis-
tic and revolutionary communism' (Callinicos,1987: 33). In a very 
real sense, therefore, Feuerbach's thought represented a bridge 
between Hegel's 'absolute' or 'objective' idealism (and dialecti~ 
cal method), and Marx's (dialectical) materialism. 
A former student of Hegel, Feuerbach rejected Hegelian idealism 
early in his development, adopting a materialistic position in 
his critique of German philosophical idealism, and especially of 
Hegelian 'speculativ~ idealism' (McLellan,1988: 131). Although 
the ideas expressed in his later writings were in simple Enligh-
tenment terms, that in itself was a 'novelty in German 
philosophy, dominated as it was by the categories of Kant and 
Hegel ... ' (Kolakowski,1987 (1): 118; also Vincent,1987: 153). For 
Marx the general importance of Feuerbach's break with the tradi-
tion of German idealism lay in his substantial contribution 
towards the transformation of the 'Young Hegelian camp by 
radicalizing its anti-religious orientation' (Kolakowski,1987 
(1): 118), directly influencing Marx's rejection of Hegelian 
categories. Furthermore the concepts of the 'species-being' and 
'alienation' which Feuerbach employed in his critique of Hegel's 
idealism were, as we shall see below, of particular importance to 
the development of Marx's early thought, and especially of Marx's 
rejection of Hegel's idealistic conception of the state. 
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Feuerbach rejected Hegel's idea of Spirit as the necessary 
development of consciousness in (historical) phases 
'from pure consciousness to absolute knowledge by way of 
self-awareness, Reason, Spirit (or Mind), and religion, and 
in that knowledge [fulfilling] the purpose of the world, 
which is identical with knowledge of the world' 
(Kolakowski,1987 (1): 58). 
In other words Feuerbach rejected Hegel's idealist notion of 
'Spirit' depending for its being on nothing but itself, absolute, 
infinite; and every form of reality, of Being, intelligible only 
as a phase of the evolution of the Mind or Spirit as not only the 
first principle but also the only reality the Absolute. 
Feuerbach's 
"radical critique of Hegel amounted to a reversion to the 
philosophical materialism of the French Enlightenment, to 
Diderot, Holbach, and La Mettrie' (Callinicos,1987: 28). 
A key to Feuerbach's critique of Hegel was his concept of the 
species-being which denoted a conception of man characterized by 
consciousness of a universal "human essence', the same in himself 
as in other men a naturalistic conception rooted in 
Feuerbach's radical anthropocentric humanism. In basic terms 
Feuerbach argued that human nature has certain permanent features 
('essences') which provide the basis or foundation for estab-
lishing 'happiness, solidarity, equality, and freedom' 
(Kolakowski,1987 (1): 119) amongst an harmonious community of 
men. Feuerbach argued that religion subverts attempts to achieve 
human solidarity by depriving the human individual of his faculty 
of independent reason (i.e. his ability to conceive of himself in 
rational terms or categories). In Feuerbach's view religion 
"inverts the relationship between subject and predicates, 
giving human predicates -- in the shape of the Deity -- the 
primacy over what is real, human, and concrete. Religion is 
a self-dichotomy of man, his reason, and feelings, the 
transference of his intellectual and affective qualities on 
to an imaginary divine being which asserts its own indepen-
dence and begins to tyrannize over its creator· 
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(Kolakowski,1987 (1): 115; see Callinicos,1987: 28-29). 
In other words for Feuerbach 
crea-'the evolution of the human consciousness led to the 
tion by the imagination of an alien being to whom all man s 
essential powers were attributed' (Callinicos,1987: 29). 
As a consequence of this process, which he termed religious self-
alienation (a manifestation of mankind's objectified human es-
sence or nature), neither the individual nor man in his social 
relations with other men can be free until religion, the source 
of conflict and servitude in man's social relations, yields to a 
rational world view. 
Feuerbach's concept of the species-being is thus informed by a 
conception of the individual as consciously distinct from other 
individuals, yet linked by consciousness of a common and 
naturally determined human essence comprising permanent and 
natural human features: 
'Feuerbach thus presetved a Hegelian conception of history 
as the evolution of forms of consciousness; man's self-
enstrangement in religion is a necessary prelude to the es-
tablishment of the unity of subject and object. However, 
this unity is that of man and nature, not of the Idea and 
its empirical manifestations [as in Hegel's philosophy]. It 
is man who is the culmination of history, his species-being 
fully developed, rendered explicit as consciousness of his 
humanity, and of his roots in nature' (Callinicos,1987: 37-
38). 
Feuerbach's assertion that the 'opposition between God and man is 
a "mystified" version of the opposition between the species and 
the individual' (Kolakowski,1987 (1): 115) therefore embodied 
more than a rejection of the alienating force of religion, the 
most extreme form of human 'impoverishment'. Implicit in 
Feuerbach's critique of religion is an affirmation of a rational 
world view rooted in the 'Enlightenment stereotype of "natural 
egoism"' (Kolakowski,1987 (1): 117), an attempt to formulate a 
radically anthropocentric universal humanism or 'materialist 
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humanism' which, as Callinicos says, had a 'profound impact on 
the more radical of the young Hegelians, notably Marx, Hess, and 
Engels', to whom it seemed to imply 'that man's alienation could 
only be abolished in a communist society' (Callinicos,1987: 32). 
In the Preface to the Manuscripts, Marx acknowledged Feuerbach's 
contribution, describing it as follows: 
'The first positive humanist and naturalist criticism dates 
from Feuerbach [who's works are] the only one's since 
Hegel's Phenomenology and Logic to contain a real theoreti-
cal revolution' (Marx,1844 (2): 76). 
Furthermore, in a letter composed during the period in which the 
Manuscripts of 1844 was taking form, Marx attributed to Feuerbach 
the provision of 
a philosophical basis to socialism', continuing that 'the 
communists, too, have similarly understood these works 
[Feuerbach's Philosophy of the Future and Essence of Faith] 
in that sense. The unity of man with man based on the real 
difference between men, the concept of human society trans-
ferred from the heaven of abstraction to the real earth, 
what is this other than the concept of society!' (Marx,1844 
(3): 113). 
However whilst acknowledging Feuerbach's richly suggestive theory 
of religious self-alienation (of the realisation of the 
individual's innate capacity for co-operation conditional upon 
the dealientaion of human society), Marx regarded religion as a 
'manifestation, not a root, of social servitude' (Kolakowski,1987 
(1): 127). Transforming the 'merely' anti-religious criticism of 
the humanists into a critique of the condition requiring 
illusion, Marx argued that man is not an abstract being, man 'is 
the world of man, the state, society' (Marx,1844: 63). Con-
sequently for individuals the 'demand to give up the illusions 
about their condition is a demand to give up a condition that 
requires illusion' (emphasis added) (Marx,1844: 64). Therefore 
although religious suffering is real enough, for Marx it is an 
expression of and protest against real suffering, the sou~ce of 
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which is to be sought elsewhere. Taking over the concept of 
species-being, Marx imparted it with a distinctly "social' bias, 
arguing that mankind's common or universal consciousness is 
rooted in the social nature of individuals and not in some 
abstract 'essence': 
'Man becomes individualised only through the process of 
history. Originally he is a species-being. a tribal being. a 
.herd animal -- though by no means a zoon politikon in the 
political sense' (Marx,1857 (2): 165). 
The unifying potential inherent in mankind's common social con-
sciousness can only be realized, Marx argued, if individuals act 
in accordance with their nature as social beings, recognizing 
themselves as members of a universal community of men. Marx~s 
view of the source of all manifestations of unsocial human rela-
tions was, as suggested above, also related to Feuerbach's con-
cept of alienation (the key element of his humanistic critique of 
speculative metaphysics) which constituted an important impetus 
for Marx's redefinition of 'alienation' in terms of and rooted in 
the labour process (Arthur,1985: 4), that is 
'the self-alienation of man produced by the dialectical an-
tagonism between wealth and the proletariat' (Marx,1845 (2): 
156-8). 
This conception of human self-alienation was, as we shall see 
below, to become a cornerstone of Marx's materialist conception 
of history. And it is in this context that Marx concluded that 
Feuerbach had failed to expound the profound political and 
theoretical implications contained in his critique of idealism 
and religion, which Marx attempted to undertake in his 'early 
political writing' (see 2.1). In these early works, however, Marx 
came to reject all previous materialism (including both 
Feuerbach's and 18th Century French materialism) as 'mechanical' 
or 'static' materialism (Marx,1845: 149-155, Marx,1845 (2): 156; 
see McLellan,1987: 136). This complex transformation is discern-
able in Marx's Manuscripts (see 2.1), in The Holy Family (1845) 
(described by Marx himself as a work of 'real humanism', 
McLellan,1988: 131), concisely formulated in his Theses on Feuer-
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b.ruili. (1845) (Marx,1845 (2): 156-8), and forged into a more sys-
tematic form in ·The German Ideology ( 1846) (see 2. 2) to form the 
basis of the 'materialist conception of history' or 'historical 
materialism'. 
The general importance to Marx of Hegel's dialectical conception 
of society and Feuerbach's 'mechanical' materialism was em-
phasised by Antonio Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks,_ and espe-
cially in his notes on the 'problems of Marxism'. It would be in-
appropriate to introduce Gramsci's substantive argument at this 
stage. However it is instructive to note the perspective Gramsci 
placed on their relation, perhaps best described in the following 
passage in which the importance of the dialectic for Marx's 
materialism is emphasised: 
'Hegel, half-way between the French Revolution and the 
Restoration, gave dialectical form to the two moments of the 
life of thought, materialism and spiritualism, but his syn-
thesis was "a man walking on his head". Hegel's successors 
destroyed this unity and there was a return to materialist 
systems on the one side and spiritualist on the other. The 
philosophy of praxis [Marxism], through its founder, relived 
all this experience of Hegelianism, Feuerbachianism and 
French materialism, in order to reconstruct the synthesis of 
dialectical unity, "the man walking on his feet" 
(Gramsci,1986: 396). 
In the following chapter we will provide an account of Marx's 
materialist conception of history against the background of the 
Hegelian and Feuerbachian influences on Marx's thought described 




In Chapter 1 Hegel's concepts of the individual, civil society, 
the state and politics were considered for the purpose of a 
general discussion of their profound influence on Marx's politi-
cal thought. For Hegel, it was the role of the modern state to 
control, regulate and order civil society, since the state is 
'abstracted' from civil conflict rooted in antagonistic par-
ticular interests. The state in Hegel thus orders society whilst 
at the same time transcending society as an idealized 
collectivity; the state conceived as a rational and eternal a-
historical entity constituted of more than just political 
institutions. It is an ideal state, establishing a harmonious 
dialectical relationship amongst the various elements of society. 
It is important to remember, however, that in Hegel's view of 
political interests (and hence the political state) transcending 
individual economic interests (and hence civil society), the 
former does not seek to 'replace' the latter. 
In Marx's 'early' political writing (i.e. prior to the German 
Ideology) he agreed with Hegel that the transition from the 
feudal to post-feudal forms of society was a dialectical 
process'. With bourgeois political revolution came the demise of 
the feudal order heralding the division between civil and politi-
cal life. This division manifested itself in the formation of the 
distinct spheres of civil society and the political state. As a 
consequence the life of the individual became one of duality, 
that is on the one hand as a 'private' member of civil society 
and on the other as citizen of the state (the significance of 
this division for Marx's conception of politics will be discussed 
below). The 'dualism' that arose both in the structure of bour-
geois society as a whole, as well as in the relation of the in-
dividual to it, marked the emergence of modern political 
pluralism which for much of the Nineteenth Century asserted it-
self as the dominant political doctrine in Europe, especially in 
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the Anglo-French world. 
Marx, like Hegel, described civil society in its liberal concep-
tion and form as the arena of egoism and self-interest, the site 
of crass materialism as well as modern property relation~ and 
human struggle (Jessop,1984: 4; Bottomore,1987: 73; see Marx,1843 
(2): 55-57). However, unlike Hegel Marx did not believe that the 
relations of competition and conflict in civil society could be 
mediated or regulated by the political state. Indeed it is in his 
conception of the political state, and of its relation to civil 
society, that Marx fundamentally differed with Hegel as well as 
bourgeois political theorists in the liberal tradition. This fun-
damental difference with many of its implications, the most im-
portant of which is the question of Marx's political monism', 
will serve as the main focus for section 2.1, and will be dis-
cussed in the context of certain of Marx's earlier works. This 
will in turn provide the basis for our discussion of historical 
materialism in section 2.2. Section 2.2 will be divided into two 
parts. Section 2.2.1 will be devoted to an account of some of the 
basic concepts of historical materialism. In section 2.2.2 we 
will outline the main features of the 'orthodox' Marxism of the 
Second and Third Internationals, focusing on the problems of 
'determinism' and 'reductionism'. Section 2.2.2 will also serve 
as the basis for our discussion of Gramsci's radical critique of 
economism in subsequent chapters. 
2.1 The 'Early' Marx 
In the articles On the Jewish Question (1843) and the 
Introduction: Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (1844) Marx 
developed a number of the political themes which he also 
addressed in his 1843 Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right 
(see 1.4.2). However in the two former works Marx achieved a 
greater degree of conceptual clarity and uriity of reasoning 
especially, as we will see below, with regard to his emerging 
concepts of the state and politics. This section will accordingly 
start with a brief discussion of these two seminal works of the 
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young Marx. 
In the article On the Jewish Question Marx's concepts of species-
being, individual man, the 'abstract' citizen, and political as 
opposed to human emancipation, rights and revolution, were more 
clearly and coherently articulated than in his 1843 Critique. In 
addition Marx explicated his notion of the relation between civil 
society and the state, from which evolyed his understanding of 
the way in which 'real', i.e. human, emancipation is to be 
attained. Indeed it was the question of emancipation which 
emerged as the central theme of the article. 
The article begins with Marx's assertion that the common con-
sciousness underlying mankind's sense of communality is not 
recognised in the atomistic bourgeois conception of the in-
dividual (Marx,1843 (2): 39-43). Marx went on to argue that the 
doctrine of individualism is inherently unable to satisfactorily 
address the problem of modern .man's alienation in his social 
relations with other men. It was this v~ew which underlay Marx's 
rejection of the liberal notion of 'political emancipation', as 
constituting the final form of human emancipation. 
More specifically, Marx argued that political emancipation, 
brought about by bourgeois political revolution transformed state 
affairs (restricted in feudal society to the authority of the 
ruler and his servants) into general or public affairs concerning 
all citizens. However, although Marx considered the destruction 
of the feudal order to be a genuine achievement of bourgeois 
political revolution, he regarded the political equality accorded 
the individual, in terms of 'inalienable political rights', to be 
merely 'formal'. For, as he argued, 
'a state can liberate itself from a limitation without man 
himself being truly free of it and the state can be a free 
state without man himself being a free man' (Marx,1843 (2): 
44). 
In other words Marx rejected the liberal bourgeois notion that 
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there is a necessary correlation between political emancipation 
and the establishment of substantive equality and freedom for 
individuals. In bourgeois society the real differences between 
individuals in their socio-economic relations in civil society 
(e.g. of birth, class, education, race, profession, etc.) are 
treated as inessential with respect to the individual's standing 
as a citizen, i.e. to the individual's participation in popular 
sovereignty (Marx,1843 (2): 45, 55-56). However, for Marx the 
abolition of the significance of socio-economic differences in 
political society does not do away with the fact that the exist-
ence of the political state presupposes these differences in 
civil society (see Marx,1843 (2): 45), and this political 
equality may in fact reinforce unequal social relations by gloss-
ing over ·their true significance for the individual's political 
standing in society, thereby rendering political equality merely 
formal. The formation of the bourgeois political state and the 
disjuncture between the state and civil society therefore results 
in the individual leading a dual existence: 
'a life ... in the political community, where he is valued as 
a communal being, and in civil society, where he is active 
as a private individual, treat[ing] other men as means ... 
(Marx,1843 (2): 46). 
In other words, the formation of the bourgeois political state as 
distinct from civil society results in the individual living a 
dual existence, i.e. on the one hand as a citizen of the abstract 
political state and, on the other hand, as a self-interested mem-
ber of civil society. Consequently in civil society where man 
'counts for himself and others as a real individual, he is 
an illusory phenomenon. In the state, on the other hand, 
where man counts as a species-being, he is an imaginary par-
ticipant in an imaginary sovereignty, he is robbed of his 
real life and filled with an unreal universality' (Marx,1843 
(2): 46). 
Therefore whilst Marx subscribed to the goal of an emancipated 
universal community of men, he regarded the universality of the 
bourgeois political state and the communality of its citizens as 
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idealized constructs, a fiction of constitutions' (Arthur,1985: 
11). And since for Marx bourgeois political emancipation was not 
the final form of emancipation, the task of complete 'human' 
emancipation remained unfinished, and could only be realized when 
the emancipation of the state is accompanied by the abolition of 
the relations of conflict, inequality, domination and oppression 
between concrete individuals in their actual lives as members of 
civil society, thereby yielding social equality and justice 
(Marx,1843 (2): 41ff, 55f etc.). 
An important element in Marx's critique of the liberal programme 
for political emancipation wa~ his interpretation of bourgeois 
'human' rights. Rights were constituted, on the one hand, of the 
citizen's formal political right of participation in state af-
fairs and, on the other, of the universal rights of man, i.e. the 
'so-called' natural and imprescriptible rights of equality, 
liberty, property and security (Marx, 1843 (2): 51). Marx argued 
that in the bourgeois conception of human rights the 
'unpolitical' (i.e. egoistic, self-interested) individual of 
civil society appears, quite ironically, to be a natural 
object ... true man' (Marx,1843 (2): 56) and his rights as natural 
rights. This was because in bourgeois society political action is 
self-conscious whilst the action of the egoistic individual is 
spontaneous and thus appears to be natural. Consequently in the 
bourgeois conception communal man., t_he citizen, is 'only the 
abstract fictional man, man as an allegorical or moral person' 
(Marx,1843 (2): 56). This, Marx argued, is not a true reflection 
of the social nature of man, man the social-being: 
'This man as he actually is, is only recognized in the form 
of the egoistic individual and the true man only in the form 
of the abst~act citizen' (Marx,1843 (2): 56). 
For Marx it was paradoxical that a revolutionary class (the 
bourgeoisie), which had shattered feudal relations to form a 
political community (the state), should proclaim 'the justifica-
tion of egoistic man separated from his fellow men and community' 
(Marx,1843 (2): 54). In Marx's view the political emancipators 
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thus degraded citizenship, the political community, 'to a mere 
means for the preservation of the so-called rights of man', in 
effect declaring the citizen 'to be the servant of egoistic man, 
the sphere in which man behaves as a partial being'. As a con-
sequence of all of this 'it is not man as a citizen but man as a 
bourgeois who is called the real and true man' (Marx,1843 (2): 
54; see also Gilbert,1981: 5-6, 21-3, 89, 128). The enforcement 
of the 'bourgeois rights of man' by the state thus leads to the 
institutionalisation of their separation and disunity as well as 
entrenching social relations of domination and conflict in civil 
society. 
For Marx the disjunction of the state and civil society produced 
a negative and inverse relation between them, i.e. the greater 
the concentration of politics and political activity in the 
political arena of the state the greater the materialism of rela-
tions in civil society (see Marx,1843 (2): 56). The contradiction 
of the egoistic individual, with all his real attributes, as a 
member of unsocial civil society with the political state made up 
of citizens who enjoy merely abstract or formal (i.e. fictitious) 
universality, can therefore not be resolved by reform of the 
state only. In opposition to Hegel, therefore, who maintained 
that the state acts autonomously to order and regulate the unso-
cial relations in civil society, Marx regarded the state as an 
expression of the unsocial relations of a depoliticised civil 
society. Consequently not even the most democratic state is 
capable of forging civil society into a genuine community. The 
only way in which the state could transcend the contradiction of 
its abstraction from the real life of the individuals in civil 
society and so enforce the general will would be to abolish the 
distinction between itself and civil society: 
'the State would have to absorb civil society and this, of 
course, would end its specific basis as an institution 
abstracted from civil life' (Arthur,1985: 11). 
Furthermore if the potential for unity inherent in mankind's com-
mon consciousness is to be realized the social nature of man must 
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serve as the organising principle of human society: 
'man must recognize his own forces as social forces, or-
ganize them, and thus no longer separate social forces from 
himself in the form of political forces. Only when this has 
been achieved will human emancipation be completed' 
(Marx,1843 (2): 57; see also Marx,1844 (4): 124-7). 
In this view, then, politics reflects man's alienation of his so-
cial nature from himself. Implicit is a narrow concept of 
politics as the activity pertaining to the structures and in-
stitutions of the political state or the governmental subsystem 
of society. Politics is identified, ultimately, with the struggle 
for state power. However, as we will show in section 2.2, Marx 
also went on to develop a rather different notion of politics in 
terms of the struggle of economically determined social classes, 
a view first expressed in The German Ideology (1846). Marx's call 
for human emancipation amounted to a negative pronouncement upon 
the narrow bourgeois concept of politics; on this view human 
emancipation would lead to the demise of the state, the arena of 
politics and government structures. For Marx the liberal 
programme for political emancipation was thus fatally flawed in 
so far as it remained within the prevailing social order. 
Emancipation, to be complete, must be extended to the 
'revolutionary transformation of the economic and social order' 
(Miliband,1988: 10; see also Held,1987: 225-226). 
In the 1844 Introduction to his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 
of Right (1843), first published in the Deutsch-Franzoesische 
Jahrbuecher, Marx crossed the threshold to revolutionary com-
munism (Callinicos,1987: 34, 35), introducing his conception of 
social revolution led by the proletarian class. In terms 
foreshadowing The German Ideology (1846), Marx argued that 
'the basis of a partial, purely political revolution... is 
that a part of civil society emancipates itself and attains 
to universal domination, that a particular class undertakes 
the general emancipation of society from its particular 
situation. This class frees the whole of society, but only 
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under the presupposition that the whole of society is in the 
same situation as this class ... ' (Marx,1844 (1): 71). 
In order, therefore, that a general revolution and the emancipa-
tion of a particular class of civil society should coincide, 
'the deficiency of all society must inversely be con-
centrated in another class... regarded as the notorious 
crime of the whole society, so that the liberation of this 
sphere appears as universal self-liberation' (emphasis 
added) (Marx,1844 (1): 71). 
Io other words a particular class with particular interests (such 
as the bourgeoisie) may project itself as the representative of 
general social needs, thus claiming to represent all of society 
in its pursuit of emancipation. However such a putative revolu-
tionary class is necessarily unable to establish universal human 
emancipation since it presupposes an equality of (human) means 
not yet in existence. The agency of actual universal emancipation 
must therefore be sought in a class 
'in civil society that is not of civil society, ... a social 
group that is the dissolution of all social groups... This 
dissolution of society, as a particular class, is the 
proletariat' (Marx,1844: 72, 73). 
Marx described the proletariat as a universal class due to its 
universal sufferings, its condition of propertylessness imposed 
by bourgeois society. The realization of the interests of the 
proletariat must thus imply the dissolution of the hitherto ex-
isting world order, for the universalization of the conditions of 
the proletariat (the realization of its demands) is the univer-
salization of those principles which society has laid down for 
the proletariat. 
Although the 1844 Introduction marked an important transition in 
Marx's thought, the concepts of 'class' and 'revolution' which 
were to become so central to his materialist conception of 
history, remained as yet ill-defined. Furthermore, although Marx 
now envisaged a central role for the proletariat in the revolu-
tionary transformation of society, the proletariat was not yet 
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conceived as a determinate class formed within 'the specific 
relations of production which endow it with the capacity to 
create a classless society' (Callinicos,1987: 35). Marx took a 
significant step towards integrating the key elements of his nas-
cent world view in the 1844 Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts. 
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 Marx linked 
his notion of the proletariat as the revolutionary agent of human 
emancipation with a discussion of alienated socio-economic class 
formation rooted in the the relation of labour to property and 
capital in the labour-process of capitalist society. Though never 
completed and still betraying the considerable influence of 
Feuerbach's 'fundamental humanism' (see for example Marx,1844 
(2): 76, 97-8), the 1844 Manuscripts nevertheless marked an im-
portant transition in Marx's thought. It introduced a revolution-
ary new materialist notion of human nature, conceived not in 
terms of some abstract essence (as in Hegel's 'Absolute Idea' and 
Feuerbach's transcendant universal human nature) but rooted in 
the labour-process: 
'Man's species-being consists, not in his self-
consciousness, but in his objective relation to nature, the 
labour-process which provides the framework of man's inter-
action with his environment' (Callinicos,1987: 38). 
In the passage titled 'Alienated Labour·, which is also the key 
organising concept of the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx asserted that he 
had been able to show that in bourgeois society the worker's 
degradation and misery stands in an inverse relation to 
'the power and size of his production; that the necessary 
'result of competition is the accumulation of capital ... and 
that finally ... the whole of society must fall apart into 
the two classes of the property owners and the propertyless 
workers' (Marx,1844 (2): 77). 
The worker stands in an alienated relation to his own production. 
Labour's product, the object that labour produces,. confronts its 
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producer as alien, as an independent and 'solidified' object. In 
consequence the worker eventually falls under the domination of 
the product of his own labour. Consequently if the product of 
labour is alienated from the producer, the entire productive ac-
tivity itself, man's 'vital activity', must be an alienating 
activity: 
'So if the product of labour is externalization, production 
itself must be active externalization, the externalization 
of activity, the activity of externalization... It is self-
alienation, as above it was the alienation of the object 
(Marx,1844 (2): 80, 81). 
The alienating effect of labour thus goes beyond merely alienat-
ing nature from man and man from himself. It also alienates 
'the species from man; it turns his species-life into a 
means towards his individual life' (Marx,1844 (2): 82). 
This alienation from his species is expressed in an . unsocial' or 
alienated consciousness, species-life becoming a 'means' for in-
dividual life and serving the interests of the individual (just 
as the abstract universal community of the bourgeois political 
state is a means to an end for the egoistic individual of civil 
society). Thus 
'only under communism, where alienated labour and its ex-
pression in private property are abolished, will human 
beings be able to enjoy a fulfilled life' (Callinicos,1987: 
40; see Marx,1844 (2): 83). 
Moreover, the worker's 'unfree', alienated relation to his own 
productive activity reflects the worker's domination and oppres-
sion by other men (see Marx,1844 (2): 83-4), namely 
'of the capitalist, or whatever else one wishes to call the 
master of the labour. Private property is thus the product, 
result, and necessary consequence of externalized labour' 
(emphases added) (Marx,1844 (2): 84). 
Alienation is hence no longer 'essentially a mental phenomenon, 
as in Feuerbach' (Callinicos,1987: 40), but a product of 
capitalist relations of production and of the conflict between 
the capitalist class and labour class or proletariat. The 
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Manuscripts pointed 
'toward a theory of history based on the analysis of the 
historically variable social and technical forms in which 
production i~ organized ... the beginnings of an analysis of 
capitalism in terms of the social relations of production· 
(Callinicos,1987: 43). 
Marx's materialist conception of history referred to in this pas-
sage constitutes the basis of the entire Marxist tradition of 
political theory. For our purposes the particular significance of 
Marx's analysis of the human labour-process in the Manuscripts is 
that it provided a foundation for his as yet implicit or emerging 
concept of politics, that is politics associated with antagonis-
tic class relations located in the economic and social relations 
of capitalist society within which the proletariat emerges as an 
active revolutionary force. Marx had by now arrived at the basis 
for a concept of politics which especially in his later writing 
came to assume a broad meaning: politics conceived as the 
struggle between classes permeating the economic and social 
spheres of society. 
For the remainder of this chapter we will examine the main fea-
tures of Marx's mature thought with particular reference to his 
analysis of capitalist society and his class-based concept of 
politics. 
2.2 Marx's Materialist Conception Of History 
As stated in the Introduction to this study, the discussion in 
Chapters 3 and 4 of the sense in which Gramsci revaluated Marx's 
conceptions of the state and politics must proceed against their 
general background in Marx's materialist theo~y of history, also 
reffered to as historical materialism. Section 2.2.1 sets out to 
construct such a broad outline of the main features of historical 
materialism, and especially of Marx's concepts of ~he state and 
politics, with reference to The German Ideology (1846). The 
reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, The German Ideology con-
tains the first and perhaps Marx's most systematic formulation of 
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historical materialism, subsequently elaborated in the Manifesto 
of the Communist Party (1848), The Poverty of Philosophy (1847), 
the 1859 Preface to a Contribution to the Critigue of Political 
Economy, and the third volume of Capital (1864). 
A second reason, and one which as we shall see is quite 
controversial, is that the conception of history expressed by 
Marx in The German Ideology is quite similar in its instrumen-
talist and reductionist concerns to that of the 1859 Preface 
which, of all of Marx's writings, had the most profound impact on 
Marxist 'orthodoxy' (see section 2.2.2). It is also relevant that 
Gramsci, who interestingly enough emphasized the 1859 Preface in 
his writing, was highly critical of this orthodoxy. Marx's view 
of human history and society in both these works lent itself to 
economic determinism· or a view of society's legal, political 
and ideological forms as fully determined by its economic struc-
ture or 'mode of production'. Since The German Ideology remained 
unpublished until 1932 it can hardly be cited as an influence on 
the 'economism' characteristic of early orthodox Marxism during 
the period of the Second and Third Internationals. However, it 
had a marked influence on the formulations of the 1859 Preface 
and as such may be regarded as a starting point for exploring the 
probl~ms arising from the economism of this Marxist orthodoxy. 
Section 2.2. will thus be structured as follows. In section 2.2.1 
we will outline the main features of historical materialism high-
lighting the notion of the 'primacy' of the economic base in 
Marx's account of society, as well as Marx's class based notion 
of politics. This will be followed in section 2.2.2, by a selec-
tive review of some of the controversies it has given rise to, 
with special reference to the Marxist orthodoxy of the Second and 
Third Internationals. 
2.2.1 Historical Materialism And The Class Based Theory Of 
Politics 
Given the general absence in Marx of a systematic and fully 
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developed framework for the analysis of the state and politics, 
this section sets out to identify the main features of the latter 
concepts in the tradition of historical materialism according to 
which Marx conceived of human society metaphorically as the 
relationship between an economic base or structure and its legal, 
political and ideological superstructure. 
The German Ideology opens with a general statement of Marx's 
view, underlying most of his earlier writing, that in all pre-
vious history 'men have constantly made up for themselves false 
conceptions ... about what they are and what they ought to be' 
(Marx,1846 (2): 37), i.e. conceptions based on idealistic inter-
pretations of human history, 'the rule of thoughts' (Marx,1846 
(2): 37) and speculative philosophy. Marx argued that the first 
premiss of all human history is the existence of living human in-
dividuals and their struggle for survival by which they are bound 
to their material conditions. In other words, for Marx men must 
be able to ensure ~heir biological survival before they are able 
to make history. Hence the fundamental condition of all history 
is the 'production of the means to satisfy these needs, the 
production of material life itself' (Marx,1846: 165). These 
material conditions involve also those produced by human 
activity. Furthermore, Marx argued, the satisfaction of the 
primary needs of men leads to the creation of new needs. And this 
production of new needs constitutes the first 'historical act' 
(Marx,1846: 166). 
Marx did not deny that consciousness distinguishes man from 
animal. However, he argued that in reality, i.e. in their con-
crete existence, men begin to distinguish themselves from animals 
as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence', 
and by so doing indirectly reproduce the conditions of their ac-
tual material life, ·a step which is conditioned by their physi-
cal organization' (emphasis added) (Marx,1846: 160). The first 
fact to be established, therefore, is the physical organization 
of individuals in the production of their means of subsistence, 
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and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. In The Ger-
man Ideology Marx argued quite generally that the way in which 
men produce their means of subsistence constitutes the mode of 
production, which is 
a definite form of activity of these individuals, a 
definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express 
their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides 
with their ·production, both with Rha..t. they produce and with 
hm! they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on 
the material conditions determining their production' 
(Marx,1846: 160-1). 
This mode of production is constituted not only by the way in 
which individuals organise the production of their physical ex-
istence (in a 'technical' sense as the mode or manner of produc-
tion of their material life) but also by the form or manner of 
their 'intercourse', a social relation, which constitutes the 
type of social formation (social system) necessary to the produc-
tion of their physical existence and which is, in turn, dependent 
on the material conditions determining their production. In other 
words for Marx the physical organisation of individuals in the 
process of production determines the social relation of in-
dividuals in the production process; a certain mode of 
production, or industrial stage, is therefore always combined 
with a certain mode of cooperation, or social stage - itself a 
'productive force' (Marx,1846: 161). 
In The German Ideology Marx argued that the degree to which the 
division of labour has developed or manifested itself within the 
dominant mode of production of a society is an indiqation of the 
extent to which the 'productive forces' (generally, the ~owers 
available to producers in the process of production, see below) 
of a society have developed (Marx,1846: 161). And changes in the 
division of labour itself is promoted by the introduction of each 
qualitatively new productive force. Within society, furthermore, 
the process of the development of the division of labour results 
in 'the separation of industrial and commercial from agricultural 
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labour'; subsequently in the 'separation of commercial from in-
dustrial labour'; and simultaneously, through the division of 
labour within these distinct branches, in 'divisions among the 
individuals co-operating in definite kinds of labour' (Marx,1846: 
161) in the production process. 
If the possibility of more than one mode of production existing 
within a society remains implicit in The German Ideology, in the 
'Introduction' to the Grundrisse (1857), Marx unambiguously as-
serted that different modes of production may coexist or subsist 
in concrete societies at a specific juncture in their historical 
development, and most especially in bourgeois society which is 
'the most developed and most highlj differentiated histori-
cal organization of production... [based] on the organiza-
tion and the relationships of production which have 
prevailed under all the past forms of society, on the ruins 
and constituent elements of which it has arisen, and of 
which it still drags along some unsurmounted remains 
(Marx,1857: 355, see 356). 
However Marx stated quite clearly that under 
'all forms of society there is a certain industry [i.e. 
determinate kind of production or mode of production] which 
predominates over all the rest and whose condition therefore 
determines the rank and influence of all the rest ... that 
appears in it' (Marx,1857: 356). 
This notion of economic primacy is also implicitly stated in a 
passage from Capital III, in which Marx discusses the general 
origin of the state in the economic base: 
'This does not prevent the same economic basis -- the same 
from the standpoint of its main conditions due to in-
numerable different empirical circumstances, natural 
environment, racial relations, external historical 
influences, etc., from showing infinite variations and 
gradations in appearance, which can be ascertained only by 
analysis of the empirically given circumstances' (emphasis 
added) (Marx, 1984: 791-2) 
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Although the constituent parts of the mode of production are not 
clearly articulated in The German Ideology, in Marx's later 
works, and especially in Capital, he quite explicitly stated that 
within each mode of production there is a relation of correspon-
dence between forces and relations of production (Marx,1986: 36). 
However before we discuss this relation we must firstly define 
Marx's concepts of the forces and relations of production. The 
account of historical materialism as first articulated in the 
German Ideology requires more specific analysis of the concept 
forces of production as this was standardised in 'orthodox' 
Marxism. A systematic account of orthodox Marxism will, however, 
only be provided in section 2.2.2. 
Marx's concept of the production forces can basically be divided 
into two elements, the means of production and labour power. The 
means of production or 'material' forces of production are con-
stituted on the one hand of raw materials generally referred to 
as the 'objects' of production, and on the other of the 
'instruments' of production such as tools, machines, factories, 
as well as 'infrastructural elements' such as roads, canals, etc. 
(Bottomore,1987: 207, see 267). In Capital Marx describes the 
means of p~oduction a~ 'the instruments of labour, the raw 
material, and the auxiliary substances consumed [in the process 
of production]· (Marx,1983: 531). Marx describes labour power or 
the capacity for labour as the 
aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing 
in a human being, which he exercises whenever he produces a 
use-value of any description' (Marx,1983: 164). 
Labour power is thus constituted of 'the skills, [techniques], 
knowledge, experience, ·· ·and other human f acu 1 ties used in work' 
(Bottomore,1987: 207, see 178; Marx,1983: 164). The means of 
production and labour power combine in the labour process to 
produce use values which involves the alteration in the object of 
work effected by labour, labour materialised or objectified. 
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McLennan argues that for orthodox Marxists, such as Georgi Plek-
hanov and in recent years G.A. Cohen, the 'material character.· of 
the production forces is emphasised (McLennan,1989: 80-63). In 
other words on his view orthodox Marxists tend to draw a clear 
distinction between production forces conceived in material 
terms, and social relations of production. This orthodox position 
is, however, controversial and it has been contested within the 
Marxist tradition as well as in the study of Marx himself. As 
McLennan, for example, argues Marx on many occasions wrote 
·of the "social forces of production", "productive power", 
and the like, with no apparent desire clearly to separate 
technologies and knowledge from social relations. Above all, 
this is true of the various forms of human co-operation in 
the labour process· (McLennan,1989: 62; see also 2.2.2). 
In McLennan's view Marx not only frequently referred to the form 
or mode of 'cooperation· existing between individuals involved in 
the production process (i.e. work relations) as a productive 
force, but frequently described the latter as the principal 
productive force (see McLennan,1989: 82-3). An example of this is 
a passage from the Grundrjsse in which Marx discussed the 
'tribal' mode of production which, he argued, 
'is as much the relationship of the individuals to one 
another as it is their specific active relationship towards 
inorganic nature, a specific mode of working ... 
munity itself appears as the first great 
The com-
f orce of 
production; particular conditions of production ... give rise 
to particular modes of production and particular forces of 
production, both subjective ones, i.e. those which appear as 
qualities of the individuals, and objective ones .. (Marx, 1857 
( 2): 164). 
In the light of the terminological difficulties which occur in 
Marx's earlier works McLennan, amongst others, questions the 
strict or narrow conceptual formulations characteristic of or-
thodox Marxism (McLennan, 1989: 82-83). Callinicos goes so far as 
to say that Marx's early account of his theory of history is 
plagued by a fundamental conflation of technical and social 
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relations. Callinicos argues, for example, that in The German 
Ideology Marx confused elements of the production forces with a 
'promiscuously' inclusive notion of social relations 
(Callinicos,1987: 49-51). However for Callinicos the 'mode of 
cooperation' itself, properly understood, 'presents no serious 
difficulty' for Marx's poncept of production forces. On the con-
trary it is one of two constituent elements of the production 
forces (Produktionsweise): 
'The first is what the classical economists called the 
"production powers" of man, the productivity of labour per-
mitted by the existing level of development of technique. 
Secondly, Marx argued, in line with his stress on the social 
nature of production, that the technical organization of the 
labour-process requires a certain "mode 
among the producers. This arises from the 
of cooperation" 
specific tech-
nological imperatives of production, irrespective of the na-
ture of the prevailing social relations' (Callinicos,1987: 
48-49). 
This brief discussion of Marx's concept of production forces as 
well as certain aspects of its later interpretation is intended 
as an introductory outline of this key but controversial concept 
for the general discussion of historical materialism. ,The concept 
will, however, be discussed further in section 2.2.2. Suffice it 
here to make the general point that for our purposes the produc-
tion forces can, broadly speaking, be said to represent the 
powers available to society in material production 
(Bottomore,1987: 207). 
Similar problems to those connected with the concept of forces of 
production arise in relation to the key concept of relations of 
production. In somewhat general terms Marx's concept of the rela-
tions of production has been described as the link between 
'productive forces and human beings in the process of production' 
(Bottomore,1987: 207) or the 'relationships between people into 
which they enter for the purpose of the production, exchange and 
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distribution of goods' (Kernig,1973: 35), relationships which 
form 'the foundation of social life' (Kolakowski,1989 (1): 337) 
and constitute what Marx referred to as the economic base of 
society. Herein lies' its crucial importance for Marx's historical 
materialism: the relations of production constitute the link be-
tween the forces of production and society's legal, political and 
ideological spheres in the superstructure. In other words, for 
Marx (by some accounts)· the developing forces of production 
determine the relations of production and they themselves deter-
mine the superstructure. This view, which is termed 
'technological determinism', is quite unambiguously expressed in 
certain of Marx's texts, e.g. in the 1859 Preface, and it formed 
the basis of the orthodox Marxist economism of the Second Inter-
national (see 2.2.2). However, like so many other of Marx's key 
concepts the relations of production has been subject to differ-
ing interpretations and remains the source of a great deal of 
controversy, in no small part due to its inconsistent meaning in 
Marx. 
A fairly standard definition of the production relations provided 
by Bottomore holds that the concept is constituted of two 'types' 
of relations. On the one hand there are those pertaining to 
'technical relations necessary for the actual production process 
to proceed', and on the other of 'relations of economic 
control ... that govern access to the forces and products of 
production', which manifest themselves legally as 'property 
ownership' or social property relations. In this view the dis-
tinction between the two types of production relations is between 
the 'material work relations and their socioeconomic integument' 
(Bottomore,1987: 207). It may well be noted that from the above 
discussion of Marx's concept of production forces as involving a 
conflation of technical and social relations Bottomore's inclu-
sion of 'material work relations' in the production relations is 
not an uncontroversial position. Nonetheless for our purpose here 
of providing a general description of the production relations 
there is no need to enter into the polemic on the issue. 
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Both Bottomore and Callinicos distinguish between 'economic' con-
trol and 'legal' ownership of the production forces. This is an 
important, and widely accepted, distinction since the formal 
legal right of ownership (legal title) over forces of production 
does not neccesarily mean effective economic control over them. 
For, as Marx argued in the Grundrisse, 
'in so far as property is only a conscious relation to the 
conditions of production as one's Q.Hll. ••• it is realised only 
through production. Real appropriation does not occur 
through the establishment of a notional relationship to 
these conditions, but takes place in the active, real 
relationship to them, when they are really posited as the 
conditions of man's subjective activity' (Marx,1857 (2): 
162). 
Kernig describes the 'conditions' of ownership of the means of 
production as the crucial factor in, or basis for, classifying 
the 'various formations of -production relations ... which have ex-
isted in history' (Kernig,1973: 35). In The German Ideology Marx 
outlined four major modes of production in terms of different 
epochs characterised by distinct relationships of the economic 
ownership of the direct producers to the 'material, instrument, 
and product of labour' (Marx,1846: 161). The first form Marx 
described as tribal ownership, 'confined to a further extension 
of the natural division of labour existing in the family' 
(Marx,1846: 161-2), in which the division between the labour-, 
power of the direct producers on the one hand, and the means of 
production on the other, had not yet arisen. In other words 
tribal ownership relations were communal in nature and precluded 
private ownership of the means of production. Marx described the 
second form as ancient communal and state ownership which cor-
responded to the emergence of private property as yet, however, 
'as an abn~rmal form subordinate to communal ownership' and in 
which 'the class relation between citizens and slaves is ... com-
pletely developed' (the concept of class in Marx will be dis-
cussed below) (Marx,1846: 162). In slave society the owners of 
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the means of production also own the labour-power (the slaves), 
i.e. they own and control society's production forces as a whole. 
As Marx argued in the Grundrisse, in slave society 
'labour itself,... in the form of the slave... is placed 
along with the other natural beings such as cattle as an in-
organic condition of production, as an appendage of the 
soil' (Marx,1857 (2): 160). 
In the third form, feudal or estate ownership, society was 
divided by the antagonistic relation of the feudal lords or 
nobility to the enserfed small peasantry. Later this latter divi-
sion was extended to a social conflict between country and towns. 
And the towns were organized along the lines of corporative 
property, i.e. 'the labour of the individual with small capital 
commanding the labour of journeymen' (Marx,1846: 163). In Marx's 
view the direct producers in feudal society had some limited 
degree of control both over the means of production as well as 
their own labour-power. Finally, Marx regarded modern bourgeois 
or capitalist relations of ownership as the most complex of the 
various historical forms of ownership. He argued that in bour-
geois society a strong division arises between the' direct 
producers, i.e. the workers or proletariat, and the owners of the 
means of production, i.e. the capitalist class. The 
proletarianised workers are denied independent access to the 
means of production and possess only their labour-power which 
they are compelled to sell to the owners of the means of 
production, the capitalist class, in order to survive 
(Callinicos,1987: 50). To put it differently, although the in-
dividual wage-labourer in capitalist society is not legally 
forced to sell its labour-power to the capitalist class, the 
workers in effect have no access to the means of production other 
than by entering the capitalist production process. For the 
labourer or worker, 
'on quitting the process, is what he was on entering it, a 
source of wealth, but devoid of all means of making that 
wealth his own' (Marx,1983: 535). 
82 
Callinicos argues that the production relations in societies 
characterised by social class division (i.e. in ancient slave, 
feudal and capitalist societies) are 'therefore, in the first 
place, relations of exploitation' (Callinicos,1987: 50; see also 
below). In other words a consequence of the private ownership of 
the means of production in class societies is that the property 
relations in these societies 'are characterised by subjugation 
and exploitation of the producers' (Kernig,1973: 35). The produc-
tion relations might therefore best be defined as 'the forms of 
possession of the means of production and the appropriation of 
surplus product' (McLennan,1989: 60), where surplus product means 
the difference between the use-value of a direct producer's 
production and the distribution of income arising from that 
production. In class societies this difference is appropriated 
and accumulated in the form of unpaid surplus value by the owners 
of the means of production. 
More specifically, in capitalist society the products of labour 
take the form of commodities which are produced for sale as 
values and are owned by the capitalist who 
'obtains surplus value from the difference between the value 
of the product and the value of the capital involved in the 
production process, [and] the amount of surplus value a 
worker produces is the difference between the value he or 
she produces and the value of his or her labour power 
(Bottomore,1987: 472, 473). 
The extraction of surplus value from the wage-labourer is thus 
the form of exploitation specific to the capitalist mode of 
production. In capitalist society the commodity involved in the 
production and exchange process appears as the union of its two 
constituent elements, namely its use value and its exchange value 
(Marx,1983: 44). The former refers to its 'usefulness to some 
agent, which is what permits the commodity to enter into exchange 
at all' (Bottomore,1987: 504). The property which determines the 
utility of a thing 
'is independent of the amount of labour required to ap-
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propriate its useful qualities... [and] become a reality 
only by use or consumption' (Marx,1983: 44). 
Exchange vlaue refers to a commodity's 'power to command certain 
quantities of other commodities in exchange' (Bottomore,1987: 
504). Marx argued that a commodity's exchange value is a 
variable, 
'a relation constantly changing in time and place. Hence 
exchange-value appears to be something accidental and purely 
relative, and consequently an intrinsic value... [and is 
generally] only the mode of expression, the phenomenal form, 
of something contained in it, yet distinguishable from it' 
(Marx,1983: 44). 
Marx argued that labour itself is composed of the same two-fold 
nature as the commodity (Marx,1983: 48) which is, furthermore, 
linked to the commodity. And the 
'contradiction between use value and exchange value inherent 
in the commodity form, when it appears in labour power 
viewed as a commodity, is the source of the major social 
contradiction of capitalist production, the class division 
between workers and capitalists' (Bottomore,1987: 504). 
From this account it will be clear that Marx's concept of produc-
tion relations is directly linked to his concept of class which 
is, in a number of respects, central to historical materialism. 
Marx did not claim to have discovered classes: 
no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of 
classes ... or the struggle between them ... What I did that 
was new was to prove... that the existence of classes is 
only bound up with particular historical phases in the 
development of production ... ' (Marx,1857: 341). 
For Marx a class is defined not merely by a shared income status 
of a collectivity of members within a society or even by the 
source of the revenue identified with that collectivity but by 
its relation to the ownership of the means of production. Since 
all classes 
'derive their revenue from the same source, namely the value 
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produced by the workers' labour, and since the way this 
value is distributed depends on who owns the means of 
production, it is the ownership that constitutes the ul-
timate criterion [of class distinction]' (Kolakowski 1,1987: 
353). 
The social collectivity to which individuals or agents belong is 
therefore determined, broadly speaking, with reference to their 
relationship to the productive process as a whole (Hunt,1984: 9). 
A factor common to the formation of all classes is exploitation 
which 
occurs when one section of the 






The relationship between classes 'turns upon the form of ex-
ploitation occurring in a given mode of production' 
(Bottomore,1987: 157). And it is the various forms of exploita-
tion which are the source of the different forms of class an-
tagonism and consequent conflict: 
'Thus the different types of society, the classes within 
them, and the class conflict which provides the dynamic of 
any society can all be characterized by the specific way in 
which exploitation occurs' (Bottomore,1987: 157). 
Marx did not assert that the structure of class societies is 
necessarily dualistic: 
'The owners merely of labour-power, owners of capital, and 
land-owners, whose respective sources of income are wages, 
profit and ground-rent, in other words, wage-labourers, 
capitalists and land-owners, constitute then three big 
classes of modern society based upon the capitalist mode of 
production' (Marx,1984: 885). 
However he did argue that by definition a class exists in rela-
tion to at least one other class, i.e. class societies are com-
posed of at least two classes. In reality class societies may be 
constituted of numerous gradations and formations of classes to 
which, however, the polarised relation of possession and 
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dispossession, domination and dominated, exploiters and 
exploited, is fundamental (Marx,1846: 169). This view is clearly 
formulated in the famous final and uncompleted chapter of Capital 
Ill. in the context of Marx's analysis of class relations in 
capitalist society. Thus although Marx conceived a third major 
class in bourgeois society, i.e. the land owners, as well as 
'intermediate' or 'transitional' classes (e.g. the petty 
bourgeoisie) and class 'fractions' (e.g. the small manufacturers, 
shopkeepers), Marx argued that in capitalist society class rela-
tions have an inherent tendency to develop towards a polar 
division. 
Nonetheless Marx asserted that even in the case of England, which 
in his day was the most developed capitalist society in the 
world, 
'the stratification of classes does not appear in its pure 
form. Middle and intermediate strata even here obliterate 
lines of demarcation everywhere... However, this is im-
material for our analysis. We have seen that the continual 
tendency and law of development of the capitalist mode of 
production is more and more to divorce the means of produc-
tion from labour, and more and more to concentrate the scat-
tered means of production into large groups, thereby trans-
forming labour into wage-labour and the means of production 
into capital. And to this tendency [corresponds] the trans-
formation of all landed property into the form of landed 
property corresponding to the capitalist mode of production' 
(Marx,1984: 885). 
Thus although Marx acknowledged the innumerable variations and 
gradations of class forms which may appear in historically actual 
societies (see for example: The 18th Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte),. the general thrust of his class analysis was a two-
class logic, i.e. the postulated tendency that social divisions 
in capitalist society lead to a duality of two principal classes 
engaged in struggle. 
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We are now in a position to describe Marx's concept of the mode 
of production with more specific reference to his concepts of the 
forces and relations of production, as well as the process of 
transition between different modes of production. In fact Marx 
provides just such a 
worth quoting at some 
description in his Grundrisse, which is 
length. Marx here argued that self-
preservation is the object of all 'communities', i.e. the 
reproduction of the same 'objective mode of existence, which a..l..s..o. 
constitutes the relationship of the members to each other. and 
therefore constitutes the community itself' (Marx's emphasis) 
(Marx,1857 (2): 162-163). As this passage suggests, by reproduc-
tion Marx meant the continua~ion of existing production as well 
as the creation of the conditions for continuation bf production 
(production in Marx cannot si•ply be reduced to material produc-
tion but on a general level involved the reproduction of the so-
cial formation as well as of the economy): 
'Whatever the form of the process of production in a 
society, it must be a continuous process ... A society can no 
more cease to produce than it can cease to consume. When 
viewed, therefore, as a connected whole, and as flowing on 
with incessant renewal, every social process of production 
is, at the same time, a process of reproduction' (Marx,1983: 
531). 
However this process of reproduction is inherently unstable since 
the dynamics of social reproduction dialectically contain forces 
which lead to the dissolution of the existing order in its trans-
formation into a new mode of production. In other words the mode 
of existence of a society is based on its conditions of produc-' 
tion and the relations corresponding to these, but 
'this reproduction is at the same time necessarily new 
production and the destruction of the old form. For 
instance, where each individual is supposed to possess a 
certain amount of land [a material means of production], the 
increase in population already presents a problem ... Thus 
the preservation of the old community implies the destruc-
tion of the conditions on which it rests, and turns into its 
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opposite. For instance, if it were to be argued that produc-
tivity could be increased within the same territory, through 
a development of the productive forces ... the old economic 
conditions of the community would be transcended. In the act 
of reproduction itself are changed not only the objective 
conditions... but also the producers, who transform them-
selves in that they evolve new qualities from within 
themselves, develop through production new powers and new 
ideas, new modes of intercourse, new needs, and new 
speech ... 
In the final analysis the community, as well as the prope~ty 
based upon it, comes down to a certain stage in the develop-
ment of the productive forces and the working subjects, to 
which correspond certain relations of these subjects to each 
other and to nature. Up to a certain point, reproduction. 
Then this turns into dissolution' (Marx,1857 (2): 162-164) 
In the above passage from the Gruodrisse Marx argued that the 
dialectical relation between the developing productive forces and 
the existing production relations of a mode of production deter-
mines the nature of society. It follows from this that the form 
of the 'community', the '"history of humanity", must always be 
studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and 
exchange' (Marx,1846: 186). This basic tenet of historical 
materialism 
Ideology: 
is already clearly ennunciated in The German 
'the social structure and the State are continually evolving 
out of the life-process of definite individuals ... as they 
operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under 
definite material limits, presuppositions, and conditions 
independent of their will' (Marx,1846: 164). 
In addition to ~he material bases of the social and political 
structure in production, Marx argued, men are the producers of 
their own conceptions and ideas, whether these are of politics, 
law, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc .. Religion, culture and 
ideology are the products of 'men in their actual, empirically 
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perceptible process of development under definite conditions' 
(Marx,1846: 164, 165, also 166, 167). 
For Marx, therefore, society's economic structure stands in a 
relation of primacy to the legal, political and ideological forms 
which constitute its superstructure. In other words, 
'the various spheres and realms of society reflect the 
dominant mode of producti~n and ... the general consciousness 
of an epoch is shaped by the nature of its production' 
(Bottomore,1987: 208). 
Marx thus did not regard human 'consciousness' as something 
'inherent' or pure'; consciousness only arises from the neces-
sity of interaction and exchange between humans and is, 
therefore, 'from the very beginning a social product' (Marx,1846: 
167), 'consciousness of existing practice' (Marx,1846: 168). And 
the contradictions arising between the products of pure con-
sciousness and existing social and economic relations only do so 
'because existing social relations have come into contradiction 
with existing forces of production ... ' (Marx,1846: 168). 
1he focus of development in society is therefore not, as in 
Hegel, the process of the development of consciousness, but 
rather the inevitable contradictions within the structure of 
production. Human ideas and conceptions 
are conditioned by a definite development of their produc-
tive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, 
up to its furthest forms' (Marx,1846 (2): 47). 
In this excerpt from The German Ideology Marx used the term 
'forms of intercourse' which embraces social relations generally. 
Callinicos argues that this term should not be confused with the 
related yet more specific and less inclusive concept of produc-
tion relations which, unlike the concept of the production 
forces, Marx first introduced in The Poverty of Philosophy 
(1847), i.e. after the German Ideology. In this view although 
Marx conceived production relations 'at the level of 
production ... they do not, unlike the productive forces, consist 
in a specific technical organization of the labour-process' 
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(Callinicos,1987: 49), i.e. they do not signify relations between 
individuals in the labour-process but instead they are social 
relations based on the antagonism of classes. Nonetheless Marx's 
essential point remains that social forms, the state and the 
manifestations of the consciousness arise from relations of 
production in society's economic structure. 
This basic determination still allows for various qualifications. 
Thus according to Marx the determination of legal and political 
structure's by the economic structure 
'will tend to be relatively direct, while its influence over 
other social realms, culture, and consciousness generally is 
more attenuated and nuanced' (Bottomore,1987: 208). 
Furthermore, Marx did allow for a certain degree of 'reciprocal 
influence' between 'spiritual production' and material 
production: 
'In other words, the superstructure of ideas is not con-
ceived as a mere passive reflection but is capable of some 
effectivity' (Bottomore,1987: 43) 
However the degree of reciprocal influence between the economic 
base and the ideological, as well as legal and political super-
structure varied in Marx's accounts, and was in fact a question 
with which he wrestled throughout his life. Marx's own formula-
tions vary in nature from being highly deterministic (see for ex-
ample his 1859 Preface) to being quite complex and nuanced (see 
for example Capital III). Marx's inconclusiveness regarding the 
nature of the base-superstructure relation has given rise to what 
is perhaps the greatest controversy regarding his theory of his-
tory (see 2.2.2). Thus, for example, in the Marxist orthodoxy of 
the Second International the base-superstructure relationship was 
conceived in a highly deterministic or straightforwardly causal 
manner. And as we will see in Chapter 4, this conception was one 
of the main targets of Gramsci's strongly dialectical critique of 
Marxist orthodoxy. 
A further issue in Marx of relevance to the Marxist orthodoxy of 
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the Second International were the shifts and inconsistencies in 
his conception of the main historically determined modes of 
production. Marxist orthodoxy laid great store by a conception of 
history as the preordained transition between successive modes of 
production (Callinicos,1987: 68). As we will argue in section 
2.2.2 this teleological view of history underlay the economism of 
Second International Marxism which became the main target of 
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Second International revisionism led by Eduard Bernstein as well 
as a central concern of Gramsci's mature writing. The origins of 
both this later economism and revisionism can be found in the 
seminal accounts provided by Marx himself at different stages of 
his own work. 
In the German Ideology Marx identified four modes of production, 
namely the tribal, ancient slave, feudal and bourgeois modes of 
production. These, Bottomore notes, were 'restricted to European 
history' (Bottomore,1987: 458). In the 1859 Preface Marx asserted 
the existence of the same four historical modes of production, 
only now he referred to the first of these as the 'asiatic mode 
of production' (Marx,1859: 390). Whether Marx intended these 
modes of production to be regarded as somehow representative of 
progressive or 'logically successive' .historical stages or epochs 
in the economic formation of all societies, or whether he was 
primarily concerned to identify all modes of production which 
have existed historically without adhering to a narrowly con-
ceived model of their progression, is a highly controversial 
issue in the history of Marxism. Bottomore argues that in ~ 
German Ideology references to historically existing modes of 
production portrayed them as each following 'the other in some 
logical pattern' (Bottomore,1987: 458). This was certainly the 
view which became dominant in the orthodox Marxism of the Second 
International. 
Iri the analyses of pre-capitalist modes of production found in 
the 1857 Grundrisse Marx seemed to acknowledge a far more complex 
historical development than he provided in either The German 
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Ideology or the Preface. In the Grundrisse Marx, for example, 
analysed the evolution of tribal existence as a progression from 
'pastoralism, or more generally a nomadic way of life' to a 
'settled' tribal community (Marx,1857 (2): 149-150). In the 
Grundrisse Marx also treats 'Asiatic fundamental forms' 
(Marx,1957 (2): 150) of the tribal mode of production as distinct 
from their European forms such as those found in 'the Slavonic 
and Romanian communities' (see, Marx,1857 (2): 151). In these 
primitive tribal societies the form of the state was as yet a 
elementary and amorphous communal 'despotism' based on a primi-
tive notion of unity rooted in communal property: 
'the communality within the tribal body may appear either in 
such a way that its unity is represented in one head of the 
tribal kinship group, or else as a relationship between the 
heads of families. The former will produce a more despotic, 
the latter a more democratic from of this community' 
(Marx,1857 (2): 151). 
In the Grundrisse Marx moreover distinguished a second mode of 
production with the formation of organized slave societies which 
heralded the 'concentration of settlement in the city' (Marx,1857 
(2): 152). Marx argued that the very presence of the city distin-
guished 'it from a mere multiplicity of separate houses' as in 
the tribal community (Marx,1857 (2): 154) giving rise to substan-
tial local variations such as the early Jewish and ancient Greek 
and Roman communities (see Marx,1857 (2): 153). In slave 
societies a distinction between communal property and private 
property evolves as a basic form: 
'Communal property -- as State property, ager publicus -- is 
here separate from private property. The property of the in-
dividual is here not itself direct communal property, as in 
our first case... To be a member of the community remains 
the precondition for the appropriation of land, but as a 
member of the community the individual is a private 
proprietor ... But this belonging is mediated through his 
being a member of the State, through the existence of the 
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State -- i.e. through a presupposition which is regarded as 
divine, etc.' (Marx,1857 (2): 152-153). 
The existence of private property is thus still conditional upon 
the owner's memebership of the community. Private property is 
thus a subordinate form of ownership. 
In the Grundrisse Marx also identified a third mode of production 
with the 'Germanic commune' by which he meant feudal society of 
the Middle Ages: 
'Here it is not the case, as in the specifically oriental 
form, that the member of the community is as such co-holder 
of the communal property. The Germanic form also differs 
from the Roman, Greek (in short, the ancient classical) 
form, where land is occupied by the community... and where 
the remainder is distributed' (Marx,1857 (2): 154). 
Marx argued that the Germanic feudal commune, unlike ancient 
society, was not concentrated in the city. On the contrary it ap-
peared as a form of loose 'assembly' as opposed to an 
·association', 
·a unification whose independent subjects are the landed 
proprietors ... the community therefore does not exist as a 
State, as a State system... For the community to come into 
real existence, the free landed proprietors must hold an 
assembly... the ager publicus does not, as among e.g. the 
Romans, embody the specific economic being of the State .. . 
[but] is rather a mere supplement to individual property .. . 
the property of the individual is not mediated through the 
community' (Marx 1957 (2): 154-155). 
Thus the community in feudal society is constituted of the un-
mediated relations of individuals one to the other and not 'as an 
entity endowed with art existence of its own (Marx,1857 (2): 
156). 
Of Marx's various writings on historically existing modes of 
production it was his account of the bourgeois or capitalist mode 
of production which was the most complete, and the most 
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important. The extensive nature of Marx's analysis of capitalism 
is not simply ascribable to its dominance in contemporary Europe. 
Marx argued that capitalism is unique in history since it estab-
lishes the potential for negating global poverty and exploitation 
by realising a level of production which establishes the objec-
tive means for satisfying the demands of all individuals in 
society. Under capitalism production becomes at least in prin-
ciple truly universal, a unique historical achievement. However 
under capitalism this potential is not realized since what is 
rightfully social wealth is appropriated by private individuals. 
More specifically, Marx argued that the bourgeois or capitalist 
mode of production amounted to systematic alienation. In the 
tribal, ancient city-state and Germanic or feudal modes of 
production, the individual 'is subjectively presupposed as 
belonging to a community, through which his relationship to the 
land [the original instrument of labour] is mediated. His rela-
tion to the objective conditions of labour is mediated by his 
being as a member of a community' (Marx,1857 (2): 157). In these 
modes of production man is the end of production, its purpose, 
and labour involves 'the absolute unfolding of man's creative 
abilities ... the absolute movement of becoming' (Marx,1857 (2): 
159) and property 'means the relation of the working (producing) 
subject (or the subject reproducing himself) to the conditions of 
his production or reproduction as his own' (Marx,1857 (2): 164). 
Marx argued that in the bourgeois"mode of production, and its 
corresponding social relations, the basis of a unified relation 
of labour to the inorganic conditions of human exchange had 
ended: 
'In the bourgeois economy -- and in the epoch of production 
to which it corresponds -- [the] complete unfolding of man's 
inner potentiality turns into his total emptying-out. His 
universal objectification becomes his total alienation' 
(Marx,1857 (2): 159). 
For Marx the bourgeois mode of production thus distinguishes it-
self from all other forms by 
'the separation between [the] inorganic conditions of human 
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existence and [the] active being, a separation which is 
posited in its complete form only in the relationship be-
tween wage labour and capital' (Marx,1857 (2): 160). 
In bourgeois society 'the worker stands there purely 
subjectively, without object' (Marx,1857 (2): 165), the worker is 
alienated both from the objective conditions of his own produc-
tion and from other men. For Marx the codification or in-
stitutionalisation of private property in bourgeois society 
heralded the creation of a class of propertyless workers, the 
proletariat, which is the direct producer of private wealth. 
This had significant implications for the nature and role of the 
state in capitalist society. Marx argued that the division be-
tween the community and individual interests which emerged in 
capitalist society took 'an independent form as the State', which 
was 'divorced' or abstracted from the objective interests of the 
individual and the community. The bourgeois state thus amounted 
to 
an illusory communal life, always based, however, on the 
real differences existing in [civil society]... and 
especially ... on the classes ... which in every such mass of 
men separate out, and of which one dominates all the others. 
It follows from this that all struggles within the state ... 
are merely the illusory forms in which the real struggles of 
the different classes are fought out among one another' 
(Marx,1846: 169). 
As this passage suggests, for Marx the bourgeois state functioned 
at the behest of the dominant class which by controlling the 
means of production has attained its position of domination at 
the expense of the labouring classes. Consequently in Marx's view 
antagonistic class relations were the basis of politics, and the 
struggle of classes, in all its real and variagated forms, con-
stituted the substance of politics. In other words, for Marx the 
conflict of these diverse and particularistic economically based 
classes not only underpinned social conflict in society, but also 
constituted a core aspect of his broad understanding of politics 
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as the 
pervasive and ubiquitous articulation of social conflict 
and particularly of class conflict, and enters into all so-
cial relations, however these may be designated' 
(Miliband,1988: 6). 
This is of considerable relevance and implications in view of our 
concern with the narrow or broad conception of politics. It indi-
cates a shift from the narrow conception of politics and the 
state rejected by the young Marx as discussed above. Political 
power was no longer narrowly equated with state power, although 
for Marx the bourgeois state was perforce a coercive institution 
of political authority whereby the dominant class in society im-
poses and defends its interests against the exploited classes 
(Held,1987: 225-226). The state in capitalist society thus ap-
pears to the dominated classes 'not as their own united power, 
but as an alien force existing outside them ... independent of the 
will and the action of man ... ' (Marx,1846: 170). Disparity be-
tween individuals in bourgeois society will remain as long as the 
bourgeois state defends the private ownership of the means of 
production and the class divisions which correspond to this form 
of ownership. The bourgeois state cannot therefore be reformed: 
'Th~ political superstructure as an apparatus of coercion 
cannot be reformed in such a way as to start serving the in-
terests of the exploited class; it must be destroyed by 
revolutionary violence' (Kolakowski,1987 (1): 360). 
Still, the broader notion of politics implicit in Marx's basic 
a'ccount of class conflict provides a foundation for an alterna-
tive Marxist account of politics itself, one which Gramsci would 
later explore. 
Against the background of our discussion of • historical 
materialism and with a view to section 2.2.2 in which we will 
address the question of 'economism', we may now turn to Marx's 
1859 Preface to A Critique of Political Economy which became a 
key text in the orthodox Marxism of the Second and Third· 
Internationals. Marx described the 1859 Preface as a self-
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assessment of his 'politico-economic studies' (Marx,1859: 388). 
In this work Marx asserted that his analysis of the general rela-
tions pertaining to the economic structure of ~ociety (the 
'material conditions of life', that is of 'civil society'), led 
him to formulate his ma~erialist theory of history, the 'guiding 
thread' for his studies. And it is the 1859 Preface which con-
tains perhaps the most famous as well as most controversial for-
mulation of Marx's materialist theory of history in terms of the 
base-superstructure metaphor: 
'In the social production of their life, men enter into 
definite relations that are indispensable and independent of 
their will, relations of production which correspond to a 
definite stage of development of their material productive 
forces. The sum total of these relations of production con-
stitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which rise~ a legal and political superstruc-
ture and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. The mode of production of material life con-
ditions the social, political, and intellectual life process 
in general. It is not the consciousness of men that deter-
mines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being 
that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of 
their development, the material productive forces of society 
come into conflict with the existing relations of 
production, or what is but a legal-expression for the 
same thing -- with the property relations within which they 
have been at work hitherto. From the forms of development of 
the productive forces these relations turn into their 
fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the 
change of the economic foundations the entire immense super-
structure is more or less rapidly transformed' (Marx,1859: 
389). 
The Preface is gener~lly regarded as an example of Marx's writing 
at its most authoritative. However it is also one of his most 
controversial formulations, lending itself towards a strongly 
deterministic interpretation of history in which the material 
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production forces are conceived of mechanistically as the motive 
force of historical- change. In other words in the Preface the 
line of historical causation goes unambiguously from the develop-
ing material production forces to the relations of production 
which constitute the economic structure of society, and the lat-
ter is described as the determining basis of the legal and 
political superstructure to which corresponds forms of social 
consciousness. Furthermore Marx argued that the transition be-
tween epochs is brought about by the contradiction between 
developing production forces, the motive force of history, and 
existing relations of production. In other words the introduction 
of qualitatively new production forces results in the existing 
production relations, existing property relations, beginning to 
act as fetters on the development of the production forces. And 
the emergent contradiction between developing production forces 
and existing production relations is then resolved 'in favour of' 
the emergent production forces by a periodic process of social 
revolution which brings about new relations of production and 
hence also a new social, political and intellectual order. There-
fore on the account of the Preface the origins of the social 
structure in its entirety, including the corresponding form of 
the state, is to be sought in the emergent contradiction between 
developing production forces and the existing relationship of the 
owners of the means of production to the direct producers of a 
prior mode of production. This contradiction between the forces 
and relations of production culminates in social revolution and 
the formation of higher relations of production which favour the 
further development of the production forces, a view also 
expressed in the Grundrisse: 
'In the final analysis the community, as well as the 
property based upon it, comes down to a certain stage in the 
development of the productive forces of the working 
subjects, to which correspond certain relations of these 
subjects to each other and to nature' (Marx,1857 (2): 164). 
From the above description of historical materialism it can be 
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seen that Marx's understanding of human history and society is 
characteristically 'monistic' in that it: 
'purports to enable us... to discern the fundamental struc-
ture of any society by analysing its relations of production 
and the class divisions based directly thereon' (Kolakowski, 
1987 ( 1): 351). 
In other words Marx proposed a conception of history which 
theorizes the determinate primacy of the mode of production and 
an analysis of politics rooted in the category of the conflict of 
economically based classes which derive their form from specific 
relations of production of a prevailing mode of production. 
Historical materialism has been criticised fbr the 'determinism' 
which it operates between a society's economic base and political 
and ideological superstructure. Furthermore Marx's understanding 
of the state and politics, rooted in his analysis of political 
and social forces in terms of the struggle between economically 
based classes (with the category of class constituting the 
theoretical nexus between the concepts of the mode of production, 
the state and politics) has been criticised as unacceptably 
'reductionist'. The questions of historical materialism's 
economic determinism and political reductionism are complex, 
especially in relation to Marx's prolific output. It is not, 
however, our main purpose to assess these issues from the point 
of view of Marx's own writing. Our immediate concern is, instead, 
to provide an account of economism in the orthodox Marxism of the 
Second and Third Internationals as the essential background for 
analysing Gramsci's revaluation of historical materialism. 
We may now proceed with that account. 
2.2.2 The Orthodox Marxism Of The Second And Third Internationals 
The purpose of this section is to serve as a background for our 
analysis of Gramsci's radical critique of economism and his Mar-
xist pluralism. Our discussion involves an overview of the lead-
ing figure~ in Marxist orthodoxy together with a brief summary of 
their most important theoretical contributions. To conclude the 
section some basic points of argument will be introduced concern-
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ing the post World War II shift towards a generally more 
pluralist Marxist perspective. Although this latter part of the 
discussion cannot be directly related to Gramsci's much earlier, 
Pre-War, critique of economism and his pluralist political 
perspective, it nevertheless provides an interesting historical 
analogy to Gramsci's essential problematic and helps to focus on 
the central issues which Gramsci addressed in his own recasting 
of historical mate~ialism. 
In the years following Marx's death in 1883, 
materialism made the transition from his classical texts 
historial 
to the 
perhaps inevitable simplifications and vulgarisations of revolu-
tionary politics. At first 'Marxism' remained the almost ex-
clusive domain of the relatively sophisticated intellectual 
milieu of German social democracy. Yet ironically this, Continen-
tal Europe's most advanced industrialised society with a powerful 
and highly organised socialist movement became engulfed in ever 
growing waves of reaction. In the socialist movement this was 
paralleled by its leaderihip's gradual retreat from revolutionary 
politics and the Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) 
thoroughgoing process of bureaucratisation. This was perhaps un-
avoidable for as Miliband tells us by 1914 the German Social 
Democratic movement had 
'become a vast institution that was staffed by more than 4 
000 paid functionaries and 11 000 salaried employees, had 20 
000 000 marks invested in business and published over 
4 000 periodicals' (Miliband,1988: 121). 
The Second International, which was based on the European labour 
movement and was dominated by German Social Democrats, was formed 
at an International Worker's Congress held in Paris in July 1889 
(Bottomore,1987: 235). Engels, who since Marx's death in 1883 en-
joyed a privileged status as the pre-eminent interpreter of 
Marxism's classical texts (McLellan,1986: 9), laid the theoreti-
cal foundation for the Second International with what is now 
known as 'dialectical materialism'. On this view human society is 
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governed by certain objective and scientifically ascertainable 
laws and 'proletarian revolution will be the outcome of an objec-
tive social process' (Callinicos,1987: 61). After Engels's death 
Karl Kautsky (1854-1938), Georgi Plekhanov (1856-1918) as well as 
Antonio Labriola (1843-1904) emerged as the most important 
theorists of the official Marxism of the Second International 
(Callinicos,1987: 62). 
From its inception the Second International was dominated by Ger-
man Social Democracy. At its Erfurt Congress in 1891 the increas-
ingly powerful SPD adopted a 'simplified form of Marxism' as its 
official ideology (McLellan,1986: 23). The two most prominant 
Marxist intellectuals in the SPD were Kautsky and Eduard 
Bernstein (1850-1932) who were widely regarded as the direct suc-
cessors of Marx and Engels (McLellan,1986: 25). However Kautsky 
was to become severely critical of Bernstein's 'revisionist' 
break with Marxist orthodoxy, which occured soon after the death 
of Engels in 1895. The publication of Bernstein's Die Vorausset-
zungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgabe der Sozialdemokratie in 
1899 led to a hardening of opposition to his revisionist views 
amongst the theoreticians of the Second International 
(McLellan,1986: 24). Bernstein regarded the Marxism of his day as 
overly determinist and criticised the orthodox tendency to make 
too sharp a distinction between base and superstructure. Yet, as 
McLellan argues, neither Kautsky nor Bernstein were dialectical 
thinkers. Bernstein was profoundly influenced by neo-Kantianism 
and Kautsky, even more so than Bernstein, by Darwinism: 
'Kautsky was a Darwinian before he was a Marxist and 
remained one, to some extent, all his life, his conception 
of social evolution being always tied to that of natural 
evolution. Hence his excessive emphasis on production forces 
and objective necessity' (McLellan,1986: 36). 
The vulgarised, evolutionist conception of the Hegelian dialectic 
which characterised Second International Marxism (Laclau and 
Mouffe,1989: 20; Callinicos,1987:65) contributed towards its 
economism which, as Mouffe argues, led directly to its theory of 
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the collapse of capitalism 
'whereby the proletarian revolution was the necessary and 
inevitable consequence of the development of the economic 
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production' 
(Mouffe,1979 (2): 172-173; see Callinicos,1987: 63). 
This deterministic position was particularly influential in the 
SPD and, paradoxically, became an argument for inaction as the 
conditions for revolution were never thought to be sufficiently 
developed for intervention' (McLellan,1986: 32; Callinicos,1987: 
64-65). For his part the revisionist Bernstein argued that 
capitalism had 
'shown itself to be sufficiently adaptable for there to be 
hope of its gradual transformation into socialism ... 
was seen as the more or less peaceful inheritor of a 
developed capitalism' (McLellan,1986: 30). 
which 
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Bernstein's view of the evolutionary transformation of capitalism 
thus involved the rejection of Kautsky's notions of revolutionary 
politics and class struggle. Instead he argued that the gradual 
broadening and deepening of democracy would 'raise the worker out 
of the social position of a proletarian into that of a bourgeois' 
(Bernstein in McLellan,1986: 31). Callinicos argues that 
Bernstein's theoretical position amounted to nothing less than a 
repudiation of historical materialism and a 'reversion to "true" 
socialism' (Callinicos,1987: 65). 
Plekhanov, like Kautsky, was severely critical of revisionism's 
political gradualism and was the first to work out a detailed 
critique of Bernstein's views (McLellan,1986: 68). However 
Plekhanov's most important contribution to Marxism was his role 
as the founding father of Russian Marxism. More particularly 
Plekhanov developed an orthodox Marxist perspective for a revolu-
tionary movement in Russia (Kolakowski,1987 (1): 400; 
McLellan,1986: 68;) and until 1914 had a profound influence on 
Lenin's thought. Plekhanov championed a version of historical 
materialism which appealed 
'directly to monism as the necessary basis for the marxist 
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theory of history. Monism, on this account, is the attempt 
to explain the totality of social life in terms of "one main 
principle" or motive force... [striving hard] to fend off 
the criticism that a monist understanding is equivalent to 
(economic) "single-factor determinism"· (McLennan, 1989: 59, 
60; see Laclau and Mouffe,1989: 24). 
In other words Plekhanov did not isolate a single historical fac-
tor and then assert the dependence of all others upon it 
(Kolakowski,1987 ?: 341-342), for as McLennan says Plekhanov made 
a distinction between 'determinate wholistic explanation' and 
single-factor determinism (McLennan,1989: 60). Unlike Kautsky, 
Plekhanov was never treated by Lenin as a complete renegade. This 
allowed his orthodoxy to contribute heavily to the Third Interna-
tional formed under Lenin's leadership (1919-1943). Furthermore, 
unlike Kautsky and Bernstein Plek~anov emphasised the particular 
contribution of Hegel to Marx's mature thought (Bottomore,1987: 
374-375). This may well, despite Lenin's own exclamations to the 
contrary, have contributed towards Lenin's emphasis on Hegel's 
dialectic after 1914: 
'It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital ... 
without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole 
of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of 
the Marxists understood Marx!!· (Lenin in McLellan,1986: 
108). 
Nonetheless, the 'radicals' or revolutionary left wing of the 
Second International, Lenin (1870-1924), Luxemburg (1871-1919), 
and Trotsky (1879-1940), developed analyses of specific questions 
in a way which represented a philosophical and political break 
with the evolutionism underlying the thought of Kautsky and 
Plekhanov. The most distinctive dimension of these analyses in-
volved a 'shift towards a version of Marxism which laid much 
greater stress on the role of consciousness and activity in the 
revolutionary process' (Callinicos,1987: 67). The position of the 
radicals were strengthened with the disintegration of the Second 
International at the outbreak of World War I, and their 'break' 
with evolutionism culminated in the Bolshevik victory and the 
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formation of the Third International. 
In the aftermath of the First World War the decision to found the 
Third International was taken at a March 1919 congress in Moscow 
under the leadership of the Bolsheviks of which Lenin and Trotsky 
were the two most important figures (Kolakowski,1987 (3): 106, 
108). Soon after its inception the founding fathers ot the Third 
International made a formal break with the principles of Second 
International Marxism, and especially with its 'reformist' 
elements. The general optimism which accompanied the founding of 
the Third International, or 'Communist International' (Comintern) 
as it came to be known, was a direct result of the October 
Revolution of 1917 as well as the prospect of heightened revolu-
tionary activity in Central Europe (especially in Poland, Germany 
and Austria). However within a few years the Comintern was con-
fronted with the failure of socialist revolution in Central 
Europe (notably in Germany) as well as the growing question con-
cerning the appropriateness of offensive (Leninist) revolutionary 
tactics in the context of the advanced capitalist states of the 
West (Bottomore,1987: 236-237). With the failure of the German 
Revolution in 1923 the Comintern's drift towards the doctrine of 
'Socialism in One Country' and thus complete Soviet domination 
was inevitable, a trend which was consolidated under Stalin's 
leadership. 
Lenin's leadership of the Russian Revolution and the Communist 
Party ensured the dominance of his views in the early years of 
the Third International. Lenin's contribution to Marxist theory, 
although real in other areas, was most notable in the field of 
politics, both revolutionary as well as theoretical. The State 
and Revolution (1917), written on the eve of the Bolshevik 
victory, set out the strategy for 
responded in great detail to what Lenin 
of the German Social Democrats (led by 
ing Germany's entry into World War I' 
~4 
the Bolshevik victory and 
regarded as the 





Polan,1984: 23, 24). It also contained the characteristic 
'Marxist-Leninist' theory of the state and politics which was to 
become the standard for an entire generation of orthodox revolu-
tionary Communists. 
Lenin regarded the bourgeois state as essentially a coercive or-
gan of class rule. He argued that although it intervenes to 
reconcile class conflict this was in fact impossible: 
'According to Marx, the state could neither arise nor main-
tain itself if it were possible to reconcile classes... the 
state is an organ of class ~. an organ for the oppression 
of one class by another; it is the creation of "order" which 
legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the 
conflict between the classes' (Lenin in Carnoy,1984: 57). 
Thus in Lenin's view the creation of the state presupposed class 
struggle and served the interests of society's dominant class 
(Polan,1984: 14). This instrumentalist view of the bourgeois 
state was the fundamental thesis of Lenin's political theory. And 
in this view the very dominance of the bourgeoisie by means of 
the state, which it controls directly, necessitates the state's 
violent revolutionary overthrow: 
'The liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not 
only without a violent revolution, but also without the 
destruction of the apparatus of state power which was 
created by the ruling class' (Lenin in Carnoy,1984: 57-58). 
As Miliband argues, it was this 
'"smashing" of the existing state which Lenin, following 
Marx, took as the first and absolutely essential task of a 
genuinely revolutionary movement and party' (Miliband,1988: 
139). 
Lenin proposed that bourgeois dictatorship through the state be 
replaced by the dictatorship of the working class over the 
capitalists and other reactionary forces. The 'dictatorship of 
the proletariat' would be a fundamentally different type of 
state, i.e. soviet democracy (Simon,1985: 17) which was a system 
of government based on direct workers' democracy. For our pur-
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poses it is of particular importance to note the determinism 
which underlay Lenin's concept of the state. For him there was a 
directly causal, mechanistic relation between economics and 
politics, a view which Gramsci rejected. 
Lenin accorded a special significance to the revolutionary party 
with respect to the initiation and leadership of a workers' 
revolution to overthrow the Russian state. Against the background 
of Czarist autocracy and mindful of attempts by reformist social 
democrats to co-opt proletarian and peasant leaders, Lenin formu-
lated his views of the party as a ·vanguard' of the oppressed 
masses, emphasising its role as the promoter of a revolutionary 
working class consciousness. In Lenin's view the working class 
movement could not, spontaneously and without coherent 
leadership, develop that articulate class consciousness which was 
a prerequisite for a successful socialist.revolution. In an early 
pamflet What Is to be Done? (1902), Lenin's seminal work on the 
role of the revolutionary party, he argued that 
since there can be no talk of an independent ideology for-
mulated by the working masses themselves... our task, the 
task of Social-Democracy, is to combat spontaneity, to 
divert the working-class movement from this spontaneous, 
trade-unionist striving to come under the wing of the 
bourgeoisie' (Lenin in McLellan,1986: 87). 
It is in such passages as these that Lenin emphasised the role of 
political consciousness for the mass revolutionary movement. 
, Lenin stressed the need for creative leadership exercised by a 
revolutionary vanguard whose function it was to disseminate 
ideology, educate the workers and forge cohesion (Bocock,1986: 
26-27). This was the basis for Lenin's understanding of the no-
tion of 'hegemony' involving the system of political alliances 
which the proletariat forms under its leadership in the process 
of democratic revolution (Bottomore,1987: 201); a contribution to 
Marxist theory which Gramsci explicitly acknowledged and radi-
cally extended (Gramsci,1986: 365; see Chapter 3). 
Lenin's proposals for the organisational basis of the revolution-
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ary movement, which by no means went unopposed, amounted to a 
strategic split between the mass movement on the one hand, and a 
core of professional and dedicated revolutionaries on the other. 
He argued that 
'in order to "serve" the mass movement we must have people 
who will devote themselves exclusively to Social-Democratic 
activities, and that such people must train themselves 
patiently and steadfastly to be professional 
revolutionaries' (Lenin in McLellan,1986: 88). 
Although in What Is to be Done? Lenin did not propose to 'divide' 
the masses off from the party elite, his notions of party 
secrecy, centralisation, specialisation, and exclusivity' 
(McLellan,1986: 87; see Miliband,1988: 142) contributed heavily 
to later trends in Soviet politics and Third International 
orthodoxy. This was a contentious issue, all the more so for Mar-
xists who 'have a commitment to thorough political democratiza-
tion and to what may be called the dis-alienation of politics' 
(Miliband,1988: 126). It was however a trend which Stalin master-
fully exploited, and it is therefore not surprising that he later 
'canonised' What Is to be Done? (McLellan,1986: 88). 
The course of political developments following the revolution 
cannot, however, be explained with reference to Lenin's political 
writing. As Polan argues with particular reference to the State 
and Revolution: 
'Such is the discrepancy between the argument of the text 
and the manner in which the Bolshevik regime actually 
developed that it appears to offer no access to an .under-
standing of what happened. Here were a set of utopian ideals 
rapidly erased by the brute necessities of political life' 
(Polan,1984: 15). 
A specific example of this disjuncture between theory and unfold-
ing reality can be illustrated with reference to Lenin's writing 
on the state. In his early writing Lenin had argued that the 
state after the revolution could not be envisaged as 'withering 
away in the early stages of socialism's construction. Lenin had 
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argued that the state machinery must instead be utilised to 
'expropriate the ~~propriators· ~McLellan,1986: 98). However, as 
we saw above in the State and Revolution Lenin transformed his 
analysis of the state arguing that the dominance of the 
proletariat after the revolution must be assured by destroying 
the old state machine and replacing it with the dictatorship of 
the prriletariat: 
'A Marxist is solely someone who extends the recognition of 
the class struggle to the recognition of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat. This is what constitutes the most profound 
distinction between the Marxist and the ordinary petty {as 
well as big) bourgeois. This is the touchstone on which the 
~ understanding and recognition of Marxism is to be 
tested' (Lenin in McLellan,1986: 99). 
As McLellan tells us in the State and Revolution there is scant 
elaboration on matters of substance, i.e. regarding the shape of 
the proletarian dictatorship (McLellan,1986: 99; also Liebman in 
Polan,1984: 22). What is clear is that from 1917 onwards the 
radical centralisation of Russia's political system gained momen-
tum and ideas of direct proletarian power dissolved. Instead what 
emerged was the dictatorship of the Party. Furthermore, a growing 
equivalence took hold between the Party · and the state 
(McLellan,1986: 100). Polan outlines Anweiler's view of these 
developments as follows: 
'Lenin's infatuation with the soviets was a short-term, tac-
tical position derived from the necessity to gain power. 
Previously, in 1905, he had been hostile to the soviets. He 
had been consistently suspicious of all attempts at 
proletarian, spontaneous self-organization, inasmuch as 
these were bound to conflict with his own party's right to 
lead. The change of attitude in 1917 was of a specific 
nature. Lenin's acceptance of the soviets only extended as 
far as their role in the revolutionary movement, and did not 
legitimize them as· structures for revolutionary self-
government' (Polan,1984: 25). 
In other words, on this view the general autocratic trend in the 
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organisation of Soviet society can be traced back to Lenin's con-
ception of the party before and during the Bolshevik Revolution 
(see Claudin,1979: 138). The notion of a workers' democracy was 
thus subverted by the Party of the workers itself. 
The most vehement, and most telling, criticism of Lenin's 
·conspiratorial vanguardist' idea of the party came from Luxem-
burg whose views are worth quoting in some length: 
'Socialist democracy is not something which begins only in 
the promised land after the foundations of socialist economy 
are created; it does not come as some sort of Christmas 
present for the worthy people who, in the interim, have 
loyally supported a handful of socialist dictators... Yes, 
dictatorship! But this dictatorship consists in the manner 
of applying democracy, not in its elimination' (Luxemburg in 
Carnoy,1984: 62). 
Luxemburg tended to regard Lenin's views as a left-wing mirror 
of Bernstein: a sectarianism that separated the party from the 
masses in the same way as Berstein separated the movement from 
its goal' (McLellan,1986~ 46). Although Luxemburg admired Lenin's 
initiative and praised his successful leadership of the October 
Revolution she had considerable reservations regarding the 
political trends in Lenin's post-revolutionary Russia: 
'Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for 
the members of one party ... is no freedom at all. Freedom is 
always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks 
differently. Not because of any fanatical conception of 
'justice' but because all that is instructive, wholesome and 
purifying in political freedom depends on this essential 
charactersitic... Lenin is completely mistaken in the means 
he employs... The only way to rebirth is the school of 
public life itself, the most unlimited, the broadest 
democracy and public opinion. It is the rule by terror which 
demoralises' (Luxemburg in McLellan,1986: 54). 
Written in prison just prior to her murder, her words were to be 
given an exceptional resonance by the consequences of Stalinism. 
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And as we will see in subsequent chapters Luxemburg's views con-
tain elements which Gramsci, for much the same reasons, iegarded 
as fundamental to any sustainable and democratic transformation 
of bourgeois society. 
Upon Lenin's death Stalin set about establishing his domination 
of the Soviet power structures. Polan eloquently describes the 
degenerative political effect of Stalinist rule over the Soviet 
Union. On this view a 'genuine politics' and Stalinism were, to 
say the least, contradictions in terms: 
'In a peculiar irony on Engels' dictum, the 'government of 
people' had truly become the 'administration of things'. The 
absolute erasure of any public sphere consigned all ideology 
to redundancy or vacuity... Where no... plurality exists, 
public discourse is an absurd non-sense, a ghost without 
substance, without connection or role within the world of 
material corporeality' (Polan,1984: 27). 
Stalin's complete victory over real and supposed opposition had 
many repercussions for the Comintern. On a theoretical plane it 
led to the paralysis of original thinking about Marxist theory 
(McLellan,1986: 137). On a political level the Comintern under 
Stalin made its most disastrous policy decisions. Firstly, Stalin 
forced a split in the Comintern culminating in Trotsky's expul-
sion in 1927. This was followed in 1928 with the official denun-
ciation of social democracy as 'social fascism', and 'Social 
Democrats were regarded... even as greater enemies than the Fas-
cists themselves' (McLellan,1986: 132). To compound this extraor-
dinarily naive move in 1931 the Comintern, by now reduced to 
little more than an organ of Stalin's personal dictatorship, 
equated bourgeois democracy per se with fascism (Bottomore,1987: 
237). The negative pronouncements on Western bourgeois democratic 
movements came on the eve of Nazi power and all that came to 
mean, especially for the Soviet Union. And as Kolakowski argues, 
the 
'fact that the German Communists, who represented a powerful 
political force, turned their fire against the socialists 
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was a major cause of Hitler's 
(Kolakowski,1987 (3): 111). 







sanctioned Stalin's 'Left Turn' and 
1930s (McLellan,1986: 132-134). 
Ironically, many Comintern leaders were not to escape their own 
sanction: 
'Stalinism was a regime which stamped out opposition in 
anticipation, and constantly struck at people who were per-
fectly willing to conform, on suspicion that they might 
eventually cease to be willing' (Miliband,1988: 145). 
The 'cruder' variants of Marxist orthodoxy are generally referred 
to as 'technological determinism', 'simple economism or 
'mechanical determinism' and, as we have argued, Second and Third 
International Marxisms had certain general, ~hough bY. no means 
consistent, features. There is, in broad terms, general agreement 
regarding these. Thus Callinicos argues that orthodox Marxism is 
a version of Marxism in which social change is an organic 
process whose outcome is determined in advance' (Callinicos,1987: 
63), history conceived 'as a series of modes of production suc-
ceeding each other in a pre-ordained sequence in response to the 
level of development of the productive forces' (Callinicos,1987: 
68). McLennan refers to orthodox Marxism as an historical teleol-
ogy whose influence 'spans Second and Third International mar-
xisms and their Soviet successors (McLennan,1989: 60). In 
McLennan's view the most notable orthodox Marxist theoreticians 
held that in each historical mode of production it is the 
autonomous or inherent growth of the productive forces 'which ac-
count for the pivotal changes in social relationships' 
(McLennan,1989: 60, see 62, 63; also Laclau and Mouffe,1989: 24). 
The concept of the mode of pr6duction is therefore the core 
component' of the orthodox Marxist account of history. For on the 
one hand each epoch in history is defined by its dominant mode of 
production. And on the other hand, the orthodox account of Mar-
xism sees revolution generally as the transition between modes of 
production, a transition determined by the inevitable contradic-
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tion between developing forces of production and given production 
relations in the economic structure (Bottomore,1987: 335). 
Indeed, as Mouffe argues, this contradiction 
'was considered to contain all the elements necessary to ex-
plain the historical process. As a consequence, political 
and ideological factors simply became epiphenomena' 
(Mouffe,1979 (2): 174). 
In other words by assigning explanatory 'priority to one part of 
an evolving complex system whose parts are all to some extent 
interdependent' (Mepham and Ruben,1979: 143-4), orthodox Marxists 
reduced the superstructure to a mere expression of dominant 
economic relations. As a consequence of this economist position 
the state, as the core component of the superstructure, was 
treated as an epiphenomenal derivative of the economic relations 
of the structure, devoid of reciprocal effectivity - a passive 
reflection of developing production forces (Jessop,1984: 10; 
Callinicos,1983: 60). Partly as a consequence of this view the 
state did not become a general 'field of investigation and debate 
within Marxism' until the 1960s (Bottomore,1987: 464). In an in-
cisive passage worth quoting in its entirety, Laclau and Mouffe 
provide a cogent summary of the negative implications which Mar-
xist orthodoxy had for Marxism's ability to conceive the com-
plexity of modern society. Thus, the orthodox paradigm reduced 
'diverse subject positions... to manifestations of a single 
position; the plurality of differences is either reduced or 
rejected as contingent; the sense of the present is revealed 
through its location in an a priori succession of stages. It 
is precisely because the concrete is in this way reduced to 
the abstract, that history, society and social agents have, 
for orthodoxy, an essence which operates as their principle 
of unification. And as this essence is not immediately 
visible, it is necessary to distinguish between a surface or 
appearance of society and an underlying reality to which the 
ultimate sense of every concrete presence must necessarily 
be referred, whatever the level of complexity in the system 
of mediations' (Lacalu and Mouffe,1989: 21-22). 
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This passage suggests that the teleology and reductionism of Mar-
xist orthodoxy have a strong tendency to abstract social rela-
tions and political processes from complex realities. 
Still, there are other interpretations possible of 
torical materialism than the determinism of 
Marx's his-
the orthodox 
position. Thus Kolakowski, who rejects technological determinism, 
argues that Marx distinguished between the determining primacy of 
the technological level in a specific society at a specific junc-
ture in history and the broad category of an 'epoch' in which the 
'material mode' or economic movement' asserts itself as neces-
sary 'in the last resort': 
'Marx's account of the dependence of the superstructure on 
the relations of production applies to great historical eras 
and fundamental changes in society. It is not claimed that 
the level of technology-determines every detail of the so-
cial division of labour, and thus in turn every detail of 
political and intellectual life' (Kolakowski,1987 (1): 339). 
In this view Marx did not intend his theory of history to be un-
derstood as an explanatory schema for specific historical events 
(subject as they are to 'accidental' circumstances and social 
causation). The basic thrust of historical materialism is the 
postulated determinate primacy of the relations of production 
corresponding to a particular technological level, but this pos-
tulated primacy of the mode of material production does not 
preclude the influence of the various elements of the superstruc-
ture which all 
exercise their influence upon the course of the historical 
struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining 
their form' (Engels in Kolakowski,1987 (1): 340). 
In this way the form and action of the state, in particular, can-
not be conceived as wholly determined - devoid of any autonomy of 
action or effectivity. Yet in the Marxist literature the con-
troversy continues to rage with respect to the extent of the su-
perstructural 'efficacy' and the reciprocity between base and 
supertsructure. The thrust of the various critiques of economic 
113 
determinism, whilst retaining the central Marxist category of the 
determining mode of product io.n, suggests some recognition of 
causal pluralism. However, the drift towards heterodoxy is 
fraught with problems. McLennan's commentary gets to the heart of 
the dilemma: 
'few Marxists are willing to accept outright causal 
pluralism; otherwise the very concept of a determining mode 
of production would be pointless' (McLennan,1989: 74). 
Nonetheless if Marxists do not incorporate some notion of the 
'contingency of social causation and the relatively 
autonomous impact of "non-economic" forces' (McLennan,1989: 
74)' 
the problems posed by the determining mode of production continue 
to generate the suspicion of fundamental explanatory deficiencies 
and contradictions in Marx's conception of history. 
In subsequent chapters we will discuss the way in which Gramsci's 
reconstruction of historical materialism, based on his radical 
critique of economism, contributed towards a viable pluralist al-
ternative to the 'overdetermination' of orthodox Marxism whilst 
retaining a distinctively Marxist perspective. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CIVIL SOCIETY. THE STATE AND HEGEMONY IN GRAMSCI 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to explore the meaning 
Gramsci attached to his concepts of hegemony and of the integral 
state. We will highlight In the course of the discussion of 
Gramsci's concept of hegemony it will become clear that it is 
linked to Gramsci's reconceptualisation of the Marxist notions of 
the base and superstructure. This in turn will serve as the back-
ground to the discussion in Chapter 4 of Gramsci's revaluation of 
Marx's conception of the base-superstructure relation in which 
Gramsci's concept of hegemony becomes the key concept in under-
standing the very unity whi6h exists in a concrete social forma-
tion (Laclau and Mouffe,1989: 7). 
The concept of hegemony is widely regarded as the key 
'organizing' concept of Gramsci's mature writing, collected in 
English translation in the Selected Prison Notebooks. Indeed, as 
Laclau and Mouffe argue, the concept of hegemony in Gramsci, as 
against that found in Lenin, 'acquires a new type of centrality 
that transcends its tactical and strategic uses' (Laclau and 
Mouffe,1989: 7). As we will see Gramsci's concept of hegemony is 
tied into a range of other concepts and insights of his theory of 
politics, a comprehensive discussion of which is neither intended 
nor possible here. Instead we will provide a systematic discus-. 
sion of the Gramscian concept of hegemony which, as will be 
argued, has two distinct yet interrelated meanings (see sections 
3.1 and 3.2. respectively). This approach to Gramsci's concept of 
hegemony is consistent with the general conclusions, if sometimes 
quite implicitly, of the more recent literature on the subject 
(see for example, Adamson,1980; Mouffe,1979; Sassoon,1987; 
Morera,1990; Carnoy,1984). 
As already indicated two distinct~yet interrelated meanings can 
be distinguished with respect to Gramsci's concept of hegemony. 
In its one sense Gramsci utilized the concept of hegemony to 
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describe the process whereby a (subordinate or 'subaltern') class 
or group conscious only of its narrow economic existence and in-
terests also develops a consciousness of its political and cul-
tural identity and significance, thereby positioning itself as a 
class of potential natioQal predominance not only in the politi-
cal sphere but also in the moral and intellectual spheres of na-
tional life. For Gramsci the process of struggle towards this 
predominance, of achieving this 'hegemony', involves the ar-
ticulation of the emerging social class or group's interests with 
those of allied classes and other social groups in order to form 
a broadly based collective will as the basis for political 
domination. Section 3.1 will be concerned with an account of this 
first meaning of hegemony, and will include a review of Gramsci's 
concepts of economic-corporate consciousness (see section 3.1), 
the intellectuals and the political party (section 3.1.1). 
Section 3.2. will be devoted to the second sense of hegemony in 
Gramsci, more specifically to an analysis of the relation between 
Gramsci's concepts of hegemony and the 'integral state'. This 
second dimension to Gramsci's concept of hegemony involves the 
dialectical relation Gramsci posed between the functions of 
'political society' and 'civil society' (both original concepts 
with a new meaning in Gramsci), which together constitute his 
con~ept of the integral state. On this view the function of the 
state is essentially one of 'domination', 'force', or 'coercion' 
(see section 3.2.2), while civil society is the sphere of 
'leadership' or 'consent' and 'consensus formation' - the arena 
of hegemony (see section 3.2.4). This section will also include 
an analysis of Gramsci's concepts of the 'passive revolution' 
(see section 3.2.1), 'war of position' and war of manoeuvre 
(see section 3.2.3), indicating their interrelation in Gramsci's 
thought. 
3.1 Economic-Corporate Consciousness And Hegemony 
The first meaning of hegemony in Gramsci, then, is related to the 
transition of a social class from a 'subaltern' or subordinate to 
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a predominant position in society. This struggle for predominance 
involves the transformation of a class's economic-corporate con-
sciousness (i.e. its consciousness of shared economic interests 
and similar economic position in society) into a fully fledged 
political consciousness. This involves a struggle which is 
largely fought on the terrain of competing ideologies in the 
political arena which Gramsci accorded a certain degree of 
autonomy in his reconstruction of historical materialism (see 
Chapter 4). In Gramsci's view an emerging class in society 
utilises ideology to help forge an organisational basis for 
economic, political, as well as moral and intellectual unity 
across a wide spectrum of social classes and groups under its 
leadership. And it is on this basis of consensus building amongst 
potential class allies that an emerging class seeks to establish 
its predominance in the political life of a society. For Gramsci 
a social class or group's predominance no longer consists solely 
'of a simple political alliance but of a complete fusion of 
economic, political, intellectual and moral objectives which 
will be brought about by one fundamental group and groups 
allied to it through the intermediary of ideology' 
(Mouffe,1979 (2): 181). 
Gramsci distinguished three phases ('levels' or 'moments') in the 
development of collective political or class consciousness 
according, in his own words, to the 'degree of homogeneity, self-
awareness, and organisation attained by the various classes' 
(Gramsci,1986: 181; see Sassoon,1987: 117). The first such 
'level' corresponds to what Gramsci termed 'economic-corporate' 
consciousness, i.e. members of a 
'professional group [who] are conscious of its unity and 
homogeneity, and of the need to organise it, but in the case 
of the wider social group [to which they belong] this is not 
yet so' (Gramsci,1986: 181). 
For Gramsci such economic-corporate consciousness thus con-
stitutes a 'primitive' form of consciousness not extending beyond 
awareness of the immediate interests of the professional group or 
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economic category to which the individual belongs. It therefore 
does not serve to unite members of the same social class but only 
to articulate professional groups or associations identified 
within a potentially unified social class. 
A ~econd level in the development of collective political con-
sciousness 
'is that in which consciousness is reached of the solidarity 
of interests among all the members of a social class but 
still in a purely economic field' (Gramsci,1986: 181). 
In other words at this le~el the members of a social class become 
self-consciously united. However consciousness of class affilia-
tion is limited to economic-corporate interests, i.e. to the 
field of production. Furthermore, although the subordinate class 
(such as for example the workers' class in capitalist society) 
formulates demands on the (bourgeois) state, these are as yet 
limited to the question of political and juridical (i.e. legal) 
equality within 'the existing fundamental structures' (of bour-
geois society) (Gramsci,1986: 181). 
The formation of a fully constituted and conscious class there-
fore involves the overcoming of narrow economic-corporate con-
sciousness which develops in the f jnal and hegemonic stage in 
which 
one becomes aware that one s own corporate interests, in 
their present and future development, transcend the cor-
porate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must 
become the interests of other subordinate groups too. This 
is the most purely political phase, and marks the decisive 
passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex 
superstructures' (Gramsci, 1986: 181). 
As Sassoon argues, this.phase 
'is political not because the object of the struggle is the 
State in a narrow sense but because the struggle is manifest 
not only in the realm of the economic or in the area of the 
present State machinery but it concerns the full range of 
human activity' (Sassoon,1987: 118). 
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At this level, which marks the stage in which an economic class 
gains political significance and efficacy as an articulated so-
cial force, a social class or combination of classes establishes 
its political and cultural predominance and leadership rooted in 
the victory of one of (or a combination of) 'previously ger-
minated ideologies'. In other words in this stage, which is 
'chracterised by ideological struggle which attempts to forge 
unity between economic, political and intellectual objectives' 
(Mouffe,1979 (2): 180), the emerging class or group sets about 
propagating 
'itself throughout society bringing about not only the 
unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual 
and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the 
struggle rages not on a corporate but on a "universal" 
plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental so-
cial group [major social class or group of classes] over a 
series of subordinate groups. the development and expan-
sion of the particular [hegemonic] group are conceived of, 
and presented, as being the motor force of a universal 
expansion, of a development of all the "national" energies' 
(Gramsci,1986: 181-2). 
Gramsci argued that this most crucial stage in the development -0f 
a class's political consciousness commences with its growing 
awareness of the potentially universal nature of its own 
interests. In other words the hegemony of an emerging class is 
established on the basis of an intellectual and moral vision 
which recognises the diverse interests of other groups, and ac-
comodates them up to a 'certain point, i.e. stopping short of 
narrowly corporate economic interests' (Gramsci,1986: 182). 
In this stage, the hegemonic moment, an emergent class or group 
(or an alliance of classes or groups) can make concessions 'in 
order to obtain the consent of allied groups, where moral and in-
tellectual reform organize that consent' (Morera,1990: 151). By 
recognising and being responsive to the interests of other social 
groups, an emerging class may thus win and maintain a position of 
legitimacy and supremacy which relies not only on coercive 
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measures to sustain itself (generally directed at its opponents), 
but can also depend on the consent of allied groups as well as, 
on a broader level, the governed. This consent must, moreover, be 
built in the sphere of civil society (for a discussion of civil 
society as the arena of hegemony in Gramsci, see 3.2.4). The 
three moments in the development of collective political or class 
consciousness may therefore be said to represent 
'the process from the origins of the individual ponscious-
ness of narrow economic interests to the hegemonic moment, 
where a universal solution is possible' (Morera,1990: 151). 
The distinction which Gramsci drew between the functions of 
'coercion' and 'consent' are of central importance to his theory 
of the state and politics. This dimension of his political theory 
will be analysed more in detail in section 3.2. However it is 
necessary here briefly to introduce his concept of the state in 
order to clarify the above statements regarding the coercive and 
consensual measures respectively characteristic of a dominant and 
of a hegemonic social group or class. The meaning of the state in 
Gramsci was not consistent. On the one hand he used it in the 
narrow sense with reference to the coercive governmental sub-
structure of a society (The sense in which it appears in orthodox 
Marxism-Leninism). In its characteristically Gramscian sense, 
however, the concept of the state is extended to embrace the 
(redefined) sphere of civil society, with the coercive sub-
structure of the state now called 'political society'. This 
'integral' concept of the state essentially circumscribes both 
the functions of coercion centered in political society, as 
against consensus centered in civil society. Thus a ruling class 
in a society both exercises its hegemoriy in civil society and 
also ensures its dominance by means of the coercive structures of 
political society. When, therefore, we refer to Gramsci's notion 
that a hegemonic class must, to the greatest possible extent, 
coordinate and integrate its interests with its allies but also 
where necessary exercise coercion to ensure its continued 
dominance, we are referring to a typically dualistic Gramscian 
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perspective regarding the measures necessary for a class's 
predominance in society. Thus, Gramsci argued, 
'the dominant group is coordinated concretely with the 
general interests of ,the subordinate groups, and the life of 
the State is conceived of as a continuous process of forma-
tion and superseding of unstable equilibria (on the juridi-
cal plane) between the interests of the fundamental group 
and those of the subordina4e groups equilibria in which 
the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to 
a certain point, i.e. stopping short of narrowly corporate 
economic interests' (Gramsci,1986: 182). 
Therefore although Gramsci viewed the state as creating 
favourable conditions for the dominant group's development and 
expansion, he went beyond a characteristically narrow Leninist 
'view of the State as an instrument of a [dominant] class' 
(Sassoon,1987: 119). The dominant group's interests prevail, but 
the state is not a class state in the sense of acting directly in 
the interests of the dominant group, acting instead 
'in the name of universal interests within a field of con-
stantly changing equilibria between the dominant class and 
subaltern groups' (Sassoon,1987: 119). 
In other words Gramsci argued that the interests of both the 
dominant as well as the subordinate groups have an economic and 
ideological dimension. This view underlay Gramsci's emphasis of 
the politico-ideological function of the dominant social group 
which must in addition to exercising 'dictatorship' (in the nar-
row Leninist sense of the dictatorship of a class) seek to estab-
lish its hegemony if its domination or supremacy is not merely to 
be based on coercive political relations. In Gramsci's conception 
therefore, the link of the dominant social group to the state is 
more complex than the acknowledged relations of forces between 
the fundamental classes (in capitalist society of capital and 
labour). All the other classes in society (such as for example 
the peasants) .and. all other social relations and interests which 
are not directly class related al.SQ go to make up the matrix of 
relations of forces which are in a relationship of ongoing and 
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continuous fluctuation affecting the life of the state. The at-
tainment of national leadership by a fundamental group is there-
fore conditional upon more than its ability to transcend its own 
narrow economic-corporate consciousness. Such a group or class 
must, in addition, move beyond the sphere of class-bound 
interests, and class-based alliances, by acknowledging the exist-
ence of popular-democratic interests and movements, i.e. inter-
ests and movements which do not arise 'directly out of the rela-
tions of production' (Simon,1985: 23) (Examples of such interests 
and movements which have become especially important in the lat-
ter part of the Twentieth Century are feminism, ethnicity, na-
tional movements of liberation, civil libertarianism, 
parliamentarism, ecological movements, etc). Gramsci argued that 
a social class or group ~spiring to national hegemony must 
successfully combine class and popular-democratic interests to 
form a 'national-popular collective will' as the basis of its 
predominance in society (see Gramsci,1986: 130-133). 
The concept of the national-popular collective will was not set 
out clearly by Gramsci. However his notes indicate that it essen-
tially refers to the combination of popular-democratic non-class 
and indirect class interests (i.e. interests which do not, at 
least not directly, have their origin in the relations of 
production) with the interests of the dominant class to con-
stitute the basis for a fundamental social group's hegemony (and 
the creation of an alternative or new historical bloc: see Chap-
ter 4). Thus hegemony has both class and non-class dimensions. 
The emergent dominant social group becomes 'hegemonic' if it 
succeeds in combining popular-democratic with class struggles and 
interests to achieve national leadership, i.e. succeeds in 
achieving a broad alliance of class and other social relations 
and forces forged on the terrain of ideology, of political 
consciousness, and thus extended beyond the narrowly economic-
corporate level or phase of consciousness of an aspirant dominant 
social class. Furthermore, the class seeking hegemony must, 
together with the other members of its alliance, acknowledge the 
autonomy of function of the non-class based popular and 
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democratic movements. Only if the autonomy of the latter groups 
is acknowledged will they be able to make a full contribution to 
the life of the hegemonic alliance by developing their unique 
value and contributing accordingly to the dynamism and richness 
of the hegemonic alliance, and hence to the construction of a 
national-popular collective will. In a lengthy passage which war-
rants extended mention here, Mouffe describes such a 'hegemonic 
class' as follows: 
'it is a class which has been able t6 articulate the inter-
ests of other social groups to its own by means of ideologi-
cal struggle. This, according to Gramsci, is only possible 
if this class renounces a strictly corporatist conception, 
since in order to exercise leadership it must genuinely con-
cern itself with the interests of those social groups over 
which it wishes to exercise hegemony· (Mouffe,1979 (2): 
181). 
In the following section we will examine Gramsci's views regard-
ing the agents involved in constructing a broad based national 
alliance and collective will upon which the hegemony of an emerg-
ing class is constructed. 
3.1.1 The Political Party, The Intellectuals And Ideology In 
Gramsci 
Gramsci's recognition of the complexities of society in the 
modern era, i.e. in advanced capitalist states, led him to argue 
that the formation of broad class and non-class based alliances 
is a condition of the national hegemony of a social group or 
class. In Gramsci's view the following question thus became cru-
cial for any emerging class in such a society: 
'When can the conditions for awakening and developing a 
national-popular collective will be said to exist?' 
(Gramsci,1986: 130). 
Gramsci's suggestions toward an answer may be reconstructed from 
a diverse collection of notes, with reference to the role of the 
modern political party, the intellectuals and ideology. 
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In general, Gramsci described the function of the (revolutionary) 
political party to develop an appropriate strategy for the at-
tainment of social and political hegemony, and state power (see 
3.2), and the function of intellectuals as primarily that of 
promoting political class consciousness: 
'The modern Prince [i.e. political party] must be and cannot 
but be the proclaimer and organiser of an intellectual and 
moral reform, which also means creating the terrain for a 
subsequent development of the national-popular collective 
will towards the realisation of a superior, total form of 
modern civilisation' (Gramsci,1986: 132-133). 
In other words for Gramsci the modern political party has the 
primary function of providing the organisational basis for the 
transformation of a society's social conscience. And in Gramsci's 
view the intellectuals have the important function of approaching 
'the people in order to guide it ideologically and keep it 
linked with the leading group... a model of hegemonic 
ideological construction' (Gramsci,1986: 421), 
The organisational and connective function of the intellectuals 
is therefore directed towards 
'the formation of homogenous, compact social blocs, which 
will give birth to their own intellectuals, their own 
commandos, their own vanguard -- who in turn will react upon 
those blocs in order to develop them ' (Gramsci,1986: 204-
205). 
In this sense, at least, Gramsci developed Lenin's political 
theory in so far as he recognised the importance Lenin attached 
to political intervention in the transformation of society and 
radically extended Lenin's analysis of the 'mechanisms' involved 
in that political intervention. This is why 'Gramsci's analysis 
of the development of parties, of intellectuals, and the role of 
culture in general is of crucial importance· (Morera,1990: 153) 
to his ~heory of politics. 
Gramsci began his analysis of the social and political function 
124 
In general, Gramsci described the function of the (revolutionary) 
political party to develop an appropriate strategy for the at-
tainment of social and political hegemony, and state power (see 
3.2), and the function of intellectuals as primarily that of 
promoting political class consciousness: 
'The modern Prince [i.e. political party] must be and cannot 
but be the proclaimer and organiser of an intellectual and 
moral reform, which also means creating the terrain for a 
subsequent development of the national-popular collective 
will towards the realisation of a superior, total form of 
modern civilisation' (Gramsci,1986: 132-133). 
In other words for Gramsci the modern political party has the 
primary function of providing the organisational basis for the 
transformation of a society's social conscience. And in Gramsci's 
view the· intellectuals have the important function of approaching 
'the people in order to guide it ideologically and keep it 
linked with the leading group... a model of hegemonic 
ideological construction' (Gramsci,1986: 421), 
The organisational and connective function of the intellectuals 
is therefore directed towards 
'the formation of homogenous, compact social blocs, which 
will give birth to their own intellectuals, their own 
commandos, their own vanguard -- who in turn will react upon 
those blocs in order to develop them' (Gramsci,1986: 204-
205). 
In this sense, at least, Gramsci developed Lenin's political 
theory in so far as he recognised the importance Lenin attached 
to political intervention in the transformation of society and 
radically extended Lenin's analysis of the 'mechanisms' involved 
in that political intervention. This is why 'Gramsci's analysis 
of the development of parties, of intellectuals, and the role of 
culture in general is of crucial importance' (Morera,1990: 15a) 
to his theory of politics. 
Gramsci began his anal~sis of the social and pplitical function 
124 
In general, Gramsci described the function of the (revolutionary) 
political party to develop an appropriate strategy for the at-
tainment of social and political hegemony, 
3.2), and the function of intellectuals as 
promoting political class consciousness: 
and state power (see 
primarily that of 
'The modern Prince [i.e. political party] must be and cannot 
but be the proclaimer and organiser of an intellectual and 
moral reform, which also means creating the terrain for a 
subsequent development of the national-popular collective 
will towards the realisation of a superior, total form of 
modern civilisation· (Gramsci,1986: 132-133). 
In other words for Gramsci the modern political party has the 
primary function of providing the organisational basis for the 
transformation of a society's social conscience. And in Gramsci's 
view the intellectuals have the important function of approaching 
'the people in order to guide it ideologically and keep it 
linked with the leading group... a model of hegemonic 
ideological construction' (Gramsci,1986: 421), 
The organisational and connec~ive function of the intellectuals 
is therefore directed towards 
'the formation of homogenous, compact social blocs, which 
will give birth to their own intellectuals, their own 
commandos, their own vanguard -- who in turn will react upon 
those blocs in order to develop them ' (Gramsci,1986: 204-
205). 
In this sense, at least, Gramsci developed Lenin's political 
theory in so far as he recognised the importance Lenin attached 
to political intervention in the transformation of society and 
radically extended Lenin's analysis of the 'mechanisms' involved 
in that political intervention. This is why 'Gramsci's analysis 
of the development of parties, of intellectuals, and the role of 
culture in general is of crucial importance' (Morera,1990: 153) 
to his theory of politics. 
Gramsci began his analysis of the social and political function 
124 
of intellectuals by broadening the customary narrow definition of 
the intellectual, arguing that even the most 'degraded and 
mechanical' physical work (such as that performed by the worker 
in capitalist society) is intellectual in the sense that all 
human activity involves a minimum of 'creative intellectual 
activity' (Gramsci,1986: 8). Although the degree of human intel-
lectual activity varies, there 
'is no human activity from which every form of intellectual 
participation can be excluded: h.o..m.Q. faber cannot be 
separated from b.Q.m.Q. sapiens' (Gramsci,1986: 9). 
However whilst Gramsci argued that all individuals think and 
therefore participate intellectualy in society, he did not regard 
individuals as 'intellectuals' (in the narrow or customary sense 
of professional 'thinkers') merely by dint of their innate or 
intrinsic capacity for thought, which characterizes all 
individuals. Nor did Gramsci regard only the professional 
'thinkers' such as the men of letters, philosophers, artists, 
even journalists 'intellectuals', although the direction of the 
latter group's professional activity is weighted towards 
'intellectual elaboration' (Gramsci,1986: 9). Gramsci rejected as 
'traditional and vulgarised' the narrow customary definition of 
intellectuals: 
'The most widespread error of method seems to me that of 
having looked for this criterion of distinction in the 
intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, rather than in 
the ensemble of the system of relations in which these ac-
tivities (and therefore the intellectual groups who per-
sonify them) have their place within the general complex of 
social relations' (Gramsci,1986: 8; see Sassoon,1987: 135-
136). 
Gramsci argued that intellectuals are better characterised by 
their position within prevailing social relations, i.e. relations 
of class and social grouping, and not by their type of work. And 
each of these social classes are complexes of, amongst other 




'All men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not 
all men have in society the function of intellectuals ... 
This means that, although one can speak of intellectuals, 
one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-
intellectuals do not exist' (my emphasis) (Gramsci,1986: 9). 
The distinction Gramsci drew is therefore one of function, with 
the intellectual function of individuals determined not by their 
formal intellectual activities or qualifications etc., but by the 
prevailing 'ensemble' of social relations which define these 
functions. In the modern era, for Gramsci the era of capitalist 
expansion, all individuals in various spheres of society (e.g. in 
the cultural, political as well as economic spheres) who perform 
the function of active organization of the fundamental social 
groups in which they originate, i.e. ·who perform 'organisational 
and connective' in addition to educative and 'directive' func-
tions (Gramsci,1986: 12; see 10, 13, 16), must also be regarded 
as .intellectuals. In civil society, the arena of hegemony (see 
3.2.4) there are, for example, civil servants; in political 
society, the arena of coercive state institutions (see 3.2.2) 
there are political leaders, state functionaries and other offi-
cials in the higher echelons of the bureaucratic-administrative 
system; and in the economic or productive sphere there are 
managers, engineers, and even factory technicians (although 
Gramsci remained unclear on his view of the role of the 
technicians) (Gramsci,1986: 10-16). All participate in and con-
tribute towards the maintenance, development, transformation or 
supersession of a particular view or conception of the world, 
i.e. of a particular hegemony: 
'The problem of creating a new stratum of intellectuals 
consists... in the critical elaboration of the intellectual 
activity that exists in everyone at a certain degree of 
development, modifying its relationship with the muscular-
nervous effort towards a new equilibrium, and ensuring that 
the muscular-nervous effort itself ... which is perpetually 
innovating the physical and social world, becomes the foun-
dation of a new and integral conception of the world' 
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(Gramsci,1986: 9). 
Gramsci's underlying concern was to reject any description of in-
tellectuals as a limited and 'autonomous· social group within 
society - they are not, or should not be seen to be, autarchic. 
And, Gramsci argued, the recognition of the various categories of 
intellectuals is important, not only in order to better grasp 
their organisational functions and potentials within the broader 
ambit of social transformation, but also to highlight the social 
basis of their distinction. 
It must, however, also be remembered that Gramsci did not regard 
the relation between consciousness and the prevailing ensemble of 
social relations as mechanistic or unilinear: 
'The relationship between the intellectuals and the world of 
production is not as direct as it is with the fundamental 
social groups but is, in varying degrees, "mediated" by the 
whole fabric of society and by the complex of 
superstructures, of which the intellectuals are, precisely, 
the "functionaries" (Gramsci,1986: 12). 
In this sense, in Morera's words, 
'political institutions and the moral and intellectual ele-
ments that predominate in a social 
mediately or mechanically determined 
(Morera,1990: 152). 
system ar~ not im-
by the economy 
For Gramsci the various forms of consciousness, whether moral and 
intellectual (cultural) or political, arise on the basis of 
structurally determined social relations. However in his view 
political and ideological forms, as well as intellectual activity 
more generally, are not mere 'reflections' of economic and class 
relations in the structure but are responses to these relations. 
In his view a good example of this capacity is the intervention 
of intellectuals and political parties in the organisation of an 
alternative hegemony. In other words the 'directive· capacity of 
intellectuals and the political party in the cultural and politi-
cal spheres of society frequently involves developing a hegemonic 
solution in response to problems hindering the expansion of an 
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emerging or dominant class or group -- even though these solu-
tions take place 'within the limits of the class structure, and 
thus ultimately, of the economy' (Morera,1990: 152). 
For, as Gramsci observed, classes are never constituted in an en-
tirely homogenous fashion, rendering the notion of class rela-
tions complex and diffuse. Moreover conflict in society, . as was 
seen above, is also characterised by struggles between non-class 
based groups which cannot, at least not directly, be explained in 
terms of a class logic. 
On this basis 
categories of 
Gramsci distinguished between 





'traditional' and 'organic' categories or strata of intellectuals 
respectively. With regard to the latter category Gramsci argued 
that 
'Every social group, coming into existence on the original 
terrain of an essential function in the world of economic 
produrition, creates together with itself, organically, one 
or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeinity 
and an awareness of its own function not only in the 
economic but also in the social and political field' 
(Gramsci,1986: 5, see 15, 18). 
These organic intellectuals are thus closely linked to the 
dominant mode of production (Sassoon,1987: 137). Furthermore the 
category of organic intellectuals, 
'which every new class creates alongside itself and 
elaborates in the course of its development, are for the 
most part "specialisations" of partial aspects of the primi-
tive activity of the new social type which the new class has 
brought into prominence' (Gramsci,1986: 6). 
In other words each social class (which, as we saw above, Gramsci 
defined in terms of its its position in the prevailing mode of 
production) produces a category of intellectuals, often consist-
ing of various 'strata', which primarily serve to promote the 
self-awareness and give articulated expression not only to the 
economic (professional and corporate), but also to the social, 
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cultural and political interests and functions of that 
(fundamental) social group (see McLellan,1986: 181). Organic in-
tellectuals therefore perform the important functions of 
organization, integration and leadership of members of a social 
class as an important condition of the creation of the overall 
'conditions most favourable to the expansion of their own class' 
(Gramsci,1986: 5-6), i.e. an alternative hegemonic project. The 
organic intellectuals, who carry out the organizing activity, are 
differentiated according to their specialized areas of competence 
and thus form a diverse yet integrated complex of relationships.· 
Gramsci gave various examples of the organic intellectuals in 
capitalist society, in particular with reference to the two fun-
damental social classes, namely the bourgeoisie or capitalists 
and the proletariat or workers. Examples of organic intellectuals 
of the capitalist class are the capitalist entrepreneur 
(commercial and industrial leaders), the industrial manager, 
specialist economists, civil servants, and 'the organisers of a 
new culture, of a new legal system', etc. (Gramsci,1986: 5). 
(The primary function of the organic intellectuals of the 
capitalist class in relation to Gramsci's second use of the con-
cept 'hegemony', will be discussed in 3.2 below). Although 
Gramsci paid particular attention to the category of working 
class organic intellectuals he did not provide any clear examples 
of these. There is, however, one passage in the Sf.H. which might 
throw some light on this issue. In this passage Gramsci makes an 
intriguing, if rather diffuse reference to the role of the 
political party in relation to the formation of organic 
intellectuals: 
'The political party, for all groups, is precisely the 
mechanism which carries out in civil society the same func-
tion as the State carries out, more synthetically and over a 
larger scale, in political society ... The party carries out 
this function in strict dependence on its basic function, 
which is that of elaborating its own component parts --
those elements of a social group which has been born and 
developed as an "economic" group -- and of turning them into 
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qualified political intellectuals, leaders ... and organisers 
of all the activities and functions inherent in the organic 
development of an integral society, both civil and 
political... all members of a political party should be 
regarded as intellectuals... What matters is the function, 
which is directive and organisational, i.e. educative, i.e. 
intellectual' (Gramsci,1986: 16). 
We have already made reference to this passage with respect to 
Gramsci's general concept of the intellectuals (see p.12). 
However some commentators (e.g. Simon,1985: 99-100; Hoare and 
Nowell Smith,1986: 15f; Togliatti,1979: 155, 177) have inter-
preted this passage as a particular, if not exclusive, reference 
to the revolutionary party's role in elaborating organic 
intellectuals. It follows that in the era of capitalism the 
revolutionary party is the party of the working class. Simon and 
Togliatti push this line of reasoning further arguing that this 
passage may well be interpreted as a particular reference to the 
revolutionary party's role.as a 'collective intellectual' of the 
working class. Simon immediately cautions, however, that this in-
terpretation of the revolutionary party as a collective intellec-
tual of the working class does not mean 
'that the revolutionary party should be the only organic ih-
tellectual of the working class. Gramsci proposes that every 
member of the party should be regarded as an organic 
intellectual, not that every organic intellectual of the 
working class should be a member of the party' (Simon,1985: 
99-100). 
Simon's interpretation of this passage, which adds an interesting 
dimension to Gramsci's concept of the intellectuals, does not 
resolve the problem of the absence of explicit examples of work-
ing class organic intellectuals. What is clear is that Gramsci 
regarded the creation of organic intellectuals as a long and dif-
ficult process 
'full of contradictions, advances and retreats, dispersals 
and regroupings, in which the loyalty of the masses is often 
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sorely tried' (Gramsci,1986: 334). 
Gramsci accorded this process a great deal of importance, arguing 
that the proletariat cannot rise above its economic-corporate 
position in capitalist society (i.e. bring about a sustainable 
socialist transformation of capitalist society) without the for-
mation and elaboratian of its own organic intellectuals. Thus 
within capitalist society, in which the proletariat is a subal-
tern or subordinate social group or class, 
'technical education, closely bound to industrial labour 
even at the most primitive and unqualified level, must form 
the basis of the new type of intellectual' (Gramsci,1986: 
9). 
Gramsci described the 'mode of being' of the new type of organic 
working dlass intellectual as fundamentally one of 
'active participation in practical life, 
organiser, "permanent persuader" and not 
orator ... ' (Gramsci,1986: 10). 
as constructor, 
just a simple 
The suggestion here is that the central function of proletarian 
organic intellectuals is to facilitate or establish the basis for 
the transformation of the workers' class consciousness from nar-
row economic-corporate to that of cultural and political 
interests. As McLellan argues, in the case of the proletariat the 
task of the organic intellectuals 
was to draw out and make coherent the 
and potentialities already inherent 
activity' (McLellan,1986: 181). 
latent aspirations 
in working-class 
However, the latter category of intellectuals can only, Gramsci 
argued, achieve this effectively (i.e. in a sustainable manner) 
to the extent that they are able to translate their potential 
domination in the sphere of production into 'cultural hegemony' 
(see Gramsci,1986: 10f) and political leadership, i.e. to the ex-
tent that the consciousness of the proletarian class can be 
transformed into a universal consciousness as a condition of 
moral and intellectual hegemony as well as political dominance by 
the proletariat: 
'The intellectuals are the dominant group's "deputies" exer-
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cising the subaltern functions of social 




Gramsci argued that traditional intellectuals, on the other hand, 
have a distinctive position in relation to established groups in 
the social relations of a society: 
'Every "essential" social group which emerges into history 
out of the preceding economic structure [for example the 
bourgeoisie emerging from feudal relations], and as an ex-
pression of a development of this structure, has found ... 
categories of intellectuals already in existence and which 
seemed indeed to represent an historical continuity uninter-
rupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in 
political and social forms' (Gramsci,1986: 6-7). 
Gramsci cited the ecclesiastics as an example of such traditional 
intellectuals, that is, those intellectuals who were 'organically 
bound to the landed aristocracy' (Gramsci,1986: 7), the dominant 
'secular' class of the feudal era. It is interesting to note 
Gramsci's further observations, however. The ecclesiastics, al-
though retaining a near intellectual (i.e. educative and 
ideological) monopoly in feudal society, had been challenged by 
the formation of various other categories of non-ecclesiastic in-
tellectuals during the transition from feudalism. These non-
ecclesiastic intellectuals were 'favoured and enabled to expand 
by the growing strength of the central power of the monarch, 
right up to absolutism' (Gramsci,1986: 7). It was the role of the 
non-ecclesiastic intellectuals in unifying and organising the 
system of absolute monarchy which enabled it to transcend the 
phase of the break-up of feudalism successfully (Gramsci,1986: 
173). 
Gramsci questioned the sense of 'autonomy' which this 'historical 
continuity' would appear to bestow on the traditional 
intellectuals, at least in their own minds. He argued that al-
though traditional intellectuals may not be organically bound to 
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the dominant social group of subsequent eras they are by no means 
independent of the historical complex of social relations: 
'Since the various categories of traditional intellectuals 
experience through an "esprit de corps" their uninterrupted 
historical continuity and their special qualification, they 
thus put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of 
the dominant social group. This self-assessment... can be 
defined as the expression of that social utopia by which the 
intellectuals think of themselves as "independent", 
autonomous, endowed with a character of their own, etc' 
(Gramsci,1986: 7-8). 
Or, as McLellan has summarised Gramsci's notion of traditional 
intellectuals: 
'Traditional intellectuals were intellectuals who mis-
takenly -- considered themselves to be autonomous of social 
classes and who appeared to embody a historical continuity 
above and beyond socio-political change... They were those 
intellectuals who survived the demise of the mode of produc-
tion that gave them birth' (McLellan,1987: 181). 
There is a measure of ambiguity in Gramsci's observations on the 
category of traditional intellectuals. In the above two passages 
quoted from the s.E..N. Gramsci appears to be suggesting that a 
category of intellectuals distinct from the dominant or fundamen-
tal class of a society does exist, 'at least in all of history up 
to the present' (Gramsci,1986: 7). Yet at the same time he dis-
missed the notion of their independence or autonomy, which he 
described as a subjective self-assessment. This apparent am-
biguity is, however, resolved if one conceives of the category of 
traditional intellectuals temporally or historically, i.e. as or-
ganic to a fundamental class of a prior mode of production. Thus, 
for example, a category of intellectuals such as the ecclesias-
tics may be described as 'organic' to the feudal era and 
'traditional' relative to the bourgeois capitalist era. Neverthe-
less Gramsci did not make the precise function of this distinc-
tion clear, although it does provide an insight into the relation 
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of his important concepts of the organic intellectuals and of the 
political party, which will be discussed below. 
Gramsci asserted that the relation between the organic and tradi-
tional intellectuals is an important key for comprehending the 
appropriate strategy for transforming a subordinate group, class, 
or formation of classes into a dominant social group, i.e. of 
transforming the emergent dominant social group from a narrowly 
economic-corporate formation, enjoying increasing supremacy in 
the economic field, into the dominant and leading or 'directive' 
(i.e 'specialised and political') intellectual-political group: 
'One of the most important characteristics of any group that 
is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimi-
late and to conquer "ideologically" the traditional 
intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest is made 
quicker and more efficacious the more the group in question 
succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic 
intellectuals' (Gramsci,1986: 10). 
In other words, in Gramsci's view one of the primary conditions 
for the successful transformation of a dominant economic group 
into an intellectually and politically hegemonic group is the 
successful absorption by that group of existing categories of 
traditional intellectuals. However, in order for this transforma-
tion and this absorption to prove sustainable the organic intel-
lectuals of the emerging hegemonic group must simultaneously 
develop a political and cultural consciousness, that is con-
sciousness not only of its economic but also of its cultural and 
political functions, thereby founding or elaborating a new 
'integral' conception of the world. And the new intellectual' 
envisaged by Gramsci must participate actively in practical 
aspects and spheres of life, constructing and creating, organiz-
ing and fulfilling the role of 'permanent persuader· and in so 
doing facilitate the broadening and deepening of the directive 
capacity of the emerging dominant social group (Gramsci,1986: 
10). 
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Gramsci accorded the institution of the 'modern political party' 
(and especially the revolutionary political party, see 
Gramsci,1986: 15f) great importance as the educative arena and 
organisational vehicle from which the 'new intellectuals' (i.e. 
the organic intellectuals of the workers' class in the case of 
capitalist society) would emerge and exercise their central 
directive function and activity of laying the ideological basis 
for that class's hegemony in society: 
'The political party for some social groups is nothing other 
than their specific way of elaborating their own category of 
organic intellectuals directly in the political and 
philosophical field and not just in the field of productive 
technique' (Gramsci,1986: 15). 
Gramsci argued that the modern political party functions as the 
'mechanism' by means of which the 'organic intellectuals of a 
given group' are 'welded' together with the traditional intellec-
tuals (Gramsci,1986: 15). Central to Gramsci's notion of the 
relationship between the modern political party and the intellec-
tuals was his assertion that 
'all members of a political party [i.e. the leading person-
nel of a social group (Gramsci,1986: 105)] should be 
regarded as intellectuals. . .. There are of course distinc-
tions of level to be made; [however], what matters is the 
function, which is directive and organisational, i.e. 
educative, i.e. intellectual' (Gramsci,1986: 16). 
This does not mean that Gramsci regarded all intellectuals 
(either organic or traditional) necessarily as members of politi-
cal parties representative either of their own particular social 
group or that of others. However an 
'intellectual who joins the political party of a particular 
social group is merged with the organic intellectuals of the 
group itself, and is linked tightly with the group' 
(Gramsci,1986: 16). 
The political party, in Gramsci's view, gives expression to an 
organic or integral conception of the world as opposed to the 
narrow economic-corporate function of professional associations: 
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'In the political party the elements of an economic social 
group get beyond that moment of their historical development 
and become agents of more general activities of a national 
and international character' (Gramsci,1986: 16). 
Thus far we have discussed the first meaning of Gramsci's concept 
of hegemony understood as a phase in the development of the 
political consciousness of a social class or group. This latter 
account in section 3.1.2 was then related to Gramsci's view of 
the functions of intellectuals and political parties in organis-
ing and securing the hegemonic position of an emergent social 
class or group in society, highlighting the special role which 
Gramsci accorded the dissemination of ideology in the hegemony 
building process. To conclude this discussion, and to establish a 
link to the following section, we will discuss an important ex-
ample of Gramsci · s many analyses of actual historical events .or 
situations in terms of this first meaning he accorded his concept 
of hegemony. 
In the section of the S.E.tI. entitled 'Notes on Italian History' 
Gramsci argued that the Italian mediaeval communes failed to 
'transcend feudalism', failed to undergo an 'organic transition 
from the Commune to. a system that was no longer feudal' 
(Gramsci,1986: 54f) precisely because their bourgeoisies failed 
to forge a national unity (see Gramsci,1986: 53f, 18). For 
Gramsci the mediaeval communes were characterized by minimal 
'centralisation': 
'The State was, in a certain sense, a mechanical bloc of so-
cial groups... within the circle of political-military 
compression ... the subaltern groups had a life of their own, 
institutions of their own, etc., and sometimes these in-
stitutions had State functions which made of the State a 
federation of social groups with disparate functions not 
subordinated in any way' (Gramsci,1986: 54f). 
Under circumstances of relative autonomy of social groups and 
classes within communes no single group could exercise unifying 
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control and predominance. Consequently it was not possible to 
forge a national-popular collective will without which the 
bourgeoisie, the emergent class in feudal society, could not es-
tablish its national hegemony. Only with the formation of the 
modern (i.e. national and united) state (in Italy's case in 1870) 
was this unity achieved: 
'The modern State substitutes for the mechanical bloc of so-
cial groups their subordination to the active hegemony of 
the directive and dominant group, hence abolishes certain 
autonomies, which nevertheless are reborn in other forms, as 
parties, trade unions, cultural associations ... ' 
(Gramsci,1986: 54f). 
Gramsci regarded the Italian case as extremely significant for 
the way in which the Italian communal bourgeoisies of the Risor-
gimento (i.e. Nineteenth Century movement for the unification of 
Italy) failed to progress beyond the economic-corporate phase, to 
unite nationally and thereby transform the communal states into a 
'communal republic' (Gramsci,1986: 53f) or 'nation-state' 
(Sassoon,1987: 125). Gramsci expanded his analysis of this 
failure by introducing the 'second' and most original meaning of 
his concept of 'hegemony' (involving his extended concept of the 
state), namely that the predominance of an emergent class or 
group in society involves not only political domination in the 
state (narrowly conceived, i.e. for Gramsci 'political society', 
see 3.2) but also cultural and ideological hegemony in civil 
society. Gramsci ascribed the failure of the Italian communal 
bourgeoisies to extend their power and dominance beyond the 
economic-corporate sphere to their failure to establish political 
domination in the state and intellectual and cultural hegemony in 
civil society. And with specific reference to the role of the in-
tellectuals in this failure, Gramsci argued that 
'it is precisely in civil society [the arena of hegemony] 
that intellectuals operate especially ... This conception of 
the function of the intellectuals, I believe, throws light 
on the reason, or one of the reasons, for the fall of the 
mediaeval communes, i.e. of the rule of an economic class 
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which did not prove able to create its own category of in-
tellectuals and thus exercise a hegemony [in civil society] 
as well as a dictatorship [in the state narrowly 
understood] ... The Communes were thus a syndicalist state, 
which did not succeed in transcending this phase and becom-
ing an integral state' (Gramsci,1986: 56f). 
Clearly, therefore, the second meaning of hegemony in Gramsci re-
volves on the special meaning which Gramsci imparted to his 
original concept of civil society as the sphere of hegemony and 
his concept of the 'integral' state, which subsumes the former. 
These and other related concepts and issues will be examined in 
the following section. 
3.2 Hegemony And Domination: Civil Society And The State In 
Gramsci 
Most of Gramsci's important and original writings concerning the 
constitution of the integral state which have been translated 
into English are contained in the SEN... For this reason this sec-
tion will focus on the SEN... In particular, the abovementioned 
'Notes on Italian History' in the SEN.. contain some of the most 
important passages in which Gramsci expressed the second meaning 
of his concept of hegemony, the elaboration of which is the 
primary goal of this section. This section will also investigate 
Gramsci's related concepts of 'civil society' and 'political 
society', which together constitute the 'integral state'. 
Furthermore, the discussion of the integral state in Gramsci in-
volves reference to his concepts of the passive revolution', 
·war of position', and 'war of manoeuvre', which will be intro-
duced in the course of the discussion below. 
3.2.1 Passive Revolution 
As already mentioned, in his notes on Italian history Gramsci was 
especially preoccupied with the reasons for the failure of the 
Italian mediaeval communes to forge a national unity, and the 
role that the communal bourgeoisies played in this failure. 
Gramsci extended his analysis of Italian history to include the 
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period of the Risorgimento, or the Italian struggle for national 
liberty and unity during the Nineteenth Century. One of the con-
cepts to emerge from Gramsci's extensive writings on the Risor-
gimento was that of 'passive revolution' which he formulated in 
the course of his description of the relation between the various 
parties and groupings constituting the Risorgimento 
(Gramsci,1986: 106-114). As will be shown the concept of passive 
revolution is central to the development of the second meaning of 
hegemony in Gramsci. 
In broad terms Gramsci's concept of passive revolution refers to 
those historical instances in which a revolution in society takes 
place 'from above', 
transition in which 
designating 
the state 
a potential in any process of 
plays the dominant role' 
(Mouffe,1979 (3): 12). In a passive revolution, in other words, 
it is not the working class which is the hegemonic agent but the 
state. Generally speaking such a passive revolution is 
'involved whenever relatively far-reaching modifications in 
a country's economic structure are made from above, through 
the agency of the state apparatuses, without relying on the 
active participation of the people' (Simon,1985: 47, 49). 
Mouffe argues that it is a generic concept: 
'The category of "passive Revolution" is often used by 
Gramsci to qualify the most usual form of hegemony of the 
bourgeoisie involving a mode of articulation [of the inter-
ests of a fundamental class to those of other social groups 
in the creation of a collective will] whose aim is to 
neutralise the other social forces. But the category is not 
limited to this situation: it assumes a central role and a 
strategic function as a crucial element in the science of 
politics' (Mouffe,1979 (3): 11). 
Gramsci regarded the Risorgimento as an important example of pas-
sive revolution, and he identified the Piedmont state as the 
agent of this passive revolution (Gramsci,1986: 105-114). It is 
an example which is worth describing in some detail since it was 
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the basis of Gramsci's analysis not only of passive revolution as 
a species of modern forms of social transformation, or as Mouffe 
puts it of a 'political theory of transition' (Mouffe,1979 (3): 
11; see also Buci-Glucksmann,1979: 207), but in addition con-
stituted the background for his theoretical formulations involv-
ing the second meaning of hegemony with which we will be con-
cerned in the following sub-section. 
When identifying the major groupings involved in the 
Risorgimento, Gramsci accorded Cavour's Moderate Party the role 
of representing the interests of the scattered bourgeoisies of 
Italy. The other major political group was the Action Party of 
Mazzini and, later, Garibaldi. Gramsci argued that the republican 
Action Party 'did not base itself specifically on any historical 
class' (Gramsci,1986: 57), and was ultimately subject to the 
'intellectual, moral and political hegemony' of the Moderates 
(Gamsci,1986: 58) constituting perhaps nothing much more than 'an 
agitational and propagandist body in the service of the 
Moderates' (Gramsci,1986: 62). For Gramsci the Moderates were the 
expression, the 'representatives, the leading stratum, the or-
ganic intellectuals' of the 'upper classes, to which economically 
they belonged ... [exercising] such a power of attraction that, in 
the last analysis, they end up subjugating the intellectuals of 
the other social groups' (Gramsci,1986: 60). Gramsci decribed 
this process as 'transformism·, by which he meant 'the formation 
of an ever more extensive ruling class' (Gramsci,1986: 58), a 
process brought about by the 
'gradual but continuous absorption, achieved by methods 
which varied in their effectiveness, of the active elements 
produced by allied groups -- and even of those which came 
from antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile. 
In this sense political leadership became merely an aspect 
of the function of domination -- in as much as the absorp-
tion of the enemies' elites means their decapitation, and 
annihilation' (Gramsci,1986: 59, see 109-110). 
It is in this sense of being a somewhat elitist and unarticulated 
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formation relying for its predominance on coercive tactics that 
Gramsci regarded the 'hegemony' of the Moderate Party as partial 
or limited. Although the Moderates gained control of the Action 
Party and of the Risorgimento itself, it did so in a m6lecular or 
uncoordinated manner, failing to develop a 'party programme 
worked out and constituted according to a plan, in advance of the 
practical and organisational action' (Gramsci,1986: 60). Thus al-
though the Moderates were· an organic intellectual vanguard of the 
bourgeoisie and in as much exercised the function of leadership, 
neither it nor the Action Party succeeded or even sought to es-
tablish a broader based programme of popular demands, i.e. of es-
tablishing and broadening the Risorgimento's popular and 
democratic character reflecting the 'essential demands of the 
popular masses (Gramsci,1986: 61; see discussion of 'national 
popular will', above). In fact this was actively avoided in the 
sense that 
"what was involved was not that throughout the Peninsula 
there existed nuclei of a homogenous ruling class whose ir-
resistible tendency to unite determined the formation of the 
new Italian national State... what was involved was not a 
social group [fundamental social class] which "led" other 
groups' (Gramsci,1986: 104, 105). 
These nuclei did exist but.they did not seek to lead or "concord 
their interests and aspirations with the interests and . aspira-
tions of other groups', such as the peasants. Instead they wished 
their interests to dominate (Gramsci,1986: 104-5). In other words 
the masses were integrated through a system of absorption and 
neutralisation of their interests in such a way as to prevent 
them from opposing those of the hegemonic class' (Mouffe,1979 
(2): 182). Thus national unity and the political predominance of 
the bourgeoisie were established by the bourgeois intellectual 
vanguard without developing popular struggles, and hegemony over 
subordinate classes. The Risorgimento movement was "characterised 
by its aversion to any intervention of the popular masses in 
state life, to any organic reform which would substitute 
"hegemony" for crude dictatorial "dominance"· (Gramsci, 1986: 
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58f). This rendered political leadership a mere 'aspect of the 
function of domination' (Gramsci,1986: 59) dictatorship 
without hegemony: 
a political form of transition in which the problems of the 
transformations of society and the establishment of hegemony 
are effected through the state apparatuses' (Mouffe,1979 
(3): 12-13). 
Throughout the series of notes in which Gramsci discusses his 
concept of passive revolution, we find the opposition between 
hegemony and dictatorial dominance. The relation between the con-
cept of passive revolution and the particular importance Gramsci 
attached to counterposing the functions of hegemony and domina-
tion can only be fully grasped in a discussion of the distinct 
spheres in which these functions are exercised, namely civil 
society and political society unified dialectically in Gramsci's 
concept of the integral state. And it is to this discussion which 
we now turn. 
3.2.2 The Integral State 
Gramsci made important contributions towards the development and 
transformation of Marxist theory in the Twentieth Century, espe-
cially with regard to the development of a marxist,theory of the 
state and politics. Gramsci's writings on the state are scattered 
throughout numerous passages in the s.Eli, and set out in what may 
at first apppear to be contradictory terms (see McLellan,1986: 
188; Sassoon,1987: 112-113, 185). To illustrate this, and to 
facilitate the purpose of theoretical analysis, we will first 
highlight and analyse those passages in Gramsci's texts which ap-
pear to contain contradictory concepts of the state. This will, 
in turn, lead to a broader appraisal of other related concepts, 
most notably that of the second sense of the concept 'hegemony', 
to which I referred at the beginning of section 3.1., as well as 
Gramsci's concept of civil society. 
Generally ~peaking, Gramsci utilised two apparently contradictory 
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definitions of the state. In a section devoted to a discussion of 
the 'intellectuals' Gramsci made one of his most important state-
ments regarding the state: 
'What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major super-
structural "levels": the one that can be called "civil 
society", that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 
"private", and that of "political society" or the "State". 
These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function 
of "hegemony" which the dominant group exercises throughout 
society and on the other hand to that of "direct domination" 
or command exercised through the State and "juridical" 
government' (Gramsci,1986: 12, see also 52). 
This description of the 'superstructural levels' implies a narrow 
definition of the state (or political society) which together 
with 'juridical government' exercises the function of 'direct 
domination', in contrast to civil society in which hegemony or 
'indirect domination' is exercised by the dominant group 
However, in a section titled 'The State' Gramsci asserted that 
'The fact is glossed over that in this form of regime [in 
which the State's functions are limited to 'the safeguarding 
of public order and of respect for the laws', i.e the 
'State' in the narrow politico-juridical sense] ... hegemony 
over its historical development belongs to private forces, 
to civil society which is "State" too, indeed is the 
State itself' (Gramsci,1986: 261). 
Gramsci is alluding to a more inclusive notion of the state here, 
one that would encompass civil society as well. And in another 
passage he asserted that 
'the general notion of State includes elements which need to 
be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the 
sense that ~ne might say that State = political society + 
civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the ar-
mour of coercion)' (Gramsci,1986: 263, see 239). 
In this latter passage Gramsci explicitly defined the state as 
somehow extended to include or overlap with civil society, while 
implying a distinction between the state and political society. 
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Thus Gramsci's frequent synonymous use of the concepts 'political 
society' and the 'state' in certain passages of the s..e.N. appear to 
be in conflict with the numerous other passages in which Gramsci 
J 
conceived of both 'political society' and 'civil society' in. 
relation to the state. These distinct notions of the state are 
echoed in numerous other passages throughout the s..e.N. in various 
different contexts. However for our purposes the focus remains on 
the reasons for Gramsci's dual perspective. Are these distinct 
descriptions of the state in fact contradictory, and if not why 
did Gramsci utilize such apparently distinct concepts of the 
state? 
A possible way of interpreting the seemingly contradictory 
definitions of the state in Gramsci is suggested in another pas-
sage involving Gramsci's critique of economism: 
'the distinction between political society and civil 
society, which is made into and presented as an organic one, 
whereas in fact it is merely methodological... in actual 
reality civil society and State are one and the same 
(Gramsci,1986: 160). 
Sassoon rightly interprets this as a key passage for understand-
ing Gramsci's unique concept of the state. In her view, which is 
in accordance with secondary literature generally, for Gramsci 
both political society as well as civil society were superstruc-
tural elements in a dialectical relation distinguishable for pur-
poses of study and analysis. Furthermore this passage reveals 
Gramsci's 'dialectical view of the nature of politics' 
(Sassoon,1987: 112; see also 4.2.). This, she tells us, accords 
with the dialectical nature of Gramsci's thought more generally 
which often involves presenting 'us with a totality constituted 
by the unity of two concepts' (Sassoon,1987: 111). For our pur-
poses here it is important to stress that the extended definition 
of the state is dominant in Gramsci (Sassoon,1987: 112), indeed 
is characteristic of Gramsci. 
A clue to this question, and one that underlies Sassoon's 
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interpretation, was provided by Gramsci in the form of an 
elaboration of what he called the '"dual perspective" in politi-
cal action and in national life' (Gramsci,1986: 169), a notion 
which is characteristic of his later writings. Gramsci asserted 
that the dual perspective presents itself on various different 
levels with respect to political action, but that these 
'can all theoretically be reduced to two fundamental levels, 
corresponding to the dual nature of Machiavelli's Centaur --
half-animal and half-human. They are the levels of force and 
of consent, authority and hegemony, violence and 
civilisation, of ·the individual moment and of the universal 
moment ("Church" and "State"), of agitation and of 
propaganda, of tactics and of strategy, etc.' (Gramsci,1986: 
169-170). 
Gramsci cautioned against reducing the relation between these 
'couples' to a mechanical succcession in time, or to absolute op-
posites in the analytical sense, whereas they in fact represent a 
'dialectical relation' or 'dialectical unity of the moments of 
force and consent in political action' (Gramsci,1986: 169f). 
Gramsci interpreted the proletarian struggle, most especially in 
the West, in this light when he argued that its revolutionary 
strategy must be founded on the recognition 'of the dialectical 
unity of the moments of force and consent in political action' 
(Gramsci,1986: 169f). With respect to the life of the state (the 
arena of political action) Gramsci similarly argued: 
'Guicciardini's assertion that two things are absolutely 
necessary for the life of a State: arms and religion... can 
be translated by various other, less drastic formulae: force 
and consent; coercion and persuasion; political society and 
civil society; politics and morality ... ; law and freedom; 
order and self-discipline; or violence and fraud' 
(Gramsci,1986: 170f). 
This passage expresses Gramsci's extended 
state, of the dialectical unity between force 
definition of the 
and consent, as 
well as implying that in this extended definition of the state 
political activity can only be separated from activity in civil 
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-society, the arena of hegemony, for methodological purposes. 
A number of important questions flow from these observations. 
Firstly, in what sense did Gramsci include civil society in his 
extended concept of the state? Furthermore, what meaning did 
Gramsci attach to the concept of hegemony in these passages, and 
therefore to the concept of civil society? And finally, does 
Gramsci's linkage of civil society and political society 'within' 
his concept of the integral state have the effect of extending 
his definition of political activity, beyond the narrow concep-
tion of politics as 'conventionally' understood (see Chapter 1) 
as only pertaining to the activities of political government? 
(This latter point will be taken up in Chapter 4 together with a 
discussion of the 'base-superstructure' relation in Gramsci). 
The first question, i.e. in what sense did Gramsci include civil 
society in his concept of the integral state, directs one to the 
dual sense in which Gramsci employs the concept of the state, 
i.e. in the contrast between, on the one hand, a narrow defini-
tion of the state as political government (which Gramsci referred 
to as 'political society'), involving government power exercised 
through 'governmental-coercive apparatus' (Gramsci,1986: 265, see 
also 261,. 262, 263, 267, 268); and on the other of the extended 
or 'integral' concept of the state, which as we saw above incor-
porates elements of civil society, that is 'hegemony protected by 
the armour of coercion' (Gramsci,1986: 263, see also 239, 264, 
265, 275). 
According to Gramsci the identification of state and government 
(i.e. the narrow concept of the state) amounts to a repre-
sentation of the economic-corporate form' (Gramsci,1986: 262) of 
the state, underlying which is a basic confusion between the 
spheres of civil society and political society. In other words 
for Gramsci the state 
'which is usually understood as political society (or 
dictatorship; or coercive apparatus to bring the mass of the 
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people into conformity with the specific type of production 
and the specific economy at a given moment)' 
must instead be conceived of 
as an equilibrium between political society and civil 
society (or hegemony of a social group over the entire na-
tional society exercised through the so-called private 
organ is at ions, .1 ike the Church, the trade unions, the 
schools, etc.)' (Gramsci,1986: 56f, see 12). 
In this sense the state 
'is the entire complex of practical and theoretical ac-
tivities with which the ruling class not only justifies and 
maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active con-
sent of those over whom it rules~ .. ' (Gramsci,1986: 244). 
By this state is 'understood not only the apparatus of 
government, but also the "private" apparatus of "hegemony" or 
civil society' (Gramsci,1986: 261). For Gramsci the concept of 
the integral state therefore primarily serves to indicate that it 
is in civil society that a dominant class's hegemony is exercised 
(Mouffe,1979 (3): 10). 
the economic-corporate stage (by acquiring political 
Gramsci argued, and this is a point which follows on directly 
from our discussion in section 3.1, that any class seeking to be 
politically dominant as well as hegemonic must progress beyond 
class ' 
consciousness), i.e. it must not merely acquire economic 
dominance and governmental power (strictly political) but, in 
addition, must establish intellectual and moral (cultural) 
hegemony by 'creating a State "with the consent of the governed"' 
(Gramsci,1986: 53f). If such a class were to remain merely 
dominant in the economic sphere, and even if that class acquired 
state power in the narrow sense, the state would remain a mere 
'syndicalist state' (see Gramsci,1986: 56f). Citing the histori-
cal example of the Italian mediaeval communes, discussed above, 
Gramsci claimed that the supremacy· of a social class or gro.up 
'manifests itself in .two ways, as "domination" and as 
"intellectual and moral leadership". A social group 
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dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to 
"liquidate", or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it 
leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and 
indeed must, already exercise "leadership" before winning 
governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal con-
ditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently be-, 
comes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds 
·it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to "lead" as·well' 
(Gramsci,1986: 57-58). 
This passage gives expression to the dialectical nature of the 
relation in Gramsci between 'domination' and 'leadership', i.e. 
the functions of domination and leadership are not absolute 
opposites: they do not preclude but rather presuppose one 
another. Furthermore, the attainment of a sustainable form of 
political leadership and governmental power by a class thus en-
tails more than mere control of the apparatuses of the state: 
'there can and must be a "political hegemony" even before 
the attainment of governmental power, and one should not 
count solely on the power and material force which such a 
position gives in order to ex~rcise political leadership or 
hegemony' (Gramsci,1986: 57f). 
As Mouffe argues, Gramsci's concept of the integral state is thus 
related. to two levels, 
'first, it involves the enlarging of the social base of the 
state and the complex relations established between the 
state, the hegemonic class and its mass base [our first 
sense of Gramsci's concept of hegemony, see 3.1]; second, it 
involves the enlarging of the state's functions, since the 
notion of the integral state implies the incorporation of 
the apparatuses of hegemony, of civil society, to the state' 
(Mouffe,1979 (2): 182). 
Gramsci's extended concept of the state reflects his fundamental 
concern to develop an account of the state which is adequate to 
its modern complexities. He regarded as partial both the narrow 
liberal conception of the state as an expression of the general 
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will and independent of particular interests, as well as the or-
thodox Marxist conception of the state as an instrument of 
dominant class interests: 
'For Gramsci it is important to emphasise that the dimension 
of the expression of general interests does exist but that 
it is always linked, through a hegemonic system, to the in-
terests of a fundamental class' (Mouffe,1979 (3): 10). 
The concept of the integral state also serves to illustrate the 
need for appropriate strategies which revolutionary forces 
require in their attempts to challenge bourgeois domination based 
on domination in political society as well as hegemony in civil 
society. In Gramsci's view direct assaults by the forces of 
revolution on the complex and sturdy foundations of the bourgeois 
state can only lead to frustration if the basis for an alterna-
tive hegemony has not already been articulated. Gramsci expressed 
this need in a discussion of revolutionary strategies and tactics 
involving his dialectically related concepts of the war of 
manoeuvre and ·war of position' which will be the focus of our 
discussion below. 
3.2.3 War Of Position And War Of Manoeuvre 
Throughout his scattered writings on the state Gramsci explicitly 
emphasised the i~portance of analysing the state, any state, 
within the appropriate historical context. In other words Gramsci 
was acutely aware of the historical epochs or periods in which 
empirical states operate and function since in different epochs 
different state forms arise out of relations of forces unique to 
that epoch and which are in 'continuous motion and shift of 
equilibrium' (Gramsci,1986: 172). Indeed much of what Gramsci had 
to say about the state can only be comprehended with reference to 
his analyses of history. Gramsci makes an important distinction 
of this sort when he distinguishes between 'advanced' or modern 
states (i.e. the bourgeois capitalist state) and pre-modern 
states (feudal forms etc.) in terms of his concepts of the war 
of movement' or ·manoeuvre', and 'siege warfare' or the 'war of 
position'(Gramsci,1986: 229-238). In their military sense, the 
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war of movement includes, for example, direct military assault 
(frontal attack); while the war of position refers to, for 
example, trench warfare and the 'whole organisational and in-
dustrial system of the territory which lies to the rear of ,the 
army in the field' (Gramsci,1986: 234). The key to understanding 
the appropriate military strategy resides in the acknowledgement 
that 
'in wars among the more industrially and socially advanced 
States, the war of manoeuvre must be considered as ieduced 
to more a tactical than a strategic function· (Gramsci,1986: 
235). 
Gramsci drew a parallel to this in the 'art and science of 
politics·: 
'at least in the case of the most advanced States, where 
"civil society" has become a very complex structure' and one 
which is resistant to the catastrophic "incursions" of the 
immediate economic element (crises, depressions, etc.)' 
(Gramsci,1986: 235), i.e. 'only politics creates the pos-
sibility for manoeuvre and movement' (Gramsci,1986: 232). 
Here Gramsci suggested a qualified historical parallel between 
major economic crises and the war of movement in political 
activity. The war of movement, of frontal attack on the state un-
derst6od in its integral sense, must at all times, and especially 
in the modern era, take the enemy's potential for a war of posi-
tion into account, i.e. must take cognisance of the dgree of 
development of (the intitutions of) civil society. To await 
economic crises, especially in the modern epoch, as if they were 
decisive historical opportunities for the defeat of a dominant 
class 
was a form of iron economic determinism ... out and out his-
torical mysticism, the awaiting of a sort of miraculous 
illumination' (Gramsci,1986: 233). 
In the sphere of politics the 
'superstructures of civil society are like trench-systems of 
modern warfare. In war it would sometimes happen that a 
fierce artillery attack seemed to have destroyed the enemy's 
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entire defensive system, whereas in fact it had only 
destroyed the outer perimeter; and at the moment of their 
advance and attack the assailants would find themselves con-
fronted by a line of defence which was still effective. The 
same thing happens in politics, during the great economic 
crises' (Gramsci,1986: 235). 
The war of position and war of movement are not, Gramsci argued, 
to be viewed as opposites or absolute alternatives. Instead they 
are in a constantly evolving and changing dialectical relation to 
each other, hence the need 
strategy rooted in the 
for a comprehensive revolutionary 
acknowledgement that the hegemony of a 
dominant social group can only successfully be opposed and ended 
if the (tactical) war of movement and (strategic) war of ,position 
are regarded as integral parts of revolutionary strategy. 
Gramsci illustrated the importance of this historical perspective 
with reference to the Russian Revolution of 1917, which he 
described as the last occurrence of a successful war of movement 
in the history of politics, marking 'a decisive turning-point in 
the history of the art and science of politics' (Gramsci,1986: 
235). He criticized Trotsky's notion of 'Permanent Revolution' 
and suggested that Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution might 
in fact merely be the political reflection, of the theory of fron-
tal or direct assault (Gramsci,1986: 236, see 238). The reference 
to Trotsky aside, it is clear that Gramsci strongly adhered to 
the view that the only appropriate revolutionary strategy is one 
which takes not only the economic conditions but also the na-
tional characteristics of a particular country or society into 
account, i.e. the 'general-economic-cultural-social conditions in 
a country' (Gramsci,1986: 236, see also 243). Thus, Gramsci 
argued, in (Czarist) Russia where the 'structures of national 
life are embryonic and loose, and incapable of becoming "trench 
or fortress"' (Gramsci,1986: 236), a frontal attack on the state 
could bring about the transferal of state power to the subor-
dinate classes, which in fact it did in 1917. However in Western 
Europe, and especially since World War One, where society is 
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'modern' in the sense that 'structures of national life' are com-
plex and articulated, revolutionary strategy must not rely on a 
frontal attack on the state which would only lead to the defeat 
of the revolutionary or proggressive forces. The fundamental task 
is to identify the nature of civil society in a country in order 
to identify 'which elements of civil society correspond to the 
defensive systems in a war of position' (Gramsci,1986: 235), and 
to determine whether civil society 'resists before or after the 
attempt to seize power' (Gramsci,1986: 236). Gramsci concluded 
this section with one of his most important comments on the na-
ture of the state and civil society: 
'In the East the State is everything, civil society was 
primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper 
relation between State and civil society, and when the State 
trembled a sturdy structure of civil society 
revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, 
there stood a powerful system of fortresses and 
more or less numerous from one State to 
(Gramsci,1986: 238; see also 243). 
was at once 
behind which 
earthworks: 
the next ... ' 
In a subsequent passage dealing with the transition from the war 
of manoeuvre to the war of position in the sphere of politics, 
Gramsci concluded that 
'all this indicates that we have entered a culminating phase 
in the political-historical situation~ since in politics the 
"war of position", once won, is decisive definitively. In 
politics, in other words, the war of manoeuvre subsists so 
long as it is a question of winning positions which are not 
decisive, so that all the resources of the State's hegemony 
cannot be mobilised. But when, for one reason or another, 
these positions have lost their value and only the decisive 
positions are at stake, then one passes over to siege 
warfare ... ' (Gramsci,1986: 239). 
In the modern (bourgeois) state these 'decisive positions' are, 
according to Gramsci, concentrated in civil society, the arena of 
hegemony. The great importance Gramsci attached to his concept of 
civil society as the arena of hegemony should, on the basis of 
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the above discussions, already be quite evident. In the following 
section the main features of Gramsci's concept of civil society 
will be highlighted and their significance for Gramsci's concept 
of hegemony clarified. 
3.2.4 Gramsci's Concept Of Civil Society 
Gramsci referred to civil society as the ensemble of organisms 
generally described as 'private' and which correspond to the 
function of '"hegemony" which the dominant group exercises 
throughout society' (Gramsci,1986: 12). And in the Lettere dal 
carcere Gramsci described civil society as the arena of 'hegemony 
of a social group over the entire national society exercised 
through the so-called private organisations, like the Church, the 
trade unions, the schools, etc.' (Gramsci,1986: 56f, see also 
258), as well as political parties (Gramsci,1986: 53). It is also 
the arena in which intellectuals operate especially 
(Gramsci,1986: 56f). These 'so-called private organisations' or 
'complexes of associations' (Gramsci,1986: 243), Gramsci argued, 
may generally be referred to as the 'hegemonic apparatus of the 
ruling group', i.e. the dominant group's 'cultural and intellec-
tual organisation' (Gramsci,1986: 170f). It is on the basis of 
such passages in the SE1i that Simon formulates a definition of 
Gramsci's concept of civil society, one accepted by Morera 
(Morera,1990: 178). Civil society comprises 
'all the "so-called" organisations such as churches, trade 
unions, political parties and cultural associations which 
are distinct from the process of production .and. from the 
public apparatuses of the state. All the organisations which 
make up civil society are the result of a complex network of 
social practices and social relations, including the 
struggle between the two fundamental classes, capital and 
labour' (Simon,1985: 69). 
As this definition suggests, for Gramsci the composition of civil 
society in modern or advanced capitalist states is not restricted 
to organisations emerging from the relations of struggle between 
the two fundamental classes, but is also the scene of organisa-
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tions which are the product or expression of a complex set of so-
cial relations evolving out of popular-democratic struggles. In 
the modern era this latter dimension of civil society in Gramsci 
can, for example, be linked to such non-class or indirectly class 
related questions as national movements of. liberation, race, en-
vironmental movements, feminism, etc. Furthermore, although civil 
society, in contrast to political society, 
'operates without "sanctions" or compulsory "obligations", 
[it] nevertheless exerts a collective pressure and obtains 
objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, 
ways of thinking and acting, morality, etc.' (Gramsci,1986: 
242). 
In his discussion of the integral state, Gramsci occasionally 
referred to the dimension of civil society as the 'ethical State' 
(Gramsci,1986: 263) which he described as the 'autonomous, educa-
tive and moral activity of the secular State' (Gramsci,1986: 
262). Here the reference is to civil society's function as the 
arena in which the consent of the governed is secured by means of 
the moral and intellectual education of the masses. For Gramsci, 
therefore, civil society was the arena of both class and non-
class ideological and political struggles, from which emerges the 
hegemony of a dominant social group (In a different sense, 
Gramsci also referred to the ethical state in relation to his 
concept of regulated or communist society: see Chapter 4). In 
other words civil society 
'is ethical or moral society, because it is in civil society 
that the hegemony of the dominant class has been built up by 
means of political and ideological struggles' (Simon,1985: 
69). 
When one considers Gramsci's concept of civil society in its 
proper dialectical relation to political society it becomes clear 
why Gramsci accorded all modern states (i.e. states with well 
developed civil societies) an ethical function: 
'In my opinion, the most reasonable and concrete thing that 
can be said about the ethical State, the cultural State, is 
this: every State is ethical in as much as one of its most 
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important functions is to raise the great mass of the 
population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level 
(or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive 
forces for development, and hence to the interests of the 
ruling classes. The school as a positive educative function, 
and the courts as a repressive and negative educative 
function, are the most important State activities in this 
sense: but, in reality,. a multitude of other so-called 
private initiatives and activities tend to the same end --
initiatives and activities which form the apparatus of the 
political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes' 
(Gramsi,1986: 258, see 10-11). 
This passage contains an implicit re~erence to ·Gramsci's notion 
of the extended or integral state, expressing a dialectical view 
of the relation between its political and ethical functions to 
which correspond the political and cultural hegemony of the 
dominant social class or group. Furthermore, in this passage 
Gramsci established a relation of correspondence between the 
level of the population's moral and cultural development (the 
function of hegemony) and the needs of the productive forces for 
development ·and hence to the interests of the ruling classes' 
(Gramsci,1986: 258). In other words Gramsci conceived of the 
functions of the integral state in terms of their potential for 
establishing the conditions in which the production forces (of a 
particular mode of production) can develop. And since civil 
society is the arena of both class struggles as well as popular-
democratic struggles (i.e. the struggle for hegemony) its rela-
tions reflect the interests of the dominant social group. 
Yet another aspect, which flows out of the last point, is the way 
Gramsci alluded to Marx's base-superstructure metaphor concerning 
the link between (or totality of) the social, economic, and 
political relations of a society. However Gramsci went beyond the 
classical Marxist conception of society when he introduced his 
concept of hegemony identified with civil society. Gramsci's 
dialectical distinction between the functions of civil society 
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and political society resulted in a conception of capitalist 
society composed of three distinguishable sets of social 
relations, namely 
'the relations of production, ,the basic relation between 
labour and capital; the coercive relations which charac-
terise the state; and all other social relations which make 
up civil society' (Simon,1985: 69). 
In other words for Gramsci capitalist society is constituted of 
the dual relations of the superstructure expressed in terms of 
the concept of the integral state, and the economic base con-
stituted of the relations of production. 
This conceptualisation of advanced capitalist society raises a 
further set of questions since Gramsci implied the inadequacy of 
the more narrowly dualistic content of the classical Marxist con-
ception of capitalist society. In other words Gramsci implied 
that the relation between base and superstructure can only be 
considered in proper terms if one avoids the twin dangers of 
determinism and ideologism by means of the concept of the in-
tegral state in which civil society is conceived of as mediating 
the economic and political spheres. And this aspect points, in 
turn, to the notion of the relative autonomy of the state and 
politics in Gramsci, since the state is no longer conceived of 
simply as an instrument of the ruling class, and politics is no 
longer simply a matter of class struggles. In other words 
Gramsci's abandonment of the notion of the direct correspondence 
between the relations of production and the state means that the 
mechanical relationship between economics and politics in, for 
example, Marxism-Leninism is rejected in favour of a more complex 
conception of modern bourgeois society mediated by the hegemonic 
sphere of civil society which is the scene of a struggle between 
a multitude of political and ideological relations of forces in-
volving both class and non-class struggles. 
In the following chapter we will see how Gramsci articulated the 
relationship between his concept of hegemony and the integral 
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state in his dialectical concept of the 'historical bloc'. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GRAMSCI'S CONCEPTS OF SOCIETY AND POLITIC~ 
One of the pivotal themes of the S£.li. was Gramsci's sustained 
criticism of economistic and idealistic or 'superstructural' in-
terpretations of Marx's theory of history. Unfortunately Gramsci 
never had the opportunity to forge into a systematic treatise his 
fragmentary critique of these two theoretical tendencies or 
'deviations' which, he argued, occur all too frequently in the 
'orthodox' version of historical materialism. His S£.li. neverthe-
less contain an implicit general framework for just such a struc-
tured critique. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe how Gramsci's revalua-
tion of historical materialism led him to emphasize a dialectical 
reading of Marx's classical texts, rejecting what he regarded as 
the twin theoretical errors of 'economism' and 'ideologism'. 
The chapter will be divided into two main sections, the first 
dealing with Gramsci's general theory of history (divided into 
four sub-sections) and section 4.2 with Gramsci's concept of 
politics. 
4.1 Gramsci's Concepts Of History And Society 
In section 4.1.1 Gramsci's general concept of 'philosophy', as 
well as aspects of his historical methodology and his general un-
derstanding of the genesis of the philosophy of marxism will be 
discussed. In particular we will focus on Gramsci's historicism 
and dialectics with specific reference to the importance of 
Marx's 1859 'Preface' for Gramsci's general theory of history and 
his critique of economism. In section 4.1.2 the distinction 
Gramsci made in his analysis of concrete societies between 
'organic' and 'conjunctural' movements, that is between longer-
term and shorter~term historically active forces, will be high-
lighted and analysed with a view to discussions of his concepts 
of the 'relations of force' and the 'historical bloc' in sections 
4.1.3 and 4.1.4 respectively. In these latter sections the ac-
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count of Gramsci's critique of economism will be developed and 
will serve as the theoretical basis for the discussion of his 
concept of politics in section 4.2. 
4.1.1 'Unity In The Constituent Elements Of Marxism' 
For Gramsci the most important distinction between Marxism and 
all previous 'philosophies' is its emphasis on the dialectical 
relation between masses and intellectuals: 
'The philosophy of praxis does not tend to leave the 
"simple" in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but 
rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it 
affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and 
simple it is not [as in catholicism] in order to restrict 
scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of 
the masses, but precisely in order to construct an 
intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically possible 
the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small 
intellectual groups' (Gramsci,1986: 332-333). 
Marxist theory in concerned with the 'politically possible', 
therefore, in the sense of the mediating or connective function 
of organic intellectuals who work out and make coherent the 
'principles and the problems raised by the masses in their prac-
tical activity, thus constituting a cultural and social bloc' 
(Gramsci,1986: 330). 
Gramsci developed this view of the function of Marxism in accord-
ance with his general concept of philosophy. Gramsci argued that 
there is in all intellectual activity, in all philosophy, an 
('essential') organic link between the various strata of intel-
lectuals on the one hand, and on the other the people or masses 
out of whose interaction a variety of problems have arisen which 
intellectuals seek to analyse. Gramsci argued, that a philosophi-
cal movement properly so called is devoted to 
'elaborating a form of thought superior to "common sense 
and coherent on a scientific plane [yet never forgetting] to 
remain in contact with the "simple" and indeed [finding] in 
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this contact the source of the problems it sets out to study 
and to resolve ... Only by this contact does a philosophy be-
come "historical" ... and become "life"' (Gramsci,1986: 330). 
Furthermore only through the 'organic quality' of philosophical 
thought, organisational stability, and central cultural direction 
can an alternative hegemony be formed in society. And central to 
all of this is politics which, as Hoare and Nowell Smith tell us, 
figures in Gramsci's thought, 
'philosophically, as the central human activity, the means 
by which the single consciousness is brought into contact 
with the social and natural world in all its forms' (Hoare 
and Nowell Smith,1986: xxiii), 'conscious action (praxis) in 
pursuit of a common social goal' (Gramsci,1986: 326). 
This conception of politics in effect circumscribes all social 
relations, all forms of activity in pursuit of social 
transformation. Implicitly this amounts to a significant broaden-
ing of Marx's reductionist concept of politics in terms of class 
conflict. We will return in section 4.2 to the crucial impor-
tance for Gramsci's transformation of Marxism by his inclusive 
concepts of 'politics' and 'political activity'. 
In Gramsci's view Marxism derives its doctrinal unity from the 
dialectical relation of its constituent theoretical elements and 
concepts. To the extent that the 'activities' of philosophy, 
politics and economics are 
necessary constituent elements of the same conception of 
the world, there must be, in their theoretical principles, a 
convertability from one to the others and a reciprocal 
translation into the specific language proper to each con-
stituent element. Any one is implicit in the oth~rs, and the 
three together form a homogeneous circle' (Gramsci,1986: 
403). 
This is a view of Marxism as a 'socio-practical activity, in 
which thought and action are reciprocally determined' 
(Gramsci,1986: 333f). And this conception of the unity of praxis 
and theory in a nexus of practical activity and theoretical 
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reflection was the underlying reason for Gramsci's consistent 
rejection of the 'widespread conception' that the 'philosophy of 
praxis' (i.e. Marxism) can be divided, in an abstract triadic 
fashion, into three constituent parts, namely 
a pure philosophy, the science of dialectics, the other 
parts of it being economics and politics' (Gramsci,1986: 
431, see 402-404). 
In a note entitled 'The constituent parts of the philosophy of 
praxis' Gramsci argued that the central doctrines of Marxism may 
well be grounded in three great European traditions, namely 
'classical German philosophy, English classical economics and 
French political activity and science (Gramsci,1986: 431; also 
402-404), yet a description· of its main historical sources does 
not and cannot account for its fundamentally revolutionary 
character. For Gramsci Marxism derives its unique character from 
its distinctive theses and not from its generic historical 
sources: 
'It will be asked whether the philosophy of praxis is not 
precisely and specifically a theory of history, and the 
answer must be that this is indeed true but that one cannot 
separate politics and economics from history' (Gramsci,1986: 
431). 
The 'philosophy of praxis proper' constitutes 
'the science of dialectics or the theory of knowledge, 
within which the general concepts of history, politics and 
economics are interwoven in an organic unity' (emphasis 
added) (Gramsci,1986: 431, see 434-436). 
Gramsci's interpretation of Marxism as an organic theory of his-
tory had important implications for his analysis of society. In 
general terms Gramsci argued that the theory of history (i.e. 
historical materialism) as formulated by Marx cannot be reduced 
to a preconstituted framework or scheme for the predictive 
analysis of specific social phenomena or whole societies. This 
was for two main reasons. On the one hand Gramsci regarded Marx's 
writing broadly as the foundation of the Marxist philosophical 
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tradition and not as a fully constituted theory of history and 
politics. And on the other hand Gramsci argued that it would be 
inappropriate to apply the general theoretical principles con-
tained in Marx's writing. to the complexities of historical 
realities, such as the analysis of a particular society, without 
regard for the latter's specific empirical variables. 
The first point relates to Gramsci's _distinction between Marx's 
contribution of a Weltanschauung or 'world view' (Gramsci,1986: 
381) constituting the basis for the 'philosophically directed 
production' of an historical epoch, and the sense in which it was 
later forged into a revolutionary 'philosophy of praxis , most 
notably by Lenin. In this view Marx articulated an 
'original and integral conception of the world... [which] 
initiates intellectually an historical epoch which will last 
in all probability for centuries' (Gramsci,1986: 382). 
In Gramsci's view Marx thus laid the foundation for the 
philosophy of Marxism, that is the general theoretical principles 
and concepts of a world view. Gramsci, drawing a comparison be-
tween Marx's philosophy and Lenin's political theory (and par-
ticularly Lenin's theory of revolution and its realization in the 
Soviet Revolution), argued that 
'They express two phases: science and action, which are 
homogeneous and heteroge~eous at the same time' 
(Gramsci,1986: 382). 
In other words for Gramsci there is a dialectic~l nexus between 
theory and praxis. In Gramsci's interpretation of Marxism this 
nexus' occurs between Marx's philosophy and its historical func-
tion in Lenin's theory, which to become ·action' must be realized 
in the mode of activity of an historically actual social group or 
class: 
'How is the statement that the German proletariat is the 
heir of classical German philosophy to be understood? Surely 
what Marx [it was in fact Engels] wanted to indicate was the 
historical function of his [Marx's] philosophy when it be-
came the theory of a class which was in turn to become a 
State? (Gramsci,1986: 381; see 330). 
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Gramsci thus understood the development of the philosophy of Mar-
xism to be a dialectical progression. In his view Marx's formula-
tion of a philosophy proper constituted the first phase of this 
,progression. This is followed by the hegemonic stage, that is by 
the formulation of a Marxist 'science of politics' which obtains 
its historical function when actualised by an historically formed 
social group or class. And in the final stage the philosophy of 
Marxism becomes 'action' when it gains its political expression 
in the foundation of a new state. Each of these phases give rise 
to intellectual expressions of their own: 
'To the economic-corporate phase, to the phase of struggle 
for hegemony in civil society and to the phase of State 
power there correspond specific intellectual activities' 
(Gramsci,1986~ 404). 
And since the intellectual expressions or activities of each 
phase are not preconstituted, they 'cannot be arbitrarily im-
provised or anticipated' (Gramsci,1986: 404). In other words the 
actualization of the philosophy cannot escape its development 
through the phases of the economic-corporate, the hegemonic, and 
the relations of power (see 3.1): 
'In the phase of struggle for hegemony it is the science of 
politics which is developed; in the State phase all the su-
perstructures must be developed, if one is not to risk the 
dissolution of the [integral] State' (Gramsci,1986: 404). 
This is a view of reality which 'does not exist on its own, in an 
for itself, but only in an historical relationship with the men 
who modify it' (Gramsci,1986: 346). One consequence of this was 
Gramsci's view that the philosopher of praxis, that is the Mar-
xist philosopher, can only affirm the eventual realization of the 
philosophy in a generic fashion or manner: 
'In reality one can "scientifically" foresee only the 
struggle, but not the concrete moments of the struggle, 
which cannot but be the results of opposing forces in con-
tinuous movement' (Gramsci,1986: 438). 
Therefore rather than detaching the philosophy of Marxism from 
praxis by regarding it as a sufficient 'scientific' basis for 
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predictive social analysis, Gramsci argued that in 
·reality one can "foresee" to the extent that one acts, to 
the extent that one applies a voluntary effort and therefore 
contributes concretely to creating the result "foreseen"' 
(Gramsci,1986: 438). 
This passage must not be interpreted as an invocation of the pure 
act of will, i.e. Gramsci did not argue that one can will the at-
tainment or realisation of one's prediction. Rather, for Gramsci 
the efficacy of creative human intervention involves an estima-
tion of the potentials inherent in a particular structural 
situation. Once these potentials or possibilities become con-
scious it is possible to contribute purposively towards their 
realisation. Once again we find a dialectical unity in Gramsci, 
i.e. that between necessity and will. 
In a related move Mouffe argues that Gramsci is concerned to 
reestablish the link between theory and praxis 
'lost in the economistic interpretations of Marx's thought 
and to formulate an interpretation of historical materialism 
which would relocate it as a mode of intervention in the 
course of the historical political process. This new inter-
pretation of historical materialism as "science of history 
and politics" ... necessitates a break with the pos~tivist 
conception of science which reduces its role to the estab-
lishment of laws· (Mouffe,1979 (3): 6). 
For our purposes it is significant that Gramsci's view of the 
genesis of philosophy suggests a possible reason for the absence 
in Marx of an explicit theory of politics. According to Gramsci's 
view Marx essentially introduced a new Weltanschauung and thus 
could not, except aphoristically, have provided anything like a 
theory or science of politics. In particular, he could not have 
foreseen the historical process whereby the state's functions 
would be expanded to accommodate its changing relationship with 
what Gramsci called civil society (Morera,1990: 179). It is this 
164 
J 
historical process which, according to Gramsci, - is involved in 
the struggle for hegemony. In other words in Marx's writings the 
philosophy of praxis had not yet made the transition from a newly 
formulated world view to an ideology, where Gramsci understands 
ideology as a practical set of principles for the realisation of 
a world view, a 'form of practical activity or will in which the 
philosophy is contained as an implicit theoretical "premiss"' 
(Gramsci,1986: 328), and not as a 'dogmatic system of eternal and 
absolute truths' (Gramsci,1986: 407). Gramsci argued that only 
once this transition from a philosophy to an ideology is realised 
can Marxism come to acquire, in practice, 'the fanatical granite 
compactness of the "popular beliefs" which assume the same energy 
as "material forces"' (Gramsci, 1986: 404). 
A second reason for Gramsci's rejection of the view that the Mar-
xist theory of history contains within itself a universally ap-
plicable set of abstract principles and propositions which can be 
applied to social analysis with the precision of the natural 
sciences, relates to Gramsci's view of the complexity of social 
realities. These are always characterised by a particular matrix 
of forces in movement; forces which can moreover be quite ·ar-
bitrary and unpredictable, even external to a particular society 
(e.g. international relations). Thus it may be possible in terms 
of the Marxist theory of history to formulate general theses, 
such as the dialectical relation between society's antagonistic 
structures and the formation of social classes and groups whose 
conflict is the substance of politics. Yet as we saw in Chapter 3 
not all political phenomena can, according to Gramsci, be reduced 
to class relations, subject as they are to other variable forces 
as well. As Gramsci wrote: 
'It is necessary to pose in exact terms the problem of the 
predictability of historical events in order to be able to 
criticise exhaustively the conception of mechanical 
causalism, to rid it of any scientific prestige and reduce 
it to a pure myth which perhaps was useful in the past in a 
backward period of development of certain subaltern social 
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groups' (Gramsci,1986: 438). 
Gramsci's awareness of the need to develop a Marxist conception 
of society which is more adequate to the complexities of the 
modern capitalist state, without being rigidly schematic or 
mechanistic, informed his later writings and was probably his 
greatest contribution to Marxist theory. 
These two points, I will argue, go to the heart of Gramsci's 
critique of economism, illustrating his concern to analyse con-
crete societies with due regard for the dialectical totality of 
their constituent parts. This concern is nowhere more apparent 
than in those of Gramsci's notes in which he paid particular at-
tention to Marx's 1859 Preface. Gramsci frequently commented on 
the Preface; in fact this runs like a leitmotif throughout his 
writing: the Preface is discussed in a variety of different con-
texts and in relation to a great many issues (see for example, 
Gramsci,1986: 106f, 114, 138, 162, 177n, 336f, 365, 367f, 371, 
410f, 432, 459, 460). From these passages it is clear that for 
Gramsci the crux of all the questions that have arisen around the 
'philosophy of praxis' are related to establishing how, without 
relapsing into an economistic reading of classical Marxism, the 
historical movement can be said to arise on the structural base 
(Gramsci,1986: 431-432). Throughout the SEN. Gramsci seeks to 
resolve this problem on the basis of· his interpretation of two 
core propositions of the Preface. The first of these core 
propositions is 'that men acquire consciousness of structural 
conflicts on the level of ideologies' (Gramsci,1986: 365). Else-
where Gramsci formulates this proposition 'That "men become con-
scious (of the conflict between the material forces of 
production) on the ideological level" of juridical, political, 
religious, artistic and philosophical forms' (Gramsci,1986: 371). 
In other words, since awareness of structural contradictions oc-
curs at the ideological level, any predetermined knowledge of the 
forms of concrete social development is precluded: 
'A structural phase can be concretely studied and analysed 
only after it has gone through its whole process of 
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development, and not during the process itself, except 
hypothetically and with the explicit proviso that one is 
dealing with hypotheses' (Gramsci,1986: 408). 
Gramsci referred to this temporal disjuncture between objectively 
operating structural conditions and the retrospective human 
awareness or consciousness of this process at the ideological 
level of the superstructures as the moment of 'organic crisis' or 
'catharctic moment' (see Gramsci,1986: 366-367). And it is be-
cause of this disjuncture that Gramsci consistently emphasised 
the development of a mass-based revolutionary consciousness (the 
terrain of organic intellectuals and the politial party) as a 
necessary condition of sustainable social transformation or 
revolution. For Gramsci this involved, as was argued in Chapter 
3, the 'realisation of a hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it 
creates a new ideological terrain, [which] determines a reform of 
consciousness' (Gramsci,1986: 365). It was for this reason that 
Gramsci highlighted the need to better understand the capacity or 
degree of potential efficacy of superstructural spheres with 
respect to the process of the revolutionary transformation of 
society. And this superstructural potential, realized by politi-
cal education and through intervention by politically active 
forces, varies in each 'situation', i.e. at each stage or moment 
of society's historical development. 
According to some commentators (see e.g. Bobbio,1979; 
Salamini,1981) Gramsci as a Marxist theoretician not only 
realised the crucial importance of the superstructures, but ac-
tually asserted the primacy of the superstructures. This amounts 
to an overstatement of the position. That Gramsci devoted the 
greater part of his writing to the study of the superstructural 
sphere is evident even from a cursory reading of his letters and 
notes. Gramsci was acutely aware of the need to elaborate a Mar-
xist theory of the superstructures in view of the fact that Marx 
had for 'purely accidental reason ... dedicated his intellectual 
forces to other problems, particularly economic (which he treated 
in systematic form)' (Gramsci,1986: 426). However, it is imper-
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tant to emphasize that Gramsci, in much of his writing and espe-
cially during his imprisonment, focused on the proper 
interpretation, and not on the refutation, of the fundamental 
principles and theses of Marx's social theory. 
The second proposition from the 1859 'Preface· to which Gramsci 
repeatedly referred pertains to Marx's view as formulated by 
Gramsci that 
'Mankind [i.e. society] only poses for itself such tasks as 
it can resolve; ... the task itself only arises when the 
material conditions for its resolution already exist or at 
least are in the process of formation ... A social order' does 
not perish until all th~ productive forces for which it 
still has room have been developed and new and higher rela-
tions of production have taken their place, and until the 
material conditions of the new relations have grown up 
within the womb of the old society' (Gramsci,1986: 432). 
Gramsci argued that according to this second proposition Marx 
ascribed to man an active role in the transformation of society, 
posing tasks and undertaking creative action arising from the 
variety of options and opportunities that objective socio-
economic conditions pose. Given that for Gramsci, too, the 
economic sphere was in the final analysis predominant, his 
problem in combatting economistic conceptions of society was, in 
Paggi's words, therefore 
'that of freeing himself from a linear derivation from a 
given economic base of the multiple aspects of historical 
and political processes' (Paggi,1979: 137). 
Gramsci emphasised that the Marxist dialectic is crucial to a 
proper understanding of the historical opportunities for social 
transformation since it 
'deals with the problem of causality in the concrete 
analysis of historical and political processes... [and] re-
lates the multiplicity of factors [i.e. relations of forces] 
to the basic struggling forces [i.e. economic sub-structure; 
class relations] and shows how a specific outcome is reached 
168 
through the exclusion of other objectively possible 
alternatives' (Paggi,1979: 131; see Gramsci,1986: 402-403). 
Only if the active human role in the unfolding of history is un-
derstood does the structure cease: 
'to be an external force which crushes man, assimilates him 
to itself and makes him passive; and is transformed into a 
means of freedom, an instrument to create a new ethico-
political form and a source of new initiatives' 
(Gramsci,1986: 367; see also Simon, 1985: 91; Morera,1990: 
164). 
In other words Gramsci does not refute the primacy of the 
economic structure in the 'final analysis'. He did however ex-
plicitly reject the notion that the existence of certain objec-
tively necessary structural conditions are sufficient for the 
socio-political transformation of society. Indeed, this is 
precisely the context in which political will can come into its 
own: 
'Where these conditions exist "the solution of the task ~ 
comes 'duty', 'will' becomes free"' (Gramsci,1986: 410, see 
also 137-138, 158-168, etc.). 
It may thus be possible to show, as historical materialism does, 
that there are structural forces which operate with relative 
'automatism' determining the contours of the superstructures. In 
order to mount an effective historical initiative (revolution) to 
transform society the forces operating in the economic structure 
must clearly be analysed, and the resulting insights be in-
tegrated into a general strategy for action. However, in 
Gramsci's interpretation of Marx these structural forces are 
themselves subject to 'relations of forces' (see 4.1.3) which are 
not all structural. Gramsci argued that in Marx's 'critique' of 
political economy (here a reference to Marx's major economic 
writings and not only to the 1859 Preface; see Gramsci,1986: 
411f), Marx 
'starts from the concept of the historical character of the 
"determined market" and of its "automatism"... [and] 
analyses in a realistic way the relations of forces deter-
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mining the market, it analyses in depth their 
contradictions, evaluates the possibilities of modification 
connected with the appearance and strengthening of new 
elements' (Gramsci,1986: 411). 
Establishing the relation of structure to superstructures is 
therefore 
'not a question of "discovering" a metaphysical law of 
"determinism", or even of establishing a "general" law of 
causality. It is a question of bringing out how in histori-
cal evolution relatively permanent forces are constituted 
which operate with a certain regularity and automatism' 
(Gramsci,1986: 412). 
The primacy of the relatively permanent structural forces is 
therefore not to be assumed as an ineluctable law operating in 
the abstract, but as an historically determined premiss in 
movement: 
'necessity exists when there exists an efficient and active 
premiss, consciousness of which in people's minds has become 
operative, proposing conc~ete goals to the collective con-
sciousness and constituting a complex of convictions.and 
beliefs which acts powerfully in the form of "popular 
beliefs". In the premiss must be contained, already 
developed or in the process of development, the necessary 
, 
and sufficient material conditions for the realisation of 
the impulse of collective will; but it is also clear that 
one cannot separate from this "material" premiss, which can 
be quantified, a certain level of culture, by which we mean 
a complex of intellectual acts and, as a product and con-
sequence of these, . a certain complex of overriding passions 
and feelings, overriding in the sense that they have the 
power to lead men to action "at any price (Gramsci,1986: 
412-413). 
This long quote contains, in embryonic form, some of Gramsci's 
most characteristic and important propositions. Thus Gramsci 
argued that (political) consciousness is consciousness of chang-
ing conditions in the structure, the relations of which at any 
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given time presents man with alternative courses of action, which 
are largely but never wholly circumscribed by structural 
conditions. In this view conscious (political) action can be 
directed to,effective and fundamental social change, and indeed 
often must be so directed as a precondition for social change 
(see Gramsci,1986: 168 and section 4.2.2). Furthermore, struc-
tural anatagonisms, when sufficiently pronounced, produce organic 
crisis, that is a 
'conjuncture where there is a generalized weakening of the 
relational system defining the identities of a given social 
or political space, and where, as a result there is a 
proliferation of floating [variable] elements' (Laclau & 
Mouffe,1989: 136; see 4.1.2). 
And awareness of structural antagonisms which produce this crisis 
can, in conjunction with conscious human action, result in fun-
damental social change. The important point here is that such ac-
tion and such change are Il.Q.t. inevitable (determined 
mechanistically) since the tendencies of development in the 
structure are not necessarily realised (Gramsci,1986: 408) and 
revolutionary consciousness may not be sufficiently developed. 
Only on this understanding 
can all mechanicism and every trace of the superstitiously 
"miraculous" be eliminated, and it is on this basis that the 
problem of the formation of active political groups, and, in 
the last analysis, even the problem of the historical func-
tion of great personalities must be posed' (Gramsci,1986: 
432). 
So when Gramsci described the economic base (with a given 'degree 
of development of the productive forces') as comprising 
'objective relations within society' or '(logically) fundamental 
social relations' (Gramsci,1986: 176; see also 4.1.2), it is im-
portant to remember Gramsci's premiss of the organicity of 
society's relations. This means rejecting undialectical notions 
of causality in the constitution of economic, social, and politi-
cal relations. The dialectic 'designates the existence of an-
tagonisms between opposing social forces [logic of connections 
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and mediations]' (Paggi,1979: 133) as the objectively given basis 
for the continuously unfolding process of social development. 
Moreover, as Paggi explains, ·it 
'is also the cognitive method necessary to gain a concrete 
and realistic representation of the antagonistic social 
unity ... the tool needed to gain knowledge of the unity, 
specificity, and concreteness of social phenomena by organi-
cally relating the otherwise separate and juxtaposed in-
dividual constitutive elements' (Paggi,1979: 133). 
As revised and reconstituted by Gramsci, the dialectic thus 
provides Marxism with the means to think through the complex or-
ganic interconnections and interactions of the various elements 
' and forces operating in society. Study and analysis of social 
phenomena must be conducted in accordance with the reconstitution 
of their totality. For Gramsci this always essentially meant af-
firming the dialectic of historical forces (dialectical an-
tagonisms arising out of historically active social 
contradictions) against the dialectic of abstract concepts and 
ideas (Gramsci,1988: 370; see Gramsci in Paggi,1979: 138-139). 
For Gramsci it was of prime importance 
'to re-establish the link between theory and practice lost 
in the economistic interpretations of Marx's thought and to 
formulate an interpretation of historical materialism which 
would relocate it as a mode of intervention in the course of 
• 
the historical plitical process' (Mouffe,1979 (3): 6). 
For our purposes the most important dimension of Gramsci's 
dialectic is his view of the organicity of the social whole, i.e. 
his rejection of the orthodox Marxist interpretive schema involv-
ing the relation of cause and effect between economic base and 
politico-ideological superstructure as well as his related rejec-
tion of political reduct~onism. Gramsci's reformulation of his-
torical materialism aimed to develop a framework for 'thinking' 
or conceiving the various levels of the social formation in their 
relative autonomy which allowed for the effectivity of the super-
structures whilst retaining a distinctively Marxist perspective. 
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In the following section we will take a further step in our 
analysis of Gramsci's revaluation of historical materialism where 
we will examine the relation between 'organic movements' and 
'conjunctural movements' in Gramsci's theory, a relation repre-
senting Gramsci's dialectical conception of historically active 
·-
forces which vary in their degree and extent of efficacy under-
stood both in a temporal as well as structural sense. 
4.1.2 Organic And Coniunctural Movements: The Analysis Of 
Situations 
As was suggested in the above discussion, Gramsci's analysis of 
society distinguished between organic and coniunctural movements 
J 
as two key components. On this view there are two basic types or 
sets of characteristics; those that determine the general nature 
of 'situations' and their development, and those which appear 
·effective' at particular junctures in its development: 
'Difference between "situation" and "conjuncture": the con-
juncture is the set of immediate and ephemeral characteris-
tics of the economic situation... Study of the conjuncture 
is thus more closely linked to immediate politics, to 
"tactics" and agitation, while the "situation" relates to 
"strategy" and propaganda, etc.' (emphasis added) 
(Gramsci,1986: 177f). 
In other words when Gramsci referred to the study of how 
'situations' should be analysed (how the study of society should 
be approached) he made a distinction between longer-term and 
shorter-term historically active forces. Gramsci termed the 
former 'organic movements' which are 'relatively permanent', and 
which are distinguishable from 'movements which may be termed 
"conjunctural" (and which appear as occasional, immediate, almost 
accidental)' (Gramsci,1986: 177). Gramsci did not portray these 
distinct movements as incompatible or contradictory, seeking in-
stead to emphasize their complementary interaction: 
'Conjunctural phenomena too depend on organic movements to 
be sure, but they do not have any far-reaching historical 
significance; they give rise to political criticism of a 
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minor, day-to-day character, which has as its subject top 
political leaders and personalities with direct governmental 
responsibilities' (Gramsci,1986: 177). 
Organic phenomena, on the other hand, 
'give rise to socio-historical criticism, whose subject is 
wider social groupings -- beyond the public figures and 
beyond the top leaders! (Gramsci,1986: 178). 
For Gramsci the great importance of clearly distinguishing or-
ganic and conjunctural phenomena or movements is demonstrated in 
the study of an actual socio-historical period. When, in such a 
period, a long-term crisis becomes manifest in society, this in-
dicates that 
'incurable structural [i.e. organic] contradictions have 
revealed themselves (reached maturity), and that, despite 
this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve 
and defend the existing structure itself are making every 
effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to overcome 
them' (Gramsci,1986: 178). 
Sassoon describes this dialectical process as 'the appearance of 
the organic contradiction at the level of the occasional [i.e. 
conjunctural]' (Sassoon,1987: 184). In Gramsci's view, 
'these incessant and persistent efforts... form the ter~ain 
of the "conjunctural", and it is upon this terrain that the 
forces of opposition organise' (Gramsci,1986: 178). 
And this 'immediate' struggle between conservative and revolu-
tionary social forces 
'is developed in a series of ideological, religious, 
philosophical, political, and juridical polemics, whose con-
creteness can be estimated by the extent to which they are 
convincing, and shift the previously existing disposition of 
social forces' (Gramsci,1986: 178). 
The opposition forces thus seek, by means of struggle, to 
'demonstrate that the necessary and sufficient conditions already 
exist to make possible, and hence imperative' (Gramsci,1986: 178) 
historically significant changes to society, such as the reor-
ganization of structural relations. 'Imperative' in the sense 
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that change is not inevitable but has,. due to irreconcilable or 
incurable structural contradictions, become historically 
necessaty. 'The full realization of these new structural 
relations, depends on the intervention of the forces of opposi-
tion on the terrain of the conjunctural, that is by means of 
political organisation and intervention in an immediate sense. 
(This latter notion is clearly a key to Gramsci's concept of 
politics, and will be explicated in section 4.2.). 
Gramsci criticised historico-political analyses which failed to 
establish and demonstrate a proper dialectical relation between 
organic and conjunctural phenomena. This he believed 
'leads to presenting causes as·immediately operative which 
in fact only operate indirectly, or to asserting that the 
immediate causes are the only effective ones. In the first 
case there is an excess of "economism", or doctrinaire 
pedantry; in the second, an excess of "ideologism". In the 
first case there is 1 an overestimation of mechanical causes, 
in the second an exaggeration of the voluntarist and in-
dividual element' (Gramsci,1986: 178; see Paggi,1979: 152). 
This is another way of saying that in the study, and life, of a 
society the relatively indirect long-term causality of organic 
movements as well as the immediacy of conjunctural movements must 
both be recognized in their own right, and posed in a correct 
dialectical relation to one another. However the 'dialectical 
nexus between the two categories of movement, and therefo~e of 
research, is h~rd to establish precisely' (Gramsci,1986: 178). 
Moreover whilst this difficulty may result in serious error in 
historiography, such error is all the more crucial in the sphere 
of political science which is directed, not merely towards the 
reconstruction of a society's past, but towards the 'construction 
of present and future history ... as a conscious "means" to stimu-
late to [political] action' (Gramsci,1986: 179). 
Gramsci maintained that the dialectical distinction 






'dual couple' in Gramsci: see Chapter 3), which was for him a 
fundamental principle of historical methodology, must be applied 
to the interpretation of all socio-economic and political 
'situations', relations, structures, and 'concrete historical 
facts'. Gramsci devoted a great deal of writing to this end, in 
the course of which he developed his concepts of the 'relations 
of force' (i.e. the relation of a society's social, political, 
and IJil.it...:ai.1:7 ftr;ni:·ir_~f::'=IE) :atJ!lld itbe "histori.:~al bloe' (o-.:· (i·-r-a.11sei view 
of society's structure-superstructure relationship) (see 4.1.3 
and 4.1.4 respectively). And it is to an analysis of these two 
concepts which we now turn. 
4.1.3 The Relations Of Force 
In the discussion of organic and conjunctural movements above it 
was argued that_Gramsci emphasised the dialectical relation be-
tween relatively permanent as against occasional or immediate 
forces operating in society. For Gramsci the two forms of 
'movement' were directly linked, yet at the same time their rela-
tion was one of disjuncture. In other words although conjunctural 
movements 'depend on organic movements' (Gramsci,1986: 177), they 
have a short-term or immediate effect on the relations of society 
and to that extent have a reality and specificity of their own. 
Conjunctural movements might therefore in a sense be described as 
'relatively autonomous' of the organic movements out of which 
they arise. This is related to Gramsci's conception of 'relations 
\ 
of force' to which we must now turn. 
Gramsci's discussion of the concept of the relations of force in 
contained in the note entitled 'Analysis of Situations. Relations 
of Force·, in many ways one of the most important in the SEN... The 
concept of the relations of force constitutes a further attempt 
to 'elucidate the complexity of the concrete situation ... a 
schema as a guide for analysis' (Sassoon,1987: 184). As such the 
various levels or moments of forces identified must be regarded 
as methodological distinctions, i.e. an aid to the analysis of 
concrete social phenomena and societies, especially if we keep in 
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mind that Gramsci viewed society in terms .of a unified dialecti-
cal focus. 
Gramsci identified three broad sets ('levels' or 'moments') of 
forces operating within a society's structural and superstruc-
tii~al spheres. The first of these Gramsci described as the 
primary level consisting of 
a relation of social forces which is closely linked to the 
structure, objective, independent of the human will, and 
which can be measured with the systems of the exact or 
physical sciences' (Gramsci,1986: 180). 
In other words Gramsci conceived of this primary level of social 
forces as closely linked to the material forces of production 
which 
'provides a basis for the emergence of the various social 
classes, each one of which represents a function and has a 
specific position within production itself' (Gramsci,1986: 
180-181). 
In this, as Simon tells us, Gramsci 'is simply giving the classi-
cal Marxist definition of the emergence of a class' (Simon,1985: 
28), i.e. a mainstream Marxist view of the organic socio-economic 
structure existing in society. 
The second level or moment of the relations of force, and the one 
most distinctive of Gramsci's analysis, was the 
'relation of political forces; in other words, an evaluation 
of the degree of homogeinity, self-awareness, and organisa-
tion attained by the various social classes' (Gramsci,1986: 
181). 
Gramsci divided this into three further levels, outlined in 
detail in section 3.1 above, 'corresponding to the various mo-
ments of collective political consciousness', the first two 
economic-corporate in nature, and the third marking the transfor-
mation of the emerging economic class into a politically fully 
conscious or hegemonic class (political force). In Gramsci's view 
only once such a social class or group has developed a hegemonic 
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consciousness (i.e. the potential to establish its socio-
political hegemony) can it be described as having a full politi-
cal existence as a political force or historical subject in the 
life of a society. 
G~~msci's description implies the potential for uneven develop-
ment of the political forces active in society since social 
classes may vary in the degree to which their political con-
··• ;.~<l'P-
sciousness is developed. In Sassoon's words, for 
a given relationship of structural forces, a variety of 
political relationships can exist since each force in the 
field can vary in its own political development whatever its 
structural features' (Sassoon,1987: 185). 
The third and final level of the relations of force is con-
stituted of the 'relation of military forces', which at times, 
i.e. especially during periods of revolutionary social change, is 
'directly decisive. (Historical deyelooment oscillates con-
tinually between the first and the third moment. with the 
mediation of the second). Two levels can be distinguished: 
the military level in the strict or technical military 
sense, and the level which may be termed politico-military' 
(emphasis added) (Gramsci,1986: 183). 
The relation of military forces mark the most active moment in 
the evolution of social classes, the moment of most active 
political intervention and of revolution. 
As was stated above Gramsci's account of the relation of social 
forces as the first and most basic level underscores his accept-
ance or adoption of Marx's general definition of the formation of 
social classes as linked to the level of development of the 
material forces of production and the division of labour (i.e. 
economic structure). However Gramsci's description of the two 
'subsequent' levels of the relations of force involves two of the 
most characteristic principles.of his political writing. Firstly 
it involves the 'mediating' role of the relation of political 
178 
forces. This indicates the potential efficacy of political inter-
vention in order to change the existing formation of the rela-
tions of force. Furthermore it involves Gramsci's related rejec-
tion of both 'economism' and 'ideologism' which is implicit in 
the active function Gramsci ascribes to the political and 
military relation of forces but within the constraints of given 
structural forces and relations (i.e. economically based class 
relations). 
There are a number of general observations regarding this notion 
of the relations of force which must be made in order to clarify 
the concept itself as well as indicate its relation to Gramsci's 
broader concept of society: The first of these points is related 
to our discussion in section 3.1. In that section it was seen how 
in the course of actual history the three levels of the relation 
of political forces 
'imply each other reciprocally horizontally and 
vertically, ~o to speak -- i.e. according to socio-economic 
activity (horizontally) and country (vertically), combining 
and diverging in various ways' (Gramsci,1986: 182). 
In other words the 'various combinations and dispersions of the 
various elements' go to make up the process by which a class 
develops from a subordinate position to cne of hegemony 
(Morera,1990: 154). As Morera argues, the process by which a 
class develops from its subaltern to its hegemonic position sug-
gests a more general problem with regard to the interpretation of 
Gramsci's concept of the relations of force. The 'successive· or 
'subsequent' moments in the development of the relations of 
force, as well as the various levels of the relation of political 
forces, could be conceived of as a complex of relations existing 
at one point in time, i.e. synchronically. However they could 
also be interpreted diachronically in terms of a 'temporal 
process (Morera,1990: 151), i.e. as historically successive 
stages developing over time. Interpreted as a temporal process 
Gramsci's concept of the relation of political forces is related 
to his concept of hegemony understood as the development of the 
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political consciousness of an emerging class (i.e. of an alterna-
tive hegemony) over successive historical stages in time. On this 
int~rpretation the 'level of ecbnomic-corporate interests, is an 
empirically necessary temporal precondition for the others, inas-
much as it is closely linked to the structure' (Morera,1990: 154; 
see Gramsci,1986: 180), i.e. the relation of socio-economic 
forces conceived of as temporally prior. This would accord with 
Gramsci's'general principle of historical necessity, outlined in 
4.1.1, namely that although structural forces have a 'tendency' 
to develop they do not develop inevitably, thus requiring the in-
tervention of political forces to enable their further develop-
ment (Gramsci,1986: 401, 404-407, 410-414). It follows that al-
though objective structural conditions are a temporally prior 
necessity for the development of political forces, it is not only 
structural conditions but also political action which have a 
function of historical necessity. In Femia's words, 
'although men are rooted in an economic reality that cir-
cumscribes their free initiative, this objective world of 
fact is not to be passively registered; human intervention 
is decisive' (Femia,1988: 117). 
And political intervention itself is contingent upon the develop-
ment of political consciousness which, though rooted in objective 
structural relations and forces, does not develop with any degree 
of inevitability, relying as it does on the connective and or-
ganisational functions of the political party and the 
intellectuals. 
Alternatively Gramsci's concept of the relations of force, and 
especially those of the relation of political forces, can be in-
terpreted as a conjunctural situation, an interpretation which is 
intended 'to unravel the general structuring of a social whole at 
a given time' (Morera,1990: 154). A problem with this interpreta-
tion of the relations of force appears from Gramsci's distinction 
between organic and conjunctural movements (see 4.1.2), i.e. the 
distinction between historically active forces which have a 
longer-term and shorter-term effect on the development of the so-
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.cial'totality. Thus the development of social groups and classes 
cannot be understood only by studying the more immediate dynamic 
forces opetating in a particular situation, since their develop-
ment is also a function of the organic structural sphere and as 
such may not, at any given time, yet have become 'observable' 
(i.e. have manifested themselves at the level of human· 
consciousness). 
The interaction of conjunctural and organic movements, of empiri-
cally observable immediate forces (such as political forces 
operative ~ithin a given structure) and organic forces (such as 
the formations of classes), can only be undertood historically. 
This suggests that the alternative approaches to Gramsci's con-
cept of the relations of fore~ may in fact most appro~riateli and 
even necessarily be conceived of as dual aspects of an integrated 
analysis, i.e. as 'abstractions which are untenable in isolation' 
(Morera,1990: 155). 
The diversity of the relations of force, and especially the ef- · 
ficacy of the relation of political and military forces, are im-. 
portant dimensions of Gramsci's rejection of any linear deter-
mination of the superstructures by the economic structure: 
'It may be ruled out that immediate economic crises of them~ 
selves produce fundamental historical events; they can 
simply create a terrain more favourable to the dissemination 
of certain modes ·of thought, and certain ways of .posing and 
resolving questions involving the entire subsequent develop-
ment of national life' (Gramsci,1986: 184). 
Gramsci cites the Frepch Revolution of 178S as an example of a 
fundamental historical event in which 
'the rupture of the equilibrium of forces did not occur ~s 
the result of direct mechanical causes i.e. the ib-
poverishment of the social group which had an interest in 
breaking the equilibrium, and which did in fact break it 
[the 'flourishing' bourgeoisie]. It occurred in the context 
of conflicts on a higher plane than the immediate world of 
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having primacy. In other words Gramsci saw the economic structure 
as the determining base for the reproduction of social relations 
and therefore also as basic to the superstructural sphere. 
However Gramsci departed from the classical Marxist concept o'f 
the superstructure (or superstructural sphere) when he conceived 
of it in terms of his dialectical concept of the extended or in-
tegral state, i.e. civil society plus political society or 
hegemony armoured by coercion (see 3.2). Furthermore it was 
argued that Gramsci's concept of hegemony is most appropriately 
and properly understood in terms of a dual meaning. On the one 
hand as a process by which an emerging social class or group at-
tains collective political consciousness, and on the other hand 
with reference to civil society as the arena of hegemonic action. 
In this section I will examine Gramsci's conception of the 
dialectical relation between the superstructural levels and the 
structural or economic base of sodiety, a relationship which he 
expressed in terms of his concept of the 'historical bloc' and of 
the 'relations of force' operating within the historical bloc. 
One of the key concerns underlying Gramsci's revaluation of the 
classical Marxist conception of the structure-superstructure 
relation was his continued attempt to counter the error of 
economism' in 'vulgar' readings of the classical texts of Marx 
without relapsing into 'ideologism' (or the idealization of the 
superstructures): 
'The claim, presented as an essential postulate of histori-
cal materialism, that every fluctuation of politics and 
ideology can be presented and expounded as an immediate ex-
pression of the structure, must be contested in theory as 
primitive infantilism, and combated in practice with the 
authentic testimony of Marx, the author of concrete politi-
cal and historical works' (Gramsci,1986: 407). 
The question, of course, is just how the relations between base 
and superstructure should be understood. In rejecting 'economism' 
while acknowledging the primacy of the base Gramsci was also not 
committed to some form of interactionism between base and super-
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structure as having co-equal significance. Gramsci did argue that 
the material base or structure 'sets limits to historical change 
[and] shapes the contours of the superstructure· (Femia,1988: 
116). But it would nevertheless be a serious error to reduce 
Gramsci's theory of social development to a 'facile 
interactionism·. Gramsci believed, in Femia"s view, 
'only that the basic trajectory of human history is ex-
plained by the development of productive forces. The. 
SQ.ecific course of any giyen society... may vary in accord-
ance with the dynamics of its own individual situation' 
(Femia,1988: 116). 
And this 'dynamic' of individual situations is, as Morera also 
argues (Morera,1990: 158), constituted by the immediate deter-
minants and variable relations of forces in a given situation. 
This accords 
methodological 
with the general Gramscian principle 
distinction between long-term and 
of the 
short-term 
forces operative in society, and of the distinction between or-
ganic movement and conjunctural movement. 
However, only if one understands that Gramsci conceived of these 
movements and forces in their totality can one begin to unravel 
his broader dialectical conception of society's structure-
superstructure relation as a 'µnity of opposites and of 
distincts" (Gramsci,1986: 137). Gramsci"s dialectical conception 
of the relation between a society's economic structure and the 
sphere of hegemony in civil society, extending as well to the 
relations of domination in political society, marked a culminat-
ing point in his political writing. With this he established a 
unifying ·focus for many of his original concepts and some of his 
most fundamental theoretical concerns. 
Gramsci made little direct reference to his concept of the his-
torical bloc. It can nonetheless be shown that he employed the 
concept in two ways. In its f ii:st use the historical bloc con-
stituted the focus of Gramsci' s conception of the proper dialec-
tical relation between structure and superstructure, a relation 
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between society's economic and political spheres mediated by the 
hegemonic relations of civil society (see Paggi,1979: 140, 
Boggs,1980: 116). A second dimension to Gramsci's concept of the 
historical bloc is his analysis of various forms of concrete so-
cial formations, especially that of advanced capitalist society, 
in which various class formations and alliances arise in relation 
to constantly changing relations of hegemony and domination. We 
will deal with each of these in turn. 
In its first and most frequent use the concept of the historical 
bloc encapsulates Gramsci's characterisation of society's 
structure-superstructure relation: 
'Structures and superstructures form an "historical bloc". 
That is to say the complex, contradictory and discordant en..=. 
semble of the superstructures is the reflection of the en..=. 
semble of the social relations of production' (Gramsci,1986: 
366). 
However as with his methodological distinction between the 
spheres of civil society and political society in his concept of 
the integral state (i.e. between the spheres within the 
superstructure) Gramsci's distinction between the spheres of 
structure and superstructure may also best be regarded 
as a methodological principle, that is, as a general 
hypothesis for gathering and controlling evidence and for 
generating particular theories about the link between stru-
ture and superstructure in given societies' (Morera,1990: 
140). 
The concept of the historical bloc is thus descriptive of the 
link between 'two areas of abstract reality' (Sassoon,1987: 121); 
i.e. society's structural and superstructural spheres. For 
Gramsci this link or relationship between these spheres was one 
of necessary reciprocity, 'a reciprocity which is nothing other 
than the real dialectical process' (Gramsci,1986: 366). 
In an early note Gramsci alluded to this relationship in 
metaphorical terms: 
'if men take cognizance of their task in the terrain of the 
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....._ __________________________________________ _ 
superstructures, this means that between structure and su-
perstructure there is a necessary and vital link, such as is 
the case in the human body between the skin and the 
skeleton' (Gramsci in Morera,1990: 139-140). 
From these and other passages it is apparent that Gramsci was 
conscious of the need to overcome a conception of the relation-
ship between structure and superstructure in terms of an absolute 
dichotomic opposition (see Paggi,1979: 139-141). Instead he 
sought to theorize the organic link or relation between society's 
structural productive activity and its superstructural political 




Structure and superstructures were conceived as in-
aspects of the historical bloc as a greater dialectical 
Thus when Gramsci referred to ideology as a necessary super-
structure of a particular structure' and not the 'arbitrary 
lucubrations of particular individuals' (Gramsci,1986: 376), he 
affirmed the principle of the dialectical unity and reciprocity 
of the structure and the superstructure. For, Gramsci argued, 
ideology properly understood is 'historically organic', i.e. the 
formation of actual ideologies is an historically necessary 
process specific to given structures inasmuch as they '"organise" 
human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire 
consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.' (Gramsci,1986: 
377). Gramsci therefore rejected any notion of ideology either as 
'arbitrary' or as an epiphenomena! reflection of the economic 
structure. Gramsci's methodological distinction between the 
structural material forces as 'content' and superstructural 
ideologies as 'form' should be understood in terms of a unified 
focus which in his view tended to affirm 
'the conception of historical bloc in which precisely 
material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, 
though this distinction between form and content has purely 
didactic value, since the material forces would be incon-
ceivable historically without form and the ideologies would 
186 
be individual fancies 
(Gramsci,1986: 377). 
without the material forces' 
What is more, as was argued above, for Gramsci ideologies 'in 
practice', i.e. as 'popular beliefs', assume the efficacy· of 
material forces in the historical process (Gramsci,1986: 404). In 
its first sense, therefore, the historical bloc constitutes a 
synchronic theoretical expression of the dialectical 'unity be-
tween nature and spirit (structure and superstructure), unity of 
opposites and of distincts' (Gramsci,1986: 137). 
Gramsci's dialectical conception of social relations was the 
basis for his rejection of economism and ideologism, twin ten-
decies in the undialectical interpretation of historical 
materialism. Gramsci argued that economistic readings of Marx in-
volve 'an overestimation of mechanical causes'; and an undialec-
tical conception of the superstructures involves an exaggeration 
of the voluntarist and individual element' (Gramsci,1986: 178). 
The dialectical concept of the historical bloc thus counteracts 
both 
'idealist distortion of the Marxist dialectic on the one 
hand and an economistic deviation on the other... [which] 
converge in their reduction of the dialectic to one or other 
of the fundamental aspects of reality, either the ethical-
political or the economic' (Sassoon,1987: 120). 
The questions of economism and ideologism in Gramsci are also re-
lated to the second use of Gramsci's concept of the historical 
bloc, i.e. in the diachronic analysis of concrete or historically 
actual social formations or societies. Gramsci argued that the 
social forces operative in a concrete society form an integrated 
and ever changing complex of economic, political, and cultural 
(moral and intellectual) relations or 'blocs' in a situation in 
which one mode of production is dominant. This complex of blocs 
constituting the historical bloc must be viewed in the con-
tinuously varying ways in which they combine and relate to the 
existing fundamental historical bloc of the dominant or ruling 
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group or class. More particularly, the historical bloc can 
produce a variety of political blocs constituted of variable com-
binations of political and governing alliances. In consequence, 
as Sassoon argues, 
'the political representation of a concrete historical bloc 
varies so that there is never a complete reflection of the 
forces that make up the historical bloc' (Sassoon,1987: 
121). 
Sassoon argues that a fundamental historical bloc can therefore 
produce a variety of government coalitions and even state forms 
without this representing a disruption in the general configura-
tion of that historical bloc. The point which needs to be 
stressed is that variations in the political bloc do not neces-
sarily represent in a 'one to one way' changes taking place in 
the historical bloc as a whole (Sassoon,1987: 122; Morera,1990: 
138-139). In this sense Gramsci allows for the possibility of a 
disjuncture between developments of the mode of production in the 
economic sphere and the varying formations of political forces at 
the level of the superstructures. 
The relation between the socio-economic, political and cultural 
spheres or dimensions in Gramsci's conception of real historical 
blocs is consequently not mechanistic, and the state therefore 
cannot be viewed as the direct instrument of a ruling class. The 
'disjuncture' in Gramsci's conception of the structure-
superstructure relation in concrete societies does not, however, 
mean that Gramsci rejected the classical Marxist thesis of the 
primacy of the economic structure in the last instance 
(Morera,1990: 139), as some commentators have concluded (see dis-
cussion of Bobbie below). To understand this it is necessary to 
recall Gramsci's concept of the integral state, as involving the 
superstructural spheres of both civil society and political 
society, the arenas of the relations of consensual hegemony and 
coercive domination respectively. The dynamic process of the for-
mation and transformation of actual historical blocs crucially 
involves the ability of a dominant social group or class to ex-
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tend its hegemonic consciousness beyond the confines of that 
class, beyond a static group awareness, to embrace and unify the 
consciousness of a broad alliance of historical class and non-
class popular democratic forces capable of effecting historical 
acts of social transformation: 
'Just as hegemony represents a higher stage within the 
political moment of the development of a class, so an his-
torical bloc is in one sense an effort to infuse this 
hegemony throughout society, above all by means of class 
alliances' (Adamson,1980: 176; see also 3.1). 
In other words Gramsci expanded or extended the narrow instrumen-
ta list concept of the state as a class state to the 'integral' 
concept of the state as the expression of the interests of an or-
ganic bloc of class and non-class popular-democratic forces 
formed on the basis of the hegemony of the leading group or 
class. Hence 'the very nature of an historical bloc is bound up 
with the extent of 
(Sassoon,1987: 122). 
the hegemony of the dominant class' 
Therefore although the concrete historical 
bloc involves the effective domination by the ruling group or 
class, this dominance is rooted in the complexity of prevailing 
social relations and forces which do not stand in a one to one 
causal relaiion with either the ruling group or the form of the 
prevailing historical bloc, allowing a possible distinction be-
tween the dominance of the ruling group and the direct governing 
formation or party. Moreover, the relation of the prevailing 
ruling group to allied groups and the directly governing forma-
tion is hegemonic in nature; while with respect to rival or enemy 
groups or classes it is expressed in terms of coercive relations 
of domination. In other words hegemony is a function of the his-
torical bloc inasmuch as a social class or group seeking to main-
tain or establish its dominance must wherever possible exercise 
persuasion and not force in its relation with its potential 
allies. For, in Gramsci's words, 
'two "similar" forces can only be welded into a new 
organism... either by binding them to each other as allies 
or by forcibly subordinating one to the other... a recourse 
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to arms and coercion... can be nothing more than a 
methodological hypothesis [since f ]orce can be employed 
against one's enemies, but not against a part of one s own 
side which one wishes rapidly to assimilate, and whose "good 
wi 11" and enthusiasm one needs' ( Gramsc i, 1986: 168). 
This aspect of Gramsci's analysis of concrete historical blocs is 
tied up with a general distinction which he drew between modern 
(i.e. bourgeois or capital~st) state forms and pre-modern (i.e. 
feudal) state forms, or between the extended or integral state 
and narrow economic-corporate state forms respectively (see Chap-
ter 3). Gramsci argued that it is only possible for a dominant 
class or group to form an organic or hegemonic historical bloc if 
it has succeeded in transfoming itself into a nationally 
hegemonic group within an integral state in which civil society, 
as the sphere of hegemony, has been succesfully developed and 
expanded. However, although there is an important link between 
the concept of hegemony and the formation of concrete historical 
blocs in Gramsci's analyses, he did not assert that the formation 
of an historical bloc presupposes a dominant group's national 
hegemony. Nor, for that matter, did he suggest that a another 
class seeking to establish its own dominance in society by means 
of forming an alternative historical bloc had necessarily to do 
so on the basis of an alternative national hegemony. A dominant 
group or class which establishes a mass based intellectual and 
moral bloc on the basis of a hegemonic consciousness 'will by 
definition be hegemonic vis-a-vis itself' (Adamson,1980: 178). 
Nevertheless the alliances (whether political or economic) such a 
group enters into are not necessarily hegemonic (i.e. consensual 
and voluntary) but may be coercive in nature. In short national 
hegemonies presuppose historical blocs, but not all historical 
blocs are hegemonic. Nonetheless the extent to which a society's 
superstructural sphere of hegemony (civil society) is articulated 
determines the ability of a dominant class to build an organic or 
, hegemonic historical bloc. The reason for this is that it is only 
once a state has developed beyond the economic-corporate stage, 
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i.e. only when it has developed the sphere. or area of hegemony, 
that 
'it is an extended or integral State, and only then can it 
represent a fully developed and maximally extended histori-
cal bloc. The social and historical base of the State in 
this case will be much stronger' (Sassoon,1987: 123; see 
Grams~i,1988: 29). 
Thus far we have provided an account of the basic characteristics 
of the concept of the historical bloc in Gramsci's political 
writings. However in the secondary literature on Gramsci there is 
considerable controversy regarding the interpretation of the his-
torical bloc. It is a complex debate, yet it is one which centers 
on a crucial issue: i.e. to what extent, if at all, can Gramsci 
as perhaps the most important Marxist theoretician of the 
superstructures, be portrayed as the theoretician of their 
primacy? The problem for Gramsci's status as a Marxist is im-
plicit in this question, and will be addressed in detail in the 
following section. 
4.1.5 Some Important Interpretations Of The Historical Bloc 
Two accounts of Gramsci's historical bloc which have enjoyed 
recognition as representative of two schools of Gramscian thought 
are those of Norberto Bobbie and Jacques Texier. Bobbie's essay, 
which appears in the English translation as 'Gramsci and the Con-
cept of Civil Society', was first published in 1968. It was soon 
the subject of controversy claiming that Gramsci ascribed primacy 
to the superstructural sphere in Marxist theory, a view with 
which Salamini, for example, agrees (Salamini,1981). In a well 
reasoned and forceful response Texier 'dismantled' Bobbie's 
position. However Texier's account of Gramsci is characterised by 
a certain degree of reductionism which he operated between 
Gramsci and Marx. Texier's 'reversion' to an 'orthodox' inter-
pretation of Gramsci has therefore not been without controversy 
of its own, especially if one considers Gramsci's growing reputa-







In his essay on the subject of Gramsci's concept of civil society 
Bobbie expresses the view that the originality of Gramsci's Mar-
xism consisted in two basic things. Firstly, Gramsci's definition 
of civil society differed from that of Marx: 
'the revaluation of civil society is not what links him to 
Marx... but what distinguishes him from Marx. In fact con-
trary to what is commonly believed, 
concept of civil society not from 
Hegel' (Bobbio,1979: 31). 
Gramsci derives his own 
Marx, but openly from 
Furthermore, 
superstructure: 
Gramsci relocated civil society in the 
'Civil society in Gramsci does not belong to the structural 
moment. but to the superstructural one... upon which the 
whole of Gramsci's conceptual system is based· (Bobbio,1979: 
30). 
Having argued that Gramsci redefined _and relocated civil society 
whilst retaining Marx's notion of its primacy (see Chapter 2), 
Bobbie suggests that Gramsci thereby revaluated a fundamental 
tenet of historical materialism, namely that of the 'primacy· of 
the economic base (a notion which itself is highly contentious, 
as was indicated in Chapter 2 and above). In a passage worth 
quoting at length, Bobbie 'asks' whether 
'this shift in the meaning of civil society in Gramsci in-
duce us to ask the question if ... he has placed "the real 
home, the theatre of all history" elsewhere? ... Both in Marx 
and in Gramsci, civil society, and not the state as in 
Hegel, represents the active and pos~tive moment of histori-
cal development. Still, in Marx this active and positive mo~ 
ment is a structural moment, while in Gramsci it is a super-
structural one. In other words, what they both stress is no 
longer the state, as Hegel had done ... but civil society, 
meaning that they entirely reversed, in a certain way, 
Hegel's conception. But with the difference that Marx's 
reversal implies the transition from the superstructural or 
conditioned moment to the structural or conditioning one, 
while Gramsci's reversal happens within the superstructure 
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tent of civil society had important implications for its relation 
to the state, and to the 'social totality'. Gramsci, in the man-
ner of Marxists generally, conceived of the 'social totality' in 
terms of the metaphor base-superstructure -- at least this is the 
case methodologically. However, Bobbio argues (and this point is 
ci~cial to Bobbie's argument), Gramsci retained Marx's view that 
civil society 
'and not the state as in Hegel, represents the active and 
positive stage of historical development', which in Marx 'is 
a structural phenomenon, while in Gramsci it is 
superstructural' (Bobbio,1988: 83). 
According to Bobbio, therefore, Gramsci's re-definition of civil 
society suggests a fundamental revaluation of the Marxist concept 
of society. For if civil society is not constituted of economic 
relations but of the institutional forms regulating economic 
relations in addition to the hegemonic cultural and intellectual 
organization of the dominant or ruling social group; and. if as 
such a superstructural element it nonetheless retains its posi-
tion of determinate primacy Y.is.-a-Y.is. the state, then Gramsci's 
conception of the social totality can be considered as fundamen-
tally distinct from that of Marx's. In effect Gramsci has ac-
corded determinate primacy to an element of the superstructure. 
Indeed, this introduces a profound theoretical 'innovation with 
respect to the whole Marxist tradition' (Bobbio,1979: 30). 
On the basis of these points, Bobbio identifies what in his view 
are the two fundamental distinctions between the conceptions of 
the base-superstructure relation in Marx and in Gramsci. The 
first of these, Bobbio argues, is Gramsci's notion that: 
' the ethical-political moment, being the moment of freedom 
understood as consciousness of necessity (that is of 
material conditions), dominates the economic moment through 
the recognition of obiectivity by the active subject of his-
tory (Bobbio,1979: 34). 
Bobbie argues that it is through the active subject's recognition 
of the objectivity of the 'material conditions' that the latter 
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are resolved into an instrument of the active subject, which can 
then be directed towards the achievement of the subject's desired 
aim. Thus for Bobbio it is the superstructural 'ethical-political 
moment' and not the structural economic moment' which is 
determining. 
Bobbie describes his view of the second fundamental distinction 
between the conception of the base-superstructure relation in 
Marx and Gramsci as follows: 
'Gramsci adds to the principal antithesis between structure 
and superstructure a secondary one, which develops within 
the sphere of the superstructure between the moment of civil 
society and the moment of the state. Of these two terms, the 
first is always the positive moment and the second is always 
the negative one' (Bobbio,1979: 35). 
Therefore Bobbie's interpretation of Gramsci suggests that 
Gramsci not only viewed the superstructural sphere as primary 
with respect to the economic base, but also subordinated his con-
cept of civil society to the political state. These are clearly 
far-reaching claims and ones which have been severely criticised. 
As Jacques Texier and others have argued, Bobbio's premises are 
problematic, and based on an inadequate understanding of Gramsc's 
dialectics. In an essay titled 'Gramsci, theoretician of the 
superstructures' Texier responds more or less directly to the two 
questions or issues Bobbio raises, which I have recounted above. 
Texier begins by stating that Bobbie's failure to acknowledge the 
dialectical unity represented in Gramsci's concept of the his-
torical bloc, which underlies Gramsci's premiss of the 'unity of 
economy and culture and culture and politics' (Texier,1979: 49), 
can be traced back to a failure to heed Gramsci's own distinction 
between real or 'organic' as against methodological distinctions 
(see Gramsci,1986: 159-160). This failure results in 
'two erroneous conceptions, 
"ideologism": in the one case 
overestimated and in the other 
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namely "economism" and 
the mechanical causes are 
the voluntarist and in-
dividual element is given excessive importance' 
(Texier,1979: 50). 
Texier quite appropriately emphasises the importance of histori-
cal dialectics for understanding such Gramscian concepts as the 
integral state and the historical bloc as an expression of 
society's structure-superstructure relation. Introducing his 
critique of Bobbio, Texier poses three.principles for a proper 
interpretion of Gramsci's conception of society. These are 
firstly the dialectical unity of the structure and the super-
structure in Gramsci's concept of the historical bloc 
(Texier,1979: 50). The second principle relates to the different 
aspects or moments of the superstructure, i.e. of political 
society and civil society or the economico-political and ethico-
political moments, which Gramsci integrates in his dialectical 
concept of the integral state. Texier's third principle involves 
recalling that for Gramsci the unity of the structure and the su-
perstructural levels can only be a process 
'in which the sole agent is human activity in its various 
forms. This process is historical dialectics considered as a 
whole... This conception of historical dialectics throws a 
new light on the thesis of the unity of infrastructure and 
superstructure which destroys all epiphenomenalist reduction 
and all voluntarist inflation of ideology' (emphasis added) 
(Texier,1979: 52). 
I 
Texier thus rejects Bobbio's use of the terms 'active' and 
'positive' to describe Marx's concept of the base. He also 
rejects Bobbio's characterisation of Gramsci's supposed inversion 
of this notion in Marx as 'a theoretical condition of the active 
character of the superstructures' (Texier,1979: 54). Such an 
assertion, Texier argues, 'supposes a mechanistic interpretation 
of Marx himself... Knowledge of Marxism has progressed' (my 
emphasis) (Texier,1979: 54). In other words Texier rejects the 
notion of an opposition between an 'active' and 'positive' struc-
ture Q.I: superstructure, a notion which is only tenable if one 
strips the dialectic from Marx's materialist conception of his-
tory and consequently if one assumes. that 
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'the concept of "reflection" and ideological "justification" 
of what is, represents the sole content that Marx and the 




Texier is here arguing that Marx's concept of the primacy of the 
base should not be described in mechanistic terms. He does not 
substantiate this claim beyond the general and rather unsatisfac-
tory comment that modern Marxist studies have progressed, par-
ticularly in the area of dialectics, as if to suggest that this 
contentious issue has been satisfactorily resolved in the minds 
of contemporary commentators on Marx. This, as we saw in Chapte~ 
2, is far from being the case. At any rate this problematic 
aspect of Texier's argument does not invalidate his subsequent 
arguments which, we believe, are relatively uncontroversial. Thus 
Texier does not dispute Bobbio's account of the relation. between 
Marx's and Gramsci's concepts of civil society, and Bobbio's 
claim that Gramsci's concept of civil society (which did not, as 
in Marx, mean the complex of relations of production and 
exchange) unlike in Marx, was situated in the superstructure. 
Rather, he points to Bobbio's confusion of terminological 'form' 
and 'content', i.e. of a focus on matters of terminological for-
mality as opposed to substantive analysis: 
'it is theses which are at stake here and not divergences in 
terminology' (Texier,1979: 54). 
Thus Texier reminds us that Marx only sometimes (in his earlier 
works) used the term 'civil society' to designate the economic 
base of society. For Bobbio to argue on the one harid that Marx 
and Gramsci defined civil society differently, whilst at the same 
time assuming that Gramsci retained Marx's thesis of the primacy 
of civil society for the sake of the term, ascribes little more 
to Gramsci's comprehension of Marx than a formal adherence to 
terminological propriety. 
compounded by Bobbio when 
society relocated to the 
sion 'with respect to the 
This error is then, in Texier's view, 
he asserts that the primacy of civil 
superstructure implies a double inver-
usual reading of Marx and Engels' 
(Texier,1979: 53). This double inversion consisted, according to 
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Bobbie's reading of Gramsci, in the moment of civil society 
standing in a primary and subordinating relation within the com-
plex of the superstructures and. the superstructure in a primary 
and subordinating relation with respect to the base: 
'In Gramsci it is not even the complex of the 
superstructures, but, within the latter -- "the whole of 
ideologico-cultural relations", "the whole of spiritual and 
intellectual life~ ... , which is the "primary", 
"conditioning", "active" moment and thus the "real home" of 
all history' (Texier,1979: 55). 
According to Texier what is lost in Bobbie's account is thus 
Bobbie's own observation that Marx and Gramsci defined civil 
society differently. In other words Bobbie assumes the primacy of 
civil society in both Marx and Grams6i without considering the 
implications of Gramsci's explicit redefinition of civil society, 
of Gramsci's shift in terminological content, for Marxism. For if 
Gramsci did not define civil society as the complex of relations 
of production and exchange as did Marx, is it not possible that 
Gramsci utilized a term for descriptive purposes which had no th-
ing to do with any supposed repudiation of the fundamental thesis 
of historical materialism, namely that the economic base (or 
whatever one chooses to .c...a..ll. it), constituted the social rela-
tions of production, and is the basis of the historical movement? 
According to Texier, therefore, what emerges from Bobbie's ac-
count is a reduction of Marx to economism and mechanicism which 
is precisely Croce's interpretation of Marxism, an interpretation 
Gramsci refuted in some great detail as was argued above 
(Texier,1979: 55; see Morera,1990: 134-135). In short 
'Texier affirms that a determining relation exists between 
two parallel kinds of phenomena, structural and superstruc-
tural ones, which undergo a process of change and in which 
the structural ones, understood as the social relations of 
production, are primary or dominant' (Morera,1990: 135). 
Morera describes a third position regarding the relationship of 
the structure and the superstructure in Gramsci, that taken by 
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Portelli in his book Gramsci et le Bloc Historique. Morera tells 
us that Portelli argues that whilst the structure-superstructure 
relation is indeed the essential aspect in Gramsci's concept of 
the historical bloc, 
'Gramsci never conceived this study in the form of the 
primacy of one element of the bloc over the other... [what 
is essential in] the relations structure/superstructure is 
the link that realizes their· unity' (Portelli in 
Morera,1990: 135). 
This would certainly accord with Gramsci's view of the organicity 
of society, outlined above. Morera argues further that Portelli 
(and Texier) appropriately emphasise the nature of the structure-
superstructure relation as a process. This implies that the 
reflection between structure and superstructure is not an im-
mediate one. Rather it 'develops' and consequently has a temporal 
aspect 'so that the structure represents the past, while the su-
perstructure signifies the future' (Morera,1990: 136). However, 
in Morera's view Portelli does not provide an adequate account of 
the 
'dialectic of the integration and disintegration of histori-
cal blocs. It is precisely this dialectic that helps us un-
derstand the process of unity which explains the structure 
as well as causal relations between structures and 
supesrtructures' (Morera,1990: 136). 
As Sassoon argues, it was 
'Gramsci's view that the precise delineation of the connec-
tions between changes in production and the organization of 
society was determined through a struggle between rival 
hegemonies rather than predetermined by any simple causal 
relationships that leads him to substitute the notion of 
'historical bloc' for the metaphor "base and 
superstructure"' (Sassoon, 1980: 85). 
The debate regarding the proper conception of the structure-
superstructure relation in Gramsci continues, and is likely to 
remain one of the most vexing yet challenging aspects of 
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Gramsci's theory. However for the purposes of this study, and 
particularly for a discussion of Gramsci's politics in the fol-
lowing section, Morera's dual interpretation of the historical 
bloc is adopted. In its one sense the historical bloc is viewed 
by Morera as a temporal process of becoming, particularly with 
reference to the analysis of the development of the relation of 
political forces 
'from the level of the structural determination of classes 
to the development of a new state' (Morera,1990: 139). 
In addition, for Morera the historical bloc also involves the 
dialectical relation of structure and superstructures at any 
given point in time 
'within a given set of structural and superstructural 
conditions' (Morera,1990: 139). 
As Morera argues, the historical bloc can only be understood 
properly and fully if both of these dimensions are taken into 
account, 
'for we need to know both the relation that exists between 
any elements at any given point in time as well as their 
process of transformation during a historical period... Al-
though Gramsci is primarily concerned with the function of 
political intervention in social change he does not reject 
the thesis of the primacy of the structure in the last 
instance' (Morera,1990: 139). 
This latter point brings us full circle to the question of 
Gramsci's concept of politics and its relation to his concept of 
society, which will be discuseed in the following section. 
4.2 Gramsci's Concept Of Politics 
In section 3.1. it was argued that Gramsci identified and distin-
guished social classes according to the degree of development of 
their collective political consciousness. In other words, Gramsci 
proposed a definition of class based on the capacity of a social 
group for establishing an alternative hegemony in society. And he 
argued that the level of political consciousness as well as the 
capacity for establishing an alternative hegemony varies greatly 
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from class to class. This diversity of levels or modes of politi-
cal consciousness amongst social 
Gramsci's concept of organicism. 
Gramsci's notion of organic crisis, 
forces in society underlies 
To cite Sassoon's summary of 
'there is a dialectical if uneven relationship between or-
ganic contradictions in the base, and the playing out of the 
political and ideological struggle in the superstructure ... 
An organic crisis is a "given" from the point of view of a 
single moment of the class struggle but at the same time it 
is a "product" of the long-term class struggle. For Gramsci 
the organic crisis refers both to the whole historical 
period... and to the determinant moment. This latter is on 
the terrain of the political' (emphases added) 
(Sassoon,1987: 183). 
Gramsci's concept of 'organic crisis' thus has at least two im-
portant characteristics relevant both to his rejection of 
economism as well as to his development of an original concept of 
politics. Whilst organic crises originate in the long-term 
process of class struggle, it is at any one point in time (i.e. 
at the 'determinant moment') expressed by the political activity 
of the superstructural sphere. This is a crucial point, suggest-
ing that Gramsci had a dual concept of politics, i.e. politics in 
a narrow sense including 'minor', 'immediate', 'tactical' politi-
cal activity (i.e. a narrow concept of politics), but at the same 
time also a conception of politics as 
'deeply imbedded in all aspects of collective revolutionary 
struggle, beyond the actual contestation for state power 
itself; as part of the "ensemble of re lat ions", it was 
neither an epiphenomenon nor an all-pow~rful prime mover 
(Boggs,1980: 116; see Sassoon,1987: 184; Gramsci,1986: 178). 
To put it another way, Gramsci's concept of politics contains the 
dialectical distinction, in Morera's words, 
'between the long-term class conditions of historical 
development, on the one hand, and the various relations of 
forces at any given time, on the other, [which] is trans-
lated in political action as the distinction between 
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strategic goals and conjunctural or tactical political in-
tervention as it is possible at any given time' 
(Morera,1990: 157). 
But how is one to understand this duality of politics and of 
political activity in Gramsci's theory? Did he merely superimpose 
or· graft a narrow concept of the 'interventionist political 
~oment' onto the classical Marxist conception of politics as the 
process of class struggle? Or did he, as has been suggested 
above, establish a unique dialectical relation between two essen-
tially distinct concepts of politics? And if the latter, how did 
he develop this view in his theory? To understand this we must 
examine Gramsci's scattered notes on politics, beginning with his 
extended references to Machiavelli's political writings. 
4.2.l Machiavelli And 'The Modern Prince' 
Gramsci's complex understanding of politics, of political ac-
tivity and political science, quite evidently was grounded in his 
writings on Machiavelli, and in Gramsci's view of the latter's 
relation to Marx. Gramsci characterised Machiavelli's masterpiece 
of political writing, The Prince, as follows: 
'It is not a systematic treatment, but a "live" work, in 
which political ideology and political science are fused in 
the dramatic form of a "myth". Before Machiavelli, political 
science had taken the form either of the Utopia or of the 
scholarly treatise... [Machiavelli represented] the process 
whereby a given collective will, directed towards a given 
political objective, is formed ... in terms of the qualities, 
characteristics, duties and requirements of a concrete 
individual' Gramsci,1986: 125, see 172). 
This 'concrete individual' was Machiavelli's vision of a 
~ythological 'Prince·. It was concrete, therefore, in the sense 
of ·a creation of concrete fantasy' which becomes actual in the 
minds of those to whom the myth becomes consciousness, in the 
figure of the Prince who 
'acts on a dispersed and shattered people to arouse and or-
ganise its collective will. The utopian character of '.l'..h.e. 
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Prince lies in the fact that the Prince had no real histori-
cal existence; he did not present himself immediately and 
objectively to the Italian people, but was a pure theoreti-
cal abstraction a symbol of the leader and ideal 
condottiere. However, in a dramatic movement of great 
effect, the elements of passion and of myth which occur 
throughout the book are drawn together and brought to life 
in the conclusion, in the invocation of a prince who "really 
exists" ... [in which] Machiavelli merges with the people ... 
whom he... has convinced by the preceding argument -- the 
people whose consciousness and whose expression he becomes 
and feels himself to be, with whom he feels identified' 
(Gramsci,1986: 126). 
In Gramsci's view Machiavelli's notion of a 'prince' as a sym-
bolic leader was his expression of a perceived need to underscore 
the principle of the unity of political action: 
'It seems clear that Machiavelli wished to persuade [the 
progressive revolutionary] forces of the necessity of having 
a leader who knew what he wanted and how to obtain it, and 
of accepting him with enthusiasm even if his actions might 
conflict or appear to conflict with the generalised ideology 
of the time -- religion' (Gramsci,1986: 136). 
In these two quotes we see how Gramsci interpreted The Prince as 
a work outlining a radical theory of political action. In this 
work Machiavelli, in his time, provided 'a kind of "political 
manifesto"' (Gramsci,1986: 127, see 172) with general guidelines 
and pr inc ip les (the need to organise a collective wi 11 ·and to 
direct this will to accepting certain 'unpopular' acts which 
might be necessary to achieve a certain goal) for real historical 
acts of social transformation by the historically progressive 
force (i.e. the revolutionary class of the era): 
'Machiavelli's ideas were not, in his own day, purely 
"bookish"... [and his] style is not that of a systematic 
compiler of treatises ... quite the contrary; it is the style 
of a man of action, of a man urging action, the style of a 
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party manifesto' (Gramsci,1986: 134). 
The question of the political party, as the modern equivalent of 
the mythic Prince, was for Gramsci an important point of inter-
section in his conception of the relation between Machiavelli and 
Marx: 
'This theme can be developed in a two-fold study: a study of 
the real relations between the two as theorists of militant 
politics, of action; and a book which would derive from Mar-
xist doctrines an articulated system of contemporary 
politics of the Prince type. The theme would be the politi-
cal party, in its relations with the classes and the State: 
not the party as a sociological category, but the party 
which seeks to found the State' (Gramsci,1986: 123). 
This extract is immensely suggestive of important Gramscian 
themes, touching as it does on the organic link between social 
class relations, the organisational and connective function of 
the political party, and the latter's endeavours to found a 'new' 
state (see also Gramsci,1986: 267-268, 269-270). And above all it 
alludes to Gramsci's dualistic concept of politics, on the one 
hand linked to the notion of class and on the other to the super-
structural sphere of the political state (see section 4.2.2). 
It would appear that the general importance of Machiavelli for 
Gramsci's account of politics is the manner in which he saw 
Machiavelli as comprehending the need, especially in revolution-
ary periods, to establish a unifying political focus for militant 
' 
political action. For Machiavelli this was the 'mythological 
prince'. For Gramsci, on the other hand, it was the 'modern 
prince', the political party: 
'The modern prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a real 
person, a concrete individual. It can only be an organism, a 
complex element of society in which a collective will, which 
has already been recognised and has to some extent asserted 
itself in action, begins to take concrete form. History has 
already provided this organism, and it is the political 
party -- the first cell in which there come together germs 
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of collective will tending to become universal and total' 
(Gramsci,1986: 129, see 147). 
The revolutionary party accordingly has a 'long-term and organic 
character', capable of cultivating or promoting an intellectual, 
moral and cultural reform and of generating a coherent national-
popular collective will (hegemonic project) directed at the 
'founding of new States or new national and social structures' 
(Gramsci,1986: 129). The political party, in Gramsci's own words, 
'must be and cannot but be the proclaimer and organiser of 
an intellectual and moral reform, which also means creating 
the terrain for a subsequent development of the national-
popular collective will towards the realisation of a 
superior, total form of modern civilisation' (Gramsci,1986: 
132-133). 
However, cultural (intellectual and moral) reform must in each 
situation be coupled to a programme of economic reform in order 
to bring about a strengthening of the position of the subordinate 
classes in the social and economic fields; 
'indeed the programme of economic reform is precisely the 
concrete form in which every intellectual and moral reform 
presents itself' (Gramsci,1986: 133, see 263-264). 
Note Gramsci's emphasis on the organicity necessary to fundamen-
tal socio-economic reform, and on the function of the revolution-
ary party, in the process of political transformation. This, ac-
cording to Gramsci, is the great value of Marxism for a modern 
concept of politics: 
'The basic innovation introduced by the philosophy of praxis 
into the science of politics and of history is the 
demonstration that... human nature is the totality of his-
torically determined social re lat ions' ( Gramsc i, 1986: 133). 
But how is this related to Gramsci's view of the conjunctural or 
immediate forces which are actually engaged in the act of 
revolution, i.e. to the third 'moment' or 'level' of relation of 
political forces as well as the relation 6f military forces? This 
concerns the determinant moment in conjunctural or tactical 
political intervention possible under given structural 
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conditions. This question is directly related to Gramsci's dual 
concept of politics, that of the dialectic of coercion and 
consent, or force and hegemony in political activity, which 
together with the question of the sense in which Gramsci's 
original concept of politics can be described as one of 'relative 
a1itonomy', will be examined in the following section. 
4.2.2 Gramsci's Dual Concept Of Politics 
In a passage of great significance for Gramsci's concept of 
politics he utilized Machiavelli's metaphor of the 'Centaur' to 
describe the dual nature of political action: 
'Another point which needs to be defined and developed is 
the "dual perspective" in political action and in national 
life. The dual perspective can present itself on various 
levels... but these can all theoretically be reduced to two 
fundamental levels, corresponding to the dual nature of 
Machiavelli's Centaur -- half-animal and half-human. They 
are the levels of force and of consent, authority and 
hegemony, violence and civilisation, and of the individual 
moment and of the universal moment ("Church" and "State"), 
of agitation and of propaganda, of tactics and strategy, etc 
(Gramsci,1986: 169-170). 
As Laclau and Mouffe as well as Morera point out, Gramsci was not 
the first political thinker to take the dichotomy of coercion and 
consent as the basis for the analysis of politics (Laclau and 
Mouffe~1989: 7-8; Morera,1990: 164-165). We have already seen in 
the above section that Machiavelli made the (political) distinc-
tion between an organised collective will (roughly paralleling 
Gramsci's concept of hegemony as consensual politics) and the 
need at times for a political leader ('prince') to take actions 
which might be unpopular but are necessary to a given end 
(coercive politics). However as Morera and Buci-Glucksmann argue, 
for Gramsci consensual politics is more complex than the activity 
of creating popular acceptance of an existing set of social and 
political relations (Morera,1990: 165; Buci-Glucksmann,1982: 
118). In Gramsci's theory of hegemony the meaning of consensus 
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'must be found not in the apparent willingness of an in-
dividual to engage in certain activities, but rather in the 
conditions for that willingness to be present. For ... 
hegemony is not the result of the sum of individual acts of 
consent, but rather, the organization of a collective 
will... Hegemony, then, is not spontaneous, but "organized 
consensus" · (emphases added) (Morera, 1990: 165, 166). 
In other words the success of an emergent class's hegemonic 
project (i.e. creation and maintenance of its hegemony) presup-
poses an adequate organisational basis for the creation of a 
spontaneous universal consensus involving both class and non-
class forces, i.e. a national-popular collective will. The crea-
tion of a collective will therefore involves both 'conjunctural' 
(immediate) as well as 'organic' (underlying) forces. The former 
is linked to non-class forces which arise on the conjuctural ter-
rain of political activity and are therefore underdetermined by 
historical laws. The organic forces, which Morera refers to as 
the structural basis of consent (Morera,1990: 165), are linked to 
the long-term development of the economic structure, and hence 
also to the historical process of class formation. 
The achievement of a hegemonic project is contingent upon two 
further aspects, both of which have been suggested above. 
Firstly, the hegemonic p~oject depends for its success on the 
ability of the emergent class or group to forge a higher moral 
and intellectual (i.e. cultural) order which attracts potential 
allies. Secondly, the creation of a social group's or class's 
hegemony is conditional upon its capacity to show those social 
groups whose consent it requires that it is both able and willing 
to solve the problems facing that particular society. To bring 
this about the emergent hegemonic group must be able to pose 
solutions to society's problems in a progressive way. As we saw 
in section 3.1, these problems are not only those generated by 
conflictual class relations. This, Gramsci argued, is par-
ticularly true of modern industrial societies in which civil 
society is well developed and complex and in which social move-
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ments and groups operate without necessarily having a class 
basis. Indeed it was Gramsci's concept of civil society, as 
characterised also by non-class relations and interests, which 
distinguished his concept of the superstructural sphere f~om that 
of Marx~ And it was argued that Gramsci's view of the absence of 
a-~eterminate class identity in such movements or groups posed 
serious problems for the classical Marxist class analysis of 
politics. 
Simon argues that for Gramsci the priva~e organisations or as-
sociations constituting civil society have a variety of distinct 
purposes. What they have in common, however, is that they all 
'embody social practices which are associated with the as-
sumptions and values which people accept, of ten 
unconsciously ... A ruling class establishes its hegemony by 
QQmbining these YJ;!.lues and assumgtiQDS Hi th its QHD Qlass 
inte:rests and thus building a social base within civil 
society for the coercive and administrative power of the 
state' (emphasis added) (Simon,1985: 89). 
As Gramsci argued, in civil society one or more of the multi-
plicity of private associations establishes its relative or ab-
solute domination. This constitutes the 'hegemonic apparatus' of 
the dominant social group: 'the basis for the State in the narrow 
sense of the governmental-coercive apparatus' (Gramsci,1986: 264-
265, see 181-182). It is for this reason that, as Sassoon argues, 
the human or subjective political element is 'the most crucial 
because it forms the terrain upon which ultimately the element of 
force depends' (Sassoon,1987: 187; Femia,1987: 117; Gramsci,1986: 
401). Gramsci's notion 
towards his view of 
(unevenly) developing 
o~ necessary political intervention points 
the dialectical relationship between 
structural and political forces; a 
relationship which Gramsci conceived in terms of his concept of 
the historical bloc. 
The function of hegemony in society is thus two-fold. Firstly it 
is directed towards justifying and developing a spontaneous ac-
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ceptance of existing structural conditions (i.e. socio-economic 
relations) which cannot be changed without transforming society 
in its totality. Herein lies the crucial organisational and con-
nective function of the political party and the intellectuals 
which bring about their confluence of conditions. Secondly 
he-gemony is directed towards accomodating those movements, 
classes or groups with which the dominant group in society seeks 
to establish an alliance in order to control conflicts arising 
out of the ever proliferating variety of institutions, associa-
tions and movements in the private spheres of civil society 
(hence Gramsci's concept of the integral state incorporating both 
the functions of domination as well as hegemony). This, as 
Gramsci said, involves concessions and compromises, but these 
concessions and compromises are limited or circumscribed by the 
prevailing structural conditions or class-structure (see 
Gramsci,1986: 168). Under these circumstances hegemony plays a 
decisive role as the means for preserving the supremacy of the 
dominant class. Hegemony 'serves the function of unifying civil 
society so that it remains adequate for the existing socio-
economic structure' (Morera, 1990: 173; see Lac lau and 
Mouffe,1989: 7-8)). In this sense the social relationships of 
civil society constitute 
'relations of power just as much (tho~gh in a different way) 
as are the coercive relations of the state. A hegemonic 
class exercises power over subordinate classes in civil 
society in addition to the state power which it exercises 
through its predominance in the state' (Simon,1985: 72; see 
Bocock,1986: 28). 
By implication, therefore, any subordinate class wishing to chal-
lenge the power of ~ dominant class must successfully challenge 
that class's hegemony. And since this can only be done by means 
of political activity Gramsci's concept of politics is extended 
'to cover any activities which are intended to change the 
nature of the spontaneous consent which has been built up in 
civil society [i.e. hegemony] ... to cover the activity of 
changing human relationships (and the ideas implicit in 
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them) in all spheres of life' (Simon,1985: 89, 90). 
Hegemony is not spontaneous but organised consensus. However 
hegemony is also not force, 'it is not imposed: it is conquered 
through a specific and intellectual and moral dimension' (Buci-
Glucksmann, 1982: 120). 
The Marxist-Leninist concept of politics as the contestation of 
state power generated by conflicting classes is thus radically 
extended by Gramsci. Morera describes this extended dual concept 
of politics as a distinction between 
'(a) a classical Marxist view, in which the state is an in-
strument of the dominant class; and- (b) an Aristotelian view 
of politics as the science of the good life... This double 
conception of politics renders the expression "primacy of 
politics" somewhat ambiguous; for it may indeed be primary 
in the Aristotelian version, but not primary in the Marxist 
sense (Morera,1990: 161; see also Simon,1985: 91; 
Sassoon,1987: 184). 
Echoing Aristotle, Gramsci described man as a 'political being', 
since in as much as men are active, i.e. living, they contribute 
towards the modification (or preservation) of their social en-
vironment (Gramsci,1986: 265). Mankind does not passively receive 
the conditions of its existence but actively, if not always al-
together consciously, reproduces and transforms these conditions. 
In this view, therefore, man changes himself to the extent that 
he modifies the 'complex relations of which he is the hub' 
(Gramsci,1986: 352). It is in this sense that Gramsci equated the 
'real philosopher' with the politician, i.e. 
'the active man who modifies the environment, understanding 
by environment the ensemble of relations which each of us 
enters to take part in. If one's own individuality is the 
ensemble of these relations, to create one's personality 
means to acquire consciousness of them and to modify one's 
own personality means to modify the ensemble of these 
relations' (Gramsci,1986: 352). 
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However, it is apparent from the above discussion that consensual 
politics is but one aspect of Gramsci's dual concept of politics, 
the other being the coercive function of the state in its narrow 
historical sense, which Gramsci termed political society. In the 
above discussion we have emphasised that for Gramsci the range of 
pri1itical activity is limited by society's class-structure which 
is a 'given': 
'Hence, politics is linked to coercion, to power understood 
as the supremacy of one class over the other, or of one 
group over another' (Morera,1990: 174). 
This is the sense in which for Gramsci politics is limited by 
structural conditions and relations, 
'real historical processes which give rise to possibilities 
within power structures or class structures which, in the 
long run, set the limits of any conscious intervention 
designed to change society' (Morera,1990: 175). 
But this is only one sense or dimension of politics; there is 
also the other dimension of effective political interests. 
Politics, on the one hand, is limited by the dialectical long-
term causal determination of the structural sphere, but on the 
other hand Gramsci recognises the efficacy of subjective politi-
cal forces on this terrain of socio-economic transformation. 
Gramsci himself provides the most succinct expression of the 
dialectical relationship between politics and economics: 
'Politics becomes permanent action and gives birth to per-
manent organisations precisely in so far as it identifies 
itself with economics. But it is also distinct from it, 




speak separately of economics and 
of "political passion" as of an im-
mediate impulse to action which is born on the . "permanent 
and organic'' terrain of economic life but which transcends 
it, bringing into play emotions and aspirations in whose in-
candescent atmosphere even calculations involving the in-
dividual human life itself obey different laws from those of 
individual profit, etc' (Gramsci,1986: 139-140). 
And furthermore that at 
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'certain moments, the automatic thrust due to the economic 
factor is slowed down, obstructed or even momentarily broken 
by traditional ideological elements -- hence... there must 
be a conscious, planned struggle to ensure that the ex-
igencies of the economic position of the masses, which may 
conflict with the traditional leadership's policies, are 
understood' (Gramsci,1986: 168). 
And in order to 'liberate the economic thrust from the dead 
weight of traditional policies' (Gramsci,1986: 168), there is a 
need for an appropriate initiative in the political sphere. This 
initiative is instrumental in changing the political direction of 
the forces which must be 'absorbed if a new, homogeneous 
politico-economic historical bloc, without internal 
contradictions, is to be successfully formed' (Gramsci,1986: 
168). 
This is the sense in which Gramsci interpreted Machiavelli's 
notion of political action, the 'assertion implicit in his. writ-
ings that politics is an autonomous activity, with its own prin-
ciples and laws' (Gramsci,1986: 134). Thus although it is correct 
to say that Gramsci emphasised 'unity', both in terms of revolu-
tionary action under the leadership of a revolutionary party in 
addition to a unified theoretical focus of the processes charac-
terising the socio-economic and political transformation of 
society, as a precondition of effective political revolution, his 
concept of politics cannot be reduced to one or the other of its 
dialectically related constituent parts. It therefore makes no 
sense to impose an extraneous categorisation on Gramsci's theory 
of politics which can only be arrived at on the basis of a narrow 
or partial interpretation of his texts. Partisan interpretations 
of Gramsci's considerable contribution to Marxism, and to politi-
cal theory more generally, is not a re-assertion of 'Leninism' or 
an insipient 'post-Marxism'. A selective or symptomatic reading 
of Gramsci offers rich pickings for lenient interpreters and 
'true-believers'. Yet such attempts to impoverish Gramsci's 
legacy must be resisted since it is these tendencies which have 
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so often imposed artificial constraints on his contribution to 
Marxism. Gramsci's was an original attempt to rescue historical 
materialism from its growing vulgarisation in the hands of 
political opportunists. 
Iri-our concluding chapter we will discuss the main implications 




The purpose of this concluding chapter is to analyse Gramsci's 
pluralist concept of politics as a contribution to the possible 
rehewal of a democratic perspective in the Marxist tradition 
which, as Laclau and Mouffe argue, has failed to create 'organic 
forms of unity' between itself and democratic practice (Laclau 
and Mouffe,1989: 149). 
In Chapter 1 we argued that the development of Western political 
theory has to a great extent proceeded against the background of 
the themes of political unitarianism and pluralism which were al-
ready clearly articulated in the works of Plato and Aristotle. 
Our discussion in Chapter 1 contrasted Plato's unitary concepts 
of the state and politics with Aristotle's political pluralism, 
indicating the significance of their contrasting perspectives for 
their notions of democracy. Aristotle's early political pluralism 
was then compared to the classical concept of politics in modern 
liberal pluralism. As against this we showed in what way Plato's 
unitary concepts of the state and politics influenced the tradi-
tions of Hegelian and Marxist political thought, highlighting the 
distinct yet related Hegelian and Marxist critiques of liberal 
pluralism. We argued that both Hegel and Marx rejected the 
liberal notion of democracy, describing it as a mere formal com-
mitment to a notion of bourgeois political rights as the basis 
for institutional and state forms which were devoid of real, 
socio-economic democratic content. In Chapter 1 we also high-
lighted Marx's rejection of Hegelian idealism, and described the 
young Marx's decisive break with the Young Hegelians, and espe-
cially with Feuerbach's radical humanism, in his transition to a 
more original and mature stage in his political thought. 
Chapter 2 outlined the gradual emergence of Marx's distinctive 
concepts of the state and politics in terms of some of his key 
earlier works which culminated in The German Ideology, which con-
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tained the first formulation of historical materialism. We con-
cluded our description of historical materialism with a summary, 
of its main implications for the concepts of the state and 
politics. It was argued that Marx rejected the liberal notion of 
politics, which in his view was based on class differences, as 
w~il as the liberal bourgeois concept of the state as a regulator 
of conflictual classes and divergent interests. Marx argued that 
the state is a classbound institution and that in capitalist 
society the state acts at the behest of the bourgeoisie, i.e. the 
dominant class in the sphere of production. For Marx the 
democratisation of society must involve the restoration of the 
direct producer's control over the means of production and the 
elimination of divisive class relations. This, he argued, was 
only possible if the bourgeois state is smashed, since it acts in 
the interests of the dominant class which would naturally oppose 
a radical process of socioeconomic and, hence, political 
democratisation. In the final part of Chapter 2 we provided a 
brief account of the development of historical materialism in the 
Marxist orthodoxy of the Second and Third Internationals. In the 
course of that discussion we emphasised the split between the 
German Social Democrats, such as Karl Kautsky and Georgi 
Plekhanov, and the 'radicals' Lenin, Luxemburg, Trotsky and 
Stalin. The strongly economistic and gradualist views prevalent 
in the German Social Democratic Party, which led to the split, 
were characterised by a tendency to regard the democratic par-
liamentary systems of Western Europe as a means by which to 
realise an incremental socialisation of society. The Social 
Democrats generally eschewed Marx's notion of the need to smash 
the state and, in stark contrast to Lenin, regarded existing 
democratic institutions as a viable arena for the pursuit of 
socialist goals. As against this we outlined Lenin's theory of 
the state and politics which in many respects constituted a 
development of Marx's own views. The course of the Russian 
Revolution and the consequences of Stalinism were contrasted with 
Trotsky's critique of what he regarded as a vulgarisation· of 
revolutionary aims and a tyranny of means. Hie views are perhaps 
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best captured in the following passage: 
'The party organisation substitutes itself for the party, 
the central committee substitutes itself for the 
organisation, and, finally, a "dictator" substitutes himself 
for the central committee' (Trotsky,1986: 79). 
Our discussion in Chapter 3 centred on Gramsci's concepts of 
hegemony and the integral state as distinguished from the in-
strumentalist concept of the state in Marxism-Leninism. It was 
argued that Gramsci's concept of hegemony had a dual meaning. On 
the one hand it referred to the phased development of the politi-
cal consciousness of a social class or group, and on the other 
hand it was used by Gramsci to describe civil society1as the 
arena of consensual politics, i.e. of hegemony building. On the 
other hand it was argued that Gramsci's concept of the integral 
state involved a significant broadening of Marx's concept of the 
state. For Gramsci the concept of the state included not only the 
governmental substructure of society, i.e. the narrow concept of 
the state which Gramsci referred to as political society, but 
also his concept of civil society, the sphere of hegemonic 
politics. 
In Chapter 4, Gramsci's concepts of hegemony and the integral 
state were related to his radical critique of the economism of 
Marxist orthodoxy. It was argued that Gramsci's rejection of 
economism involved two elements. On the one hand he abandoned a 
narrowly instrumentalist concept of the state. And on the other 
Gramsci rejected the reductionist concept of politics dominant in 
Second and Third International Marxism. Instead, Gramsci posited 
a dualistic concept of politics. A key to this concept was 
Gramsci's recognition that popular democratic struggles do not 
necessarily have a class character, i.e. for Gramsci not all 
agents of political activity arose on the basis of society's 
production relations. And in Gramsci's view the formation of so-
cial groups without direct links to class-structure constituted 
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the terrain of political intervention. Furthermore, private in-
stitutions in the sphere of civil society may be formed indepen-
dently from coercive state structures which are located in 
political society. Nevertheless, on this view the efficacy of 
conscious political intervention is, in the final instance, 
limited or circumscribed by existing class relations and power 
structures. Thus popular democratic forces, as against social 
classes, may function with a relatively high degree of autonomy 
but do not function independently of the effects of class rule. 
In the era of the mass proliferation of private institutions in 
civil society the state must, in Morera's words, 
'change its relation to private institutions, for it can no 
longer dominate them and overcome conflicts in an easy way. 
The potential for conflict must be transformed into or-
ganized consensus; conflict must be contained within the 
limits of permissible opposition' (Morera,1990: 163). 
This reflects Gramsci's view that increased state intervention in 
the modern era cannot be based on coercion alone but in par-
ticular must involve an extension of the ruling class's hegemony. 
Furthermore, although opposition forces might function with a 
relative degree of autonomy, they cannot escape the effects which 
class rule have on their ability to intervene in a politically 
effective manner. Revolutionary strategy must therefore be based 
on a correct understanding of the potential of and the limita-
tions on effective political intervention. In this sense 
Gramsci's concept of the state and politics is more adequate 
(than, for example, that found in Lenin) for a Marxist account of 
the complex social structure and political processes of advanced 
capitalist societies. The focus of Gramsci's analysis of politics 
may be likened to what Laclau and Mouffe describe as a 'new 
situation' in which the very identity of the forces engaged in 
political struggle is constantly shifting, necessitating a con-
tinuoris revaluation of agents involved in the political process 
(Laclau and Mouffe,1989: 151). As Sassoon argues, with reference 
to the novel relationship between the state and society in the 
advanced stages of capitalism, 
217 
as the state intervenes in all aspects of peoples' lives, 
old notions of the division between economics and politics, 
between public and the private are open to discussion' 
(Sassoon,1980: 82). 
Gramsci's major contribution lies is his particular conception of 
this new situation which, as we argued, is located in his ~x­
tended critique of economism and the pluralistic perspective 
which this brought to Marxism. We are now in a position to inves-
tigate the question of the relation between Gramsci's integral 
concept of the state and his broadening of the reductionist or-
thodox Marxist concept of politics on the one hand, and his no-
tion of democracy on the other. 
Gramsci described the division between rulers and ruled as a 
'primordial fact' of politics: 
'The first element of politics is that there really do exist 
rulers and ruled, leaders and led. The entire science and 
art of politics are based on this primordial, and (given 
certain general conditions) irreducible fact' (Gramsci,1986: 
144). 
However Gramsci argued that these 'given' conditions are histori-
cal and therefore potentially transient: 
'One premiss is fundamental: is it the intention that there 
should always be rulers and ruled, or is the objective to 
create the conditions in which this division is no longer 
necessary [i.e.] the belief that this division is only an 
historical fact, corresponding to certain conditions?' 
(Gramsci,1986: 144). 
Adopting the latter view Gramsci accorded the revolutionary 
political party (and 'organic' intellectuals) the task of over-
coming these historically determined conditions and to found a 
new type of state' (Gramsci,1986: 147). Sassoon rightly argues 
that in the context of modern societies in which social and or-
ganisational pluralism is highly developed, the expansive task 
which Gramsci accorded the party is unrealistic (Sassoon,1987: 
XV). Nevertheless, the central role which the political party 
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played in Gramsci's conception of revolutionary politics (whether 
it be the party of the hegemonic and dominant social group or 
that of its socialist opposition) should not be interpreted as an 
invocation of party tyranny. Gramsci's views both on Italy's Fas-
cist Party as well as his critique of Stalin's Communist Part~ 
attest to this. Thus, for example, in a series of comments in the 
SEJ:i Gramsci rejected the notion of a 'democratic' one-party 
state, i.e. the reduction of the state's organisation to the form 
of the party, thus implicitly re-affirming his political 
pluralism: 
'In countries where there is a single, totalitarian, govern-
ing party ... the functions of such a party are no longer 
directly political, but merely technical ones of propaganda 
and public order, and moral and cultural influence. The 
political function is indirect. For, even if no other legal 
parties exist, other parties in fact always do exist and 
other tendencies which cannot be legally coerced... in such 
[totalitarian] parties cultural functions predominate, which 
means that political language becomes jargon. In other 
words, political questions are disguised as cultural ones, 
and as such become insoluble' (Gramsci,1986: 149). 
This passage contains two important general points relating to 
Gramsci's pluralism. Firstly, Gramsci criticised all forms of 
dictatorial party rule. Commenting on this passage Sassoon says: 
'A critique of fascism, yes, but also of Stalinism' 
(Sassoon,1987: 231). Secondly, this passage indicates that for 
Gramsci the political (and cultural) life of societies with one-
party dictatorships becomes merely mechanistic and formal, i.e 
impoverished. In such societies the masses 
'have no other political function than a generic loyalty, of 
a military kind, to a visible or invisable political 
centre ... The mass following is simply for 'manoeuvre', and 
is kept happy by means of moralising sermons, emotional 
stimuli, and messianic myths of an awaited golden age, in 
which present contradictions and miseries will be automati-
cally resolved and made we 11' ( Grams·c·i, 1986: 150). 
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As against this Gramsci emphasised that the socialist transforma-
tion of a society depends for its success on the extent to which 
the political process of that society is democratised. In 
Gramsci, as Sassoon argues, 
'the very activity of politics, of State activity in the 
widest sense is no longer separated from society but becomes 
an aspect of the lives of the whole population' 
(Sassoon,1987: 223). 
In other words for Gramsci politics and political activity in an 
integral socialist state was not limited to the traditional 
political sphere located in the governmental sub-structures of 
political society. Politics must be based on widespread consensus 
in the sphere of civil society. Conformism extracted by means of 
the coercive power of political society cannot be substituted for 
hegemony. However, for Gramsci politics 
'defined as hegemonic activity cementing an historical bloc 
around the universalistic vocation of the dominant class 
degenerates into a version of the passive revolution in 
which the economic-corporative interests of sections of 
society ... are articulated. In a very contradictory manner, 
the State and that party which claims moral, ethical leader-
ship in the absence of a pluralism of political and cultural 
forces, remains on the terrain of coercion and economic-
corporativism' (Sassoon,1987: 224). 
Thus although Gramsci argued that every political party is the 
expression of a particular social group (Gramsci,1986: 148), he 
nevertheless regarded 'arbitration' or mediation as a key func-
tion of any political party seeking to establish a new (working 
class) state based not on coercion but rather on an alternative 
hegemony: 
'certain parties represent a single social group precisely 
in so far as they exercise a balancing and arbitrating func-
tion between the interests of their group and those of other 
groups, and succeed in securing the development of the group 
which they represent with the consent and assistance of the 
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allied groups -- if not out and out with that of groups 
which are definitely hostile' (Gramsci,1986: 148). 
The central function of the party, therefore, 
coherent strategy, to act as a 'collective 
developing alternative conceptions to 
is to formulate a 
intellectual' by 
those existing in 
ca-pi ta list society, alternative conceptions which are directed 
towards social transformation brought about by the broad mass of 
the population under the hegemony of the working class. The new 
state form which emerges from this process thus reflects an his-
torical bloc constituted of a diversity of forces not all of whom 
are concentrated in any single party or combination of parties 
(Sassoon,1980: 87). 
Gramsci emphasised that, in order to be 'progressive', working 
class parties must take on a democratic form. Thus despite the 
fact that parties have a policing function, i.e. 'the function of 
safeguarding a certain political and legal order', the nature of 
the party bears on the 'means and the procedures by which such a 
function is carried out' (Gramsci,1986: 154-155). In assessing 
the nature of parties it must be established whether their pur-
pose is one of progressive dissemination or of reactionary 
repression: 
'It is progressive when it tends to keep the dispossessed 
reactionary forces within the bounds of legality, and to 
raise the backward masses to the level of the new legality. 
It is regressive when it tends to hold back the vital forces 
of history and to maintain a legality which has been 
superseded, which is anti-historical, which has become 
extrinsic' (Gramsci,1986: 155). 
Gramsci laid great store by the implications which the internal 
functioning of the party has for the greater society, and the new 
state form towards which it must wor~. He argued that parties are 
progressive when they function according to the principles of 
democratic centralism, 
terms of bureaucratic 
and regressive ·when they are organised in 
centralism. Gramsci characterised the 
second form of party as a 'si~ple, unthinking executor' which 
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amounts to a policing organism. Reference to it as a political 
party 'is simply a metaphor of a mythological character' 
(Gramsci,1986: 155) 
As suggested, Gramsci extended his description of the internal 
functioning of political parties to characterise the relationship 
between leaders and their mass following as the basis of politi-
cal life, drawing a distinction between organic unity and mere 
uniformity. Conscious of the dangers which bureaucratisation pose 
for the vitality and coherence of the workers' movement and it~ 
party, Gramsci vehemently rejected bureaucratic centralism. He 
argued for democratic centralism: 
'"organicity can only be found in democratic centralism, 
which is so to speak a "centralism" in movement -- i.e. a 
continual adaptation of the organisation to the real 
movement. . . [which] does not so 1 id ify mechanically in to 
bureaucracy' (Gramsci,1986: 188-189). 
In one of the .s..E.li's most eloquent passages Gramsci's conception 
of democratic centralism is explicitly connected with the view 
that political action must be consciously directed towards 'true' 
social transformation: 
'Democratic centralism... consists in the critical pursuit 
of what is identical in seeming diversity of form and on the 
other hand of what is distinct and even opposed in apparent 
uniformity, in order to organise and interconnect closely 
that which is similar ... This continuous effort to separate 
out the "international" and "unitary" element in national 
and local reality is true concrete political action ... It 
requires an organic unity between theory and practice, be-
tween intellectual strata and popular masses, between rulers 
and ruled .. ~ whereas... in the bureaucratic conception ... 
there is no unity but a stagnant swamp, on the surface calm 
and "mute", and no federation but a "sack of potatoes", i.e. 
a mechanical juxtaposition of single "units" without any 
connection between them' (Gramsci,1986: 190). 
Laclau and Mouffe provide a characterisation of democracy based 
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on Gramsci's notion of organic unity. They argue that democracy 
faces two dangers. On the one hand there is the totalitarian 
'attempt to pass beyond the constitutive character of antagonism 
and deny plurality in order to restore unity'. However there 'is 
also a symmetrically opposite danger of a lack of all reference 
to this unity' (Laclau and Mouffe,1989: 188). Unity cannot be 
imposed. Rather, it involves identifying and articulating 
positions, values and interests which social subjects hold in 
common as the basis for constructing a dynamic unity: 
'Between the logic of complete identity and that of pure 
difference, the experience of democracy should consist of 
the recognition and the multiplicity of social logics along 
with the necessity of their articulation. But this articula-
tion should be constantly re-created and renegotiated, and 
there is no final point at which a balance will be defini-
tively achieved' (Laclau and Mouffe,1989: 188). 
Gramsci's notion of organic unity is the basis for his view of 
the true end of social transformation, i.e. the 'withering away' 
of political society. And in Gramsci's view, the Marxist doctrine 
of the state conceived political society as 'tendentially capable 
of withering away·, i.e. that it 
'is possible to imagine the coercive element of the State 
withering away by degrees, as ever-more conspicuous elements 
of regulated society (or ethical State or civil society) 
make their appearance' (my emphasis) (Gramsci,1986: 263). 
Gramsci argued that it is only once political society has been 
subsumed into civil society that the 'coming of a regulated 
society', that is the formation of a communist society, could be 
complete (Gramsci,1986: 382, see 257f). 
The crisis in Marxist political theory today has been brought 
about by its failure to make the transition into a sustainable 
form of political practice in what used to be called 'real exist-
ing socialism'. This has been vividly demonstrated by the col-
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lapse of Soviet Communism, which for most of our century has been 
the focal point and measure of this practice. The reasons for 
communism's disintegration may symptomatically be traced to this 
or that decision, some development or other,' etc .. Thus one may 
rest with the observation that communism:s Post-War political 
-.... 
development has shown that Stalinism's underlying despotic prin-
ciple was never truly expunged from the political ethic of the 
Soviet Union and its extensive, global sphere of influence. The 
most sustained and systematic critique of Stalinism in the Post-
war period took place amongst a core group of Marxist intellec-
tuals and political movements in Western Europe. Though there 
were reapeated attempts in Eastern European countries such as 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, to initiate a democratisation 
of their ossified communist systems, these projects failed. Coer-
cive Soviet intervention certa1nly played a large role in this 
failure. However, besides the highly visible failure of Soviet 
style politics, the far more important general failure in Marxism 
remains its seeming inability to evolve democratic forms of 
political practice. 
Communism's teleology for too long paraded, by doctrinal 
implication, as the reason for coerced 'unity' in the face of 
bourgeois 'reaction', or whatever happened at the time to be the 
favoured slogan for liberal democracy. In other words, a 
precariously balanced holding action was maintained between the 
need and pressure to democratise communist societies and the 
lingering sense that the West would self-destruct, given time. 
Consequently the Soviet Union and its allies never abandoned the 
erroneous assumption that Western states were incapable of in-
stituting radical incremental reforms to effectively address the 
particular social, economic and political problems which they 
have faced since World War II. Furthermore, the ruling Soviet 
elite never quite abandoned the reductionist Stalinist view that 
Western Social Democractic parties were by definition unwitting 
tools of bourgeois hegemony. In this regard the German Social 
Democratic Party's alignment with imperial militarism in 1914 
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must surely have contributed towards the institutionalisation of 
Stalin's professed abhorrence of Social Democracy. However, 
Stalin's reductionist analysis of Inter-War Western European his-
tory and politics, coupled to his genocidal practices, had the 
long term consequence of precluding the possibility of sig-
nificant gains for Post-War Soviet communist ideology in Western 
Europe. A belated recognition of this surfaced with Mikhael 
Gorbachev's rise to power. Still, his November 1989 decision to 
allow the dismantling of the Berlin Wall amounted to the end of 
Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe as well as the Post-War world 
order. 
Marxism today cannot avoid the challenging task of 'rethinking 
Marx's thought' if the entire tradition is not to recede into 
obscurity or retreat into oblivion. Such a reassessment of Mar-
xism will have to take into account certain identifiable global 
trends which have begun to emerge in the aftermath of the Cold 
War. The international political scene is charactersied by acute 
volatility. This is perhaps an unavoidable aspect of fundamental 
shifts and ruptures in the socio-economic and political spheres 
of the lives of billions of people. Particularly in Europe, al-
though certainly not only there, there is in every dimension of 
life growing disaffection with past practices and norms. Amongst 
Western European~ there is a general abhorrence of Marxism as 
well as a growing tendency to question the efficacy of liberal 
democracy in conditions of increasing intolerance and economic 
malaise. In Eastern Europe social and political life is consumed 
by parochial national and ethnic concerns. This in particular is 
a development which threatens the stability not only of Europe 
but of the entire world community. Ominously, in many European 
regions fascism and national socialism are re-emerging and enjoy 
ever growing support at grass-roots level. Concomittantly, a 
recent poll revealed the somewhat startling fact that as opposed 
to 29% in 1989, today 45% of Russians regard Stalin as a ·great 
leader'. These trends are not good reasons for a reversion to 
either Hitlerism or Stalinism. Yet they reveal elementary forces 
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which are operating in European society. And these may be linked 
to the widespread failure of European leaders and political 
parties to understand and hence address even the most basic con-
cerns of the broader population. Political decisions are to an 
ever increasing extent being taken on the basis of a dangerous 
conflation of transient sentiment and reaction on the one hand, 
and conviction and prudence on the other. In other words a 
profound disjucture is emerging between leaders and led. The fu-
ture success (and survival) of political movements, globally, 
depends on their capacity to demonstrate, in concrete ways, their 
ability to meet the crisis of confidence head on and to reassert 
positive leadership in accordance with a coherent and workable 
vision. It is in this transitional environment that motives for 
Gramsci's fundamental concern with the organic link between 
political parties, intellectuals and mass followings become once 
again the deciding factor in political life. Given the degenera-
tion of historical hegemonies and the widespread disenchantment 
with past and existing democratic practices, Gramsci provides us 
with a way to think a new Weltanschauunt and to begin working, 
towards its realisation. Dogmatism and nostalgia have no place in 
this crucial process. 
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